DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 400 700 FL 024 180

AUTHOR	Bouton, Lawrence F., Ed.
TITLE	Pragmatics and Language Learning. Monograph Series Volume 7.
INSTITUTION	Illinois Univ., Urbana. Div. of English as an International Language.
PUB DATE	96
NOTE	219p.; For individual papers, see FL 024 181-191.
AVAILABLE FROM	Pragmatics and Language Learning, English as an International Language, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 3070 Foreign Languages Building, 707 South Mathews Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801 ($12).
PUB TYPE	Collected Works - General (020)
EDRS PRICE	MF01/PC09 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	Chinese; College Faculty; College Students; Communication Apprehension; Contrastive Linguistics; Discourse Analysis; English (Second Language); *Intercultural Communication; Interpersonal Communication; *Language Patterns; Language Research; Linguistic Theory; Metacognition; Metaphors; North American English; *Pragmatics; Russian; Second Language Instruction; Second Language Learning; *Second Languages; Sociocultural Patterns; Special Education; Teacher Student Relationship; *Writing (Composition); Written Language
IDENTIFIERS	Requests

ABSTRACT

Papers on aspects of pragmatics include: "Pragmatics and Language Learning" (Lawrence F. Bouton); "Pragmatics and Language Teaching: Bringing Pragmatics and Pedagogy Together" (Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig); "Cross-Cultural Communication and Interlanguage Pragmatics: American vs. European Requests" (Jasone Cenoz, Jose F. Valencia); "'At Your Earliest Convenience:' A Study of Written Student Requests to Faculty" (Beverly S. Hartford, Bardovi-Harlig); "Cross-Cultural Differences in American and Russian General Conventions of Communication" (Yuliya B. Kartalova); "Foregrounding the Role of Common Ground in Language Learning" (Sara W. Smith, Andreas H. Jucker); "The Pragmatics of Uncertainty" (Noriko Tanaka); "Sociocultural Dimensions on Voice in Non-Native Language Writing" (Linda A. Harklau, Sandra R. Schecter); "Metadiscourse and Text Pragmatics: How Students Write After Learning about Metadiscourse" (Margaret S. Steffensen, Xiaoguang Cheng); "Underproduction Does Not Necessarily Mean Avoidance: Investigation of Underproduction Using Chinese ESL Learners" (Jiang Li); and "Contextual Thinking about Teaching: Special Educators' Metaphorical Representations of Practical Knowledge" (Mark P. Mostert). (MSE)

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Pragmatics And Language Learning

Monograph Series Volume 7 1996

ED 400 700

Lawrence F. Bouton

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Pragmatics and Language Learning
Monograph Series

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

Pragmatics and Language Learning consists of papers selected each year from those presented at the annual conference sponsored by the Division of English as an International Language and the Intensive English Institute at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The general theme of this conference each year is on the interaction of pragmatics (including) discourse analysis and conversation analysis) with the teaching and/or learning of a second or foreign language (especially English) in either formal or informal surroundings. Individuals papers may be focused on any of the following related topics:

1. the contribution of pragmatics to our understanding of what we mean by communicative competence
2. research into specific facts of English discourse
3. contrastive pragmatics
4. analysis of the discourse patterns found in the language classroom

The purpose of both the conference and this monograph series is to serve as a forum for research into the pragmatics of the language learning process and to encourage the interaction of scholars involved in pragmatics and in language pedagogy in a common effort to increase the level of communicative competence achieved in the language classroom.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

Pragmatics and Language Learning is published once each year in the spring. Copies can be obtained at a cost of $12.00 each by writing to:

Editors
Pragmatics and Language Learning
English as an International Language
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
3070 Foreign Languages Building
707 South Mathews Avenue
Urbana, Illinois 61801
U.S.A.

Pragmatics and Language Learning

Volume 7
1996

Editor

Lawrence F. Bouton

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Intensive English Institute
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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Pragmatics and Language Learning
Monograph Series Volume 7 1996

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INTRODUCTION

The papers in this volume have been divided into four groups which might be subtitled 1) pragmatics and language teaching, 2) pragmatic aspects of human interaction, 3) the analysis of written discourse, and 4) pragmatics and second language learning.

The first of these, Bouton's *Pragmatics and Language Learning*, attempts to demonstrate three general ways in which pragmatics is crucial to any attempt to assist students in their learning of a language. Bouton's first example is based on the assumption that what pragmatics has to offer to language pedagogy is no better than the research from which it is derived. He also assumes that cross-cultural research into the pragmatics of a student's native and target languages is essential to our perception of what our students must learn as they work to increase their communicative competence. These two assumptions point to the importance of rigorous cross-cultural research as one contribution that pragmatics can make to language pedagogy. Yet significant doubts have been raised in the past few years of the validity of much of the cross-cultural research in recent years because of the weakness of the devices designed to assure that the subjects from the different cultures perceive the situations to which they must respond in the same way. With this in mind, one of the most important things that pragmatics can contribute to language pedagogy today is the development of research techniques that will provide results on which teachers can rely with confidence as they develop materials and teach their classes. And so the first example of what pragmatics can give to language pedagogy involves one person's rigorously worked out strategies for guaranteeing that the situations used in cross-cultural research are, in fact, perceived in the same way by subjects from both cultures. For his second illustration of the bond between pragmatics and language teaching, he briefly describes his own work with implicatures. Beginning with the need to identify different types of implicatures that proved difficult to nonnative speakers of English (NNS), he moved from there to an investigation of how rapidly those NNS learned to interpret different types of implicatures effectively under the normal situation in which they receive no instruction focused directly on helping them develop the skills they need to do so. Finally, he compares the progress made by those NNS with that of others who did receive formal instruction designed to make them aware of implicatures, to help them realize that they have implicatures in their own languages, too, and to give them some practice at developing and using them in English. The result was somewhat mixed, but did show beyond a doubt that some types of implicatures that are quite hard to learn to use without explicit instruction are quite easy to learn with it. Then, in closing, Bouton offers one example of how much difference there can be between the treatment of a speech act in an otherwise excellent ESL text and in the literature describing that speech act from data based on the analysis of actual conversation. This difference, he concludes, suggests the need for both pragmatics researchers and language educators to become more aware of the need for them to work together if language pedagogy is to derive the considerable benefits that real cooperation between the two fields would provide.

Bardovi-Harlig, in *Pragmatics and Language Teaching: Bringing Pragmatics and Pedagogy Together*, develops a theme similar to that of Bouton, but in more detail and with a focus more directly on the language classroom. She argues that interlanguage is, in effect, a needs assessment establishing the importance of pragmatics to the process of language teaching. "Learners show significant differences from native speakers in the execution of certain speech acts and in conversational functions such as greetings and leave takings," she argues. "[Even] a learner of high grammatical proficiency will not necessarily show concomitant pragmatic competence." From this basic premise, Bardovi-Harlig goes on to divide the problems that often plague even advanced NNS into four sets and provides an example of each: problems with knowing what speech acts are appropriate to what contexts; problems with finding the right form in which to express a speech act; problems in selecting a semantic formula appropriate to a particular speech act; and, finally, problems in giving the semantic formula the type of content that it should have.

After providing examples of each of these pitfalls facing the NNS, the author turns to the importance of different types of pragmatic input to the learning process. In discussing the contribution of ESL texts to this input, she notes one in which the author provides the learner with several alternative ways of carrying out a speech act, but provides absolutely no information about the types of situation to which each of those variants is appropriate -- why speakers might be constrained to choose one form over another because of who their interlocutors were, how much of an imposition a request was, etc. Throughout her paper, the author draws on her own experience and on the literature to provide excellent examples of what needs to be done, what has been done well, and what still needs doing. And, she concludes, "There is clearly a meaningful task for everyone interested in working on pragmatics, whether your specialty is second language acquisition, materials development, innovations in language teaching, methods, classroom oriented research; whether you are a researcher, teacher educator, or language teacher; whether the language you teach is English, Italian, Japanese or Kiswahili." Taken together, these first two papers make an extremely strong case for what has been over the years the central theme of the series of conferences on pragmatics and language learning from which the papers in this monograph series are annually selected -- the need, in Bardovi-Harlig's words "[to] bring pragmatics and pedagogy together, together."

The second group of papers are those focusing on different facets of interaction. Starting things off is a paper by Bardovi-Harlig and Hartford, *At Your Earliest Convenience: A Study of Written Student Requests to Faculty*. This paper is unusual in two way. First, the speech act that it investigates appears in written form; and second, it provides evidence of the positive or negative impact of the different forms in which the speech act was couched. It also notes that NNS were less successful in getting what they were asking for and links that lack of success to the form and substance that they chose to use in making the request. Nicely supported by authentic data, this paper is an excellent example of the type of effective research that is so necessary to the effectiveness of communication oriented language teaching.

In her *Cross-cultural communication and interlanguage pragmatics: American vs. European requests*\, Cenoz first provides us with an excellent review of the literature relevant to speech acts and then reports on her study of Americans and Europeans using the DCT as they attempt to learn English and Spanish. With regard to the English of European NNS, while the author finds that certain features of that language approximate that of British English, others seem to be "typically associated with nonnative requesting behavior." And, she argues, given the widespread use of English by Europeans, for many of whom English is a second, third or fourth language, "nonnative European English could be regarded as a *deviation* rather than a *mistake*." This same issue seems to come up with Spanish, since the extent to which the Spanish speakers use indirectness when speaking Spanish seems to run counter to results for Argentinean Spanish speakers. Because of these variations in both the English and the Spanish of some of the speakers in this study, the author argues that there is a need to rethink the issue as to what type of pragmatic competence should be the norm for speakers in various geographical or national contexts. And finally, when the author compares the requests by learners of Spanish and of English, she notes several differences, including those related to their relative directness of expression and their use of down graders.

Kartalova's *Cross-cultural differences in American and Russian general conventions of communication* takes a broader perspective as it focuses on a wide variety of similarities and differences in cultural background that lead to success or failure in interactions between Russians and Americans. Her approach is "to explore how aspects of culture and its institutions are encoded symbolic meanings of 16 cultural themes. Her subjects were Russian and American university exchange students who had lived in the other country. "The findings show that there are indeed marked differences in the symbolic meanings of all six themes." Because of the confusion and misunderstanding these differences caused in the visitors to the other country in each case, the author argues that there is a need for raising the consciousness of individuals planning to live or interact with people from other cultures, "to combine linguistic instruction with explicit discussion of cultural assumptions, values and etiquette norms of the target language culture as compared to the learner's own cultural and individual assumptions and views." The idea is not entirely new, but it is couched in different terms and supported by plentiful evidence that simply has not been available in the literature up to now. Given the fact that it is also persuasively written, it is highly interesting and well worth reading.

In an especially nice paper, *The pragmatics of uncertainty*, Tanaka starts with the early and somewhat primitive understanding of speech acts by Austin and Searle, moves on through a description of the growth of the concept in the work of Gordon and Lakoff, Levinson, and Leech, before arriving at Thomas's introduction of the claim that a speech act can be *ambivalent*. And finally, she demonstrates that that concept, too, must be extended, showing that there are two different types of ambivalence -- *ambivalence-strategic* and *ambivalence-genuine*. Tanaka's style of argument is "to explore different cases of ambivalence and to consider what factors make them different." Having described and illustrated these subtypes of ambivalence, Tanaka goes on to show how they can cause confusion if the perception as to which type of ambivalence is involved in a particular utterance is not the same in the mind of the speaker and that of the listener. Situations like this, Tanaka refers to as *mismatches*. They are especially likely, she says, if the interlocutors are from different cultures with different world views. However, having noted the possibility that ambivalence can become an obstacle to communication, especially to cross cultural communication, Tanaka professes optimism about the chances of people from different cultures learning to interact effectively and sees even the mismatches as positive, educational experiences. But her paper does leave one wondering whether explicit instruction designed to make subjects aware of the presence of ambiguity and how it can be differently used in dissimilar cultures might ease the burden of the language learner in this aspect of language learning as Bouton, Bardovi-Harlig, Smith and Jucker, Steffensen and Cheng, and others have argued elsewhere in this volume, though in relation to other facets of the learner's pragmatic competence.

The title of Smith and Jucker's paper, *Foregrounding the role of common ground in language learning* says it all. Using examples gathered from the literature involving studies of first and second language acquisition, the authors demonstrate that the need for common ground between participants in normal conversation extends into the language learning situation as well. Much of normal conversation, they say, consists not only of conveying information or expressing social relations; it also has as a central function the establishment by each speaker of a model of the other participant's world view as it is relevant to the particular conversation. And they show quite clearly that this type of negotiation does go on in the classroom and that, at the same time, it involves knowledge and skills that language learners do not always command. These must be taught in the same classroom in which they may have to be used. This fact, the authors argue, "supports the strategy of gradually and systematically moving from contextualized to decontextualized language, both in conversing and in writing." Furthermore, they contend that the strategies and assumptions that individuals must learn to use in the negotiation that is conversation should be dealt with explicitly -- "that students should and can learn to think about what assumptions we carry about each other and the role these assumptions play in our use of language."

With the paper by Steffensen and Cheng, we turn to the final set, those reporting research that focuses more clearly on what goes on in the classroom. Again, the authors offer us study in which an experimental group was taught specific pragmatics principles and given an opportunity to put those concepts to use in actual communication. The paper, entitled *Metadiscourse and text pragmatics: How students revise after learning about metadiscourse*, indicates that both the experimental group and the control group were composition classes, with the former being taught explicitly about *metadiscourse markers*, which can be used "to indicate how the text is structured, to explain difficult words..., and to record the rhetorical acts we are performing." The control group, on the other hand, "was taught using the dominant strategy in university composition courses, the process method." The discussion in this paper both of the specific metadiscourse markers taught and the results achieved is detailed and persuasive. In essence, they note that although the papers serving as a posttest for both the experimental group and the control group were rated by people totally unfamiliar with the nature of the study, the evaluation of the experimental group papers averaged almost a full grade higher than those of the control group. More specifically, the students in the experimental group made much better use of the discourse forms themselves and, at the same time, "they began to critique their own and other's essays at a much higher level."

The second paper of this last set, Li's *Underproduction does not necessarily mean avoidance: Investigation of underproduction using Chinese ESL learners*, "examines a widely accepted theory in L2 learning -- avoidance behavior," first proposed by Schacter and based on a study of the use of relative clauses by Chinese and Japanese English language learners. After describing Schacter's argument and providing the type of data on which he based his conclusion, Li reconsiders that evidence and the assumptions on which Schacter's analysis was based. She then compares Chinese relative clauses with those from English, finding several striking differences including instances in which English uses a relative clause where

Chinese does not, those in which English can reduce a relative clause to verbal or prepositional phrases, and the fact that relative clauses of any sort appear much less frequently in Chinese than in English. Basing her first main argument on the assumption that Chinese would transfer the mode of their expression from Chinese into English, Li argues that a major reason Chinese use fewer relative clauses in English than one would expect is that they would tend to use the same structures in English as in Chinese in so far as possible. Since there are many uses of relative clauses in English that are expressed by other structures in Chinese, Li finds it quite natural that Chinese using English would employ fewer relative clauses than native speakers would -- and more of the structures that they would have used if speaking or writing Chinese.

Li's second point focuses on the fact that the strategy of avoidance is *deliberate*. She argues that failing to use relative clauses in English because one transfers the practices of one's native Chinese when using the second language should be considered *subconscious* underproduction and not deliberate. Underproduction of this sort, she argues, is not *avoidance*. To support this argument, subjects were asked to translate sentences from Chinese to English and then, where a relative clause would have been expected but was not used, the subject was asked if he/she had considered using a relative clause but avoided doing so. Only those subjects who said *yes* in response to that question was assumed to have followed a deliberate strategy of avoidance as defined by Schacter in that situation.

The final paper in this volume is *Contextual thinking about teaching: special educators' metaphorical representations of practical knowledge* by Mostert. Having found that there are relatively few studies of "what special education teachers know and how they acquire their practical knowledge," Mostert sets out to apply some of the methods used to study regular classroom teacher to focus in on the former group. The method he chooses is the examination of the metaphors that the teachers use to describe what they do.
He then performs a careful analysis of the meaning of the metaphors based on the contexts in which they appear.

PRAGMATICS AND LANGUAGE LEARNING

Lawrence F. Bouton

The purpose of this paper is to consider some of roles that pragmatics can play in the development of communicative competence. To illustrate three of those roles, three specific examples are given: one focused on the improvement of the tools necessary to cross-cultural research; one that follows a line of research beginning with the investigation into different types of implicature and moves on into the classroom to see if the skills necessary to the interpretation of those implicatures can be taught effectively in an ESL classroom and, finally, one focused on the interaction of the researcher and the language educator so that what is found out by the investigator gets into the language classroom instead of lingering only in the seminars and journals frequented by pragmatics enthusiasts.

INTRODUCTION

The subject of this conference and title of this paper, *Pragmatics and Language Learning*, represents the conjunction of two disciplines. What's more, it suggests a belief on the part of those who come to conference, whether to present papers or simply to listen and to interact with others who they find there, that **pragmatics** and **language learning** are inherently bound together and that both are stronger because of that bond than either would be by itself. Pragmatics provides language teachers and learners with a research-based understanding of the language forms and functions that are appropriate to the many contexts in which a language is used -- an understanding that is crucial to a proficient speaker's communicative competence. At the same time, the importance of this knowledge to the language learning process, and our realization as to how limited that knowledge is, has provided a powerful motivation for the rapid expansion that we have seen in pragmatics research over the past 15 years. And so each of these two disciplines contributes to and stimulates the other.

This bond, of course, has not always existed. Not long ago, pragmatics was only a gleam in the eye of a few far seeing and perceptive scholars of various persuasions. And language learning was accomplished by repeating strings of isolated sentences chorus-like, often to the regular clapping of the teacher's hands or the tick-tock of a metronome enthroned prominently in the front of the classroom. I remember hearing one teacher praised highly in the early 70's because, it was said, he could put his class through drill after drill without missing a beat. And why not? For, as Paulston (1980) reminds us, (citing works by two of the most eminent language pedagogues of that period), "Drills [were] undertaken solely for the sake of practice, in order that performance [might] become habitual and automatic" (Brooks, 1964, p. 146), and "[those drills] made no pretense of being communication" (Bowen, 1965, p. 295).

Then, in 1971, how languages were taught and learned began to change - thanks in large part to Savignon's demonstration that if the students were given practice in *truly* *communicative acts* in addition to work with the structure and vocabulary of the language, *communicative competence* could be developed in the language classroom from the first day of class. *Communicative competence*, as Savignon used the term then, involved a person's "ability to function in a truly communicative setting," to do things like getting directions to the nearest pharmacy, giving an accurate account of an accident to which the person has been a witness, or making introductions at a dinner party (1971, p. 1). In short, *communicative competence* permitted a person to use the language he had learned "in a variety of very practical situations" (p. 45).

The idea that the development of *communicative competence* should be an immediate and central goal of language pedagogy caught on quickly. But, as Savignon noted 12 years later, instruction intended to develop communicative competence in the target language will be useful only to the extent that teachers alert their students to the need to adapt their communication strategies to the new culture. When teachers fail to do this - when they fail to provide an authentic cultural context within which the meaning of what is said and done in the classroom can be interpreted - "the goal of communicative competence is an illusion." In short, she says, this focus on L2 social rules required by adopting communicative competence as the primary objective of language learning "puts a tremendous burden on the teacher who must become an anthropologist of sorts, discovering and interpreting cultural behavior for which there are no explicit rules" (1983, p. 25). The unfortunate fact was that, at that time, scholars were just beginning to become interested in pragmatics and to recognize its importance to the language learning process. Furthermore, teachers were not really prepared to be amateur anthropologists as McLeod (1976) urged them to be, or to do their own pragmatics research. In 1980, only 23 MATESL programs, or less than a third of all of those in operation in the United States at that time, included any course related to culture and, of course, none of them listed a course in pragmatics.

But that was 15 years ago, when both pragmatics and the communicative competence movement among language teachers were still relatively new to the academic world. By now, of course, the proportion of MATESL programs offering courses related to culture has increased. Sixty-five of the 171 MATESL programs described in TESOL's *Directory of Professional Programs* list courses in sociolinguistics, for example; 48 show courses in intercultural communication, and 18 even include courses in pragmatics or discourse analysis. But still today, the descriptions of 58 of the 171 programs in the United States have no culture oriented courses of any sort.

It was fortunate, therefore, that about the same time that language teachers adopted the development of *communicative competence* as their primary objective, *pragmatics* was coming into its own also. The topics on which pragmatics focused were often just those that were troublesome to language teachers. As Beebe (1988) notes, for instance, a great deal of effort has gone into the description and analysis of different speech acts -- the contexts to which they are appropriate, how they are performed, whether at least some of them have characteristics in common. More recently, cross cultural studies have been undertaken to determine whether the same speech act can be found in different cultures and, if so, to what extent it is performed in the same way and appropriate to the same context from one culture to another.

It was to foster the relationship between pragmatics and language learning that the annual Conference on Pragmatics and Language Learning was initiated at the University of Illinois in 1987. Over the years, a considerable number of papers have been presented there on speech act research and on politeness strategies related to those acts. Other papers have dealt with various facets of written discourse; still others, more than one might imagine, have reported on analyses of discourse in the classroom, and a few have pursued what so far seem to be rather esoteric topics, but extremely important, for instance Molly Wieland's (1991) Tannen-like investigation of turn-taking in a cross cultural context involving French and American bilinguals in France, and Ann Berry's (1994) similar work with Spanish and English bilinguals in the United States. What we have lacked to some extent are rigorous investigations searching for ways to make pragmatics more readily and meaningfully available to language programs.

SOME CONTRIBUTIONS PRAGMATICS CAN MAKE TO LANGUAGE PEDAGOGY

It is with that purpose in mind that we will now to look at three different aspects of pragmatics that have something to offer to language pedagogy: (1) the refinement of the study of speech acts as they occur in different cultures; (2) an investigation to determine the extent to which explicit instruction can increase the rate at which nonnative speakers (NNS) develop different facets of their pragmatic competence; and (3) the contribution that pragmatics can make to the presentation of different functions of a language in textbooks designed for second language learners.

The Cross Cultural Investigation of Speech Acts

The first of these involves cross-cultural research into when and how speech acts are performed by people from different cultural backgrounds. In doing this type of research there are two basic questions: first, given a particular context, will the same speech act be appropriate to that context in the different cultures being studied; and second, if so, what form will that speech act take in each case. But if such studies are to be effective, it is important that the investigator and the subjects providing the data perceive the various facets of the contexts to which the subjects are to respond in the same light. For example, if an investigator intends a context (s)he has described to be seen as involving interactants of equal status, but the subjects involved in the study perceive them to be unequal, the investigator's analysis of the data will be inherently flawed. What's more, this same thing is true of the social distance assumed to exist between the interactants, the seriousness of the imposition behind a request that is to make of the other, etc. Yet, as Cody and McLaughlin (1985) have shown, the perception of the investigator and that of the subjects do, in fact, differ at times. And Spencer-Oatey (1993) has pursued this problem a step further and has established that groups of subjects from different cultural backgrounds can also perceive the same speech act context quite differently. And so if we are to carry on cross-cultural speech act studies successfully, it is clear that new ways have to be found to ensure that the investigator and the subjects, whatever their cultural background, share a common perception of the various contexts to which the subjects are asked to respond.

One attempt to resolve this problem is that underlying the dissertation research of Mei-chen Huang (1996) involving a comparison of American and Chinese *requests*. The basic instrument that Huang has used in this study is a form of the DCT. In each item that she uses, she confronts her subjects with a context within which they interact with another character of whom they are to make a request. It is assumed that the form of the request will depend on the social distance and the power differential that the subjects perceive to exist between themselves and the other character in each situation, and also on the extent to which they see the request they are to make as an imposition on the other person. But, as Spencer-Oatey has noted in the study mentioned earlier, "people from different socio-cultural groups may hold differing norms regarding the power and distance of a given role relationship" (p. 28). The problem for Huang, then, was to insure that the situations that she developed were such that both Chinese and American subjects would assign the same relative power and social distance to each situation so that the contexts within which subjects made their requests would be as comparable as they could be made to be. The careful, step by step approach that she developed in the process provides us with a model to use in pursuing further studies of this sort and, at the same time, gives others comparing Chinese and American speech acts a set of contexts to use as they see fit that are perceived by both Chinese and American subjects as essentially the same with regard to the relative status and social distance separating the characters and the imposition involved in the request.

From the start Huang took nothing for granted. The first round of her study involved asking a number of Americans and a number of Chinese college students for a list of as many different people as they could that they might make a request of. Then she asked these same people for lists of requests that they might make of these people. Furthermore, she made sure that these Groups of Chinese and Americans were demographically similar to the subsequent groups she would be working with.

Once she had these lists of requestees and requests from both the Americans and the Chinese, Huang created a survey that investigated the perception of the relative power and distance that the subjects felt existed between themselves and the person named in each. Items like those in (1) were used to ask the subjects to make these judgements, rating each person on a 3-point scale.

(1) Below is a list of people and situations. Please **CIRCLE** an appropriate rating score (1, 2, 3) to indicate the amount of power and distance each person would normally have in relation to you according to the following criteria:

Power:	low	equal	high
	1	2	3

1 (low) -- The person in question has **less social power or lower status than you**.
2 (equal) -- The person in question and you have **equal social power or status**.
3 (high) -- The person in question has **more social power or greater status than you**.

For example: if you think that your boss in the office has **High** social power in relation to you, then circle **3** for **Power**.

Distance: close moderate distant
1 2 3

1 (close) -- The person in question is **likely to be a good friend or relative and close to you.**
2 (moderate) -- The person in question would probably be **an acquaintance or a friend, but not particularly close to you.**
3 (distant) -- The person in question would probably be **a stranger to you.**

For example: if you think that your boss in your office is an acquaintance or friend, but not particularly close to you, i.e., the social distance between you and your boss in the office is **Moderate**, then circle **2** for **Distance**.

1. Your little brother/sister an elementary school child -- at home. Power: 1 2 3 Distance: 1 2 3

2. A fellow student in your department who you never talked with before -- in the hallway. Power: 1 2 3 Distance: 1 2 3

3. A city police officer -- on the street. Power: 1 2 3 Distance: 1 2 3

(Huang, 1996)

The second half of the questionnaire asked the subjects to indicate how much of an imposition they thought each of the requests listed there would be if asked of someone who was merely an acquaintance. This was to be done by rating that imposition as either *small* or *big* as in the example in (2).

(2) Below is a list of requests. Please **CIRCLE** an appropriate rating score (1 or 2) for each item according to the size of imposition (small or big) that you perceive when you issue that request to **a person with whom you are acquainted but who is not a close friend.**

Imposition: small big
1 2

1. Ask someone to help wash your car. Imposition: 1 2

2. Ask someone to switch the TV channel she/he is watching to one you like. Imposition: 1 2

3. Ask someone to lend you his/her car. Imposition: 1 2

4. Ask someone what time it is since you don't have a watch. Imposition: 1 2

Once all of this data from (1), (2) and (3) had been processed, those characters and requests on which the subjects had been unable to reach a consensus as to how they should be rated were discarded. The rest were combined into situations like those in (4), which were given to new sets of Chinese and Americans, who again rated the characters and the requests in terms of power, distance and imposition, just as they had initially.

(4) You need a nice stereo for a weekend party. Your little brother/ sister, an elementary school child, just got a very nice one as his/her birthday present. You ask him/her to lend it to you for this weekend party to which he/she is not invited.
Imposition: 1 2
Power: 1 2 3
Distance: 1 2 3

This last step involving items like those in (4) was necessary because there was concern that once the characters and requests had been combined into specific situations, the interaction of those two elements within those situations might change the way in one or the other was perceived by some or all of the subjects -- and this did happen in a half dozen cases. But by and large the ratings held firm and those situations for which they did were then organized into DCTs and combined into a research instrument ready for the next and final step -- a cross-cultural study of American and Chinese requests. What's more, given the rigorous process through which the situations eliciting those requests were developed, we can assume that they will be seen as involving essentially the same relative power, social distance and imposition in both the Chinese and the American cultures. This will mean that any difference in the requests themselves should be assigned to some other cause.

Huang's study should prove extremely valuable to teachers, textbook writers, and researchers who are responsible for helping Chinese students learn to use *request strategies* in American English. For one thing, there will be the obvious benefit that comes from a careful comparison of what strategies are used by the members of the two groups in situations that both perceive as essentially the same.

But there are also important by-products of Huang's approach. For example, because she has developed a set of characters, requests and situations that are perceived in the same way by both Chinese and Americans, she can use these herself, or offer to others, either for reduplication of the same study or for new cross-cultural research related to requests in some other way. Or her contexts themselves can be taken into the classroom and used when teachers or textbook writers want to set up situations in the United States that they are sure Chinese students will recognize and understand on the basis of their experience in their own culture. And, finally, in developing and refining the steps she has taken to insure the comparability of the Chinese and American contexts in her study, Huang has developed a model for doing that type of work that can be studied, followed and perhaps improved upon by others.

Teaching NNS to Interpret Implicatures – Can It Be Done?

A second type of pragmatics project that can be of value to the language classroom is one that studies pragmatic principles related to that language and ends up investigating whether what it discovers can be taught effectively in the language classroom. One such study concerned itself with the ability of NNS to derive the same message from American English implicatures and, to the extent that they do not, whether the skills necessary to close that gap can be taught effectively.

The study began in 1986, at which time it was established that NNS on arriving in the United States tended to interpret American English implicatures the way NS do only about 79 percent of the time (Bouton, 1988). As the study progressed, we also noted that certain types of implicature were considerably more difficult than others for NNS to master, though for NS there was little difference in this respect. At the same time, a survey of a number of ESL texts showed that none of them made any direct attempt to develop the skills necessary to interpret implicatures, and instances in which the attention of the students was focused on a particular implicature as a source of indirectly conveyed information were relatively rare. "In most English language texts," it was noted, "there are relatively few examples of it in lines assigned characters in dialogues...and when such lines do occur, the implicatures involved may or may not be highlighted through comments or discussion questions" (Bouton, 1990, pp. 45-46). Knowing this, it was not surprising that we found the progress made by NNS in learning to interpret American English implicatures successfully to be slow. And this led us to wonder whether that rate of progress could be increased through explicit instruction in the ESL classroom designed for that purpose.

The answer, it turns out, is clearly *yes* for some types of implicature, though not for all. But before we can go on to the issues we have just raised in more detail, we first need to make clear exactly what we mean by the term *implicature*. Implicature was first mentioned by Grice (1975, 1981) and further developed by Levinson (1983) and Green (1989) among others. It is a process through which inferences are drawn based on the interaction of an utterance and the context in which it is uttered. Consider, for example, the question *Do you have any coffee?* asked of a person behind the counter in a fast food restaurant, on the one hand, or of a clerk in a grocery store, on the other. In the first case, the question would probably be understood to be asking for a cup of coffee to drink; in the second, it would be seen as asking if they have coffee beans in some form and, perhaps, exactly where they could be found in the store. In both cases, the utterance was the same; the difference in the message came from the interaction of that utterance with the situation in which it occurred. These different messages are said to be derived through *implicature*, and the messages themselves are usually referred to as *implicatures*. Some of the different types of implicature that were used in this study are given in (5)-(10). [Note that the utterance embodying the implicature in each question is in italics.]

5. **Relevance implicatures:**

A: How about going for a walk?
B: *Isn't it raining out?*

6. **Minimum Requirement Rule** - Two golfers are talking about their chances in the local university golf tournament.

Fred: What kind of score do you think it will take to make the cut tomorrow, Brad?
Brad: Oh, a 75 ought to do it. *Did you have a 75? I didn't.*
Fred: *Yeah, I did.*

7. **Indirect Criticism:**

A: Have you seen *Robin Hood*?
B: Yeah. I went last night.
A: What did you think of it?
B: *The cinematography was great.*
A: Oh, that bad, huh?

8. **Sequence-based implicature** -- easily seen in the oddness of...

Jack ate his steak and barbecued it without saying a word.
Mary dialed Joe's number, waited for the dial tone, and quickly picked up the phone.

9. **The POPE Q implicature**:

A: Does Dr. Walker always give a test the day before vacation?
B: *Does the sun come up in the east?*

10. **Irony**: Bill and Peter work together in the same office. They sometimes are sent on business trips together and are becoming good friends. They often have lunch together and Peter has even invited Bill to have dinner with him and his wife at their home several times. Now Peter's friends have told him that they saw Bill out dancing with Peter's wife recently while Peter was out of town on a business trip. On hearing this, Peter's comment was...

Peter: *"Bill knows how to be a really good friend, doesn't he?"*

All but the most recent facets of the study have been reported elsewhere (Bouton, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994), so we will discuss here only those aspects related to the question of whether NNS interpretation of implicatures can be improved through explicit classroom instruction focused.

As we noted earlier, the first step in this study was to test two groups of nonnative English speaking international students (NNS) shortly after their arrival in the United States. The purpose of that test was to determine the extent to which they could derive the same message from American English implicatures that American NS did. The first group, consisting of 436 subjects, was tested in 1986; the second, numbering 304, in 1990.

When the interpretations of the implicatures by the two NNS groups were compared with those of the Americans, it was found that the 1986 group had derived the expected message from the implicatures only 71.3 percent of the time, or 79.5 percent as often as the American NS control group did (Table 1). The 1990 group, using a revised version of the same test, answered as expected 76.8 percent of the time, or 84.8 percent as often as the Americans (Table 2)[1]. This suggested that the use of implicature as a cross-cultural conversational strategy did pose a potential obstacle to interaction between Americans and international students. The question, then, was whether this problem would resolve itself over time.

To answer this question, a longitudinal study was conducted in which subsets of the 1986 and the 1990 groups were tested again after they had been at the university for extended periods of time. For instance, one group of 30 NNS who had been tested in 1986 were retested in 1991, after they had been on campus for 4 1/2 years. By that time, the NNS interpreted the implicatures as expected 91.5% as often as the Americans did, up from the original 79.5% (Table 1). Students from the 1990 group were retested 17 and 33 months later with similar results (Table 2). And finally, as a cross sectional variation on these two studies, students who had been in the United States for from 4 to 7 years were tested in 1992 using the same test that had been used with the 1990 group (Table 2).[2]

Table 1: Comparison of the Mean Scores of NNS and NS in the 4 ½ Year Study

NNS/NS	NNS	NNS	NS
Date Given	Aug 86	Jan 91	Aug 86
Number of Items	28	28	28
Mean Score	19.97	22.97	25.11
N	30	30	28
% choosing the expected message	71.3%	82.0%	89.7%
Ratio - $\text{Mean}_{NNS}/\text{Mean}_{NS}$	79.5%	91.5%	---

On the other hand, though the number of items that were troublesome for the NNS had shrunk from 20 to 8, those eight constituted almost 30% of the total number of items tested. These subjects were native-like in their interpretation of 70% of the implicatures facing them, but not at all so with regard to the rest. They had come a long way, but there was still a ways to go - and it had taken 4 1/2 years.

The same thing proved true with the 1990 group (Table 2). On the first testing, the NNS derived the expected message only 83.4% as often as the American NS. Seventeen months later, that figure had risen to 90.6%, and 16 months after that, to 94.4%. And for a third group, who had been in the United States for from 4 to 7 years, the figure was 94.1%.

Table 2: Comparison of the Mean Scores of the NNS and the NS in the 1990 Longitudinal Study

NNS/NS	NNS	NNS	NNS	NNS	NS
Date Given	Aug 90	17 mo	33 mo	4-7 yr	--
Number of Items	22	22	22	22	22
Mean Score	16.90	18.06	18.80	18.74	19.92
N	304	34	35	34	77
% choosing the expected message	78.8%	82.1	85.5	85.1	90.5
Ratio - $\text{Mean}_{\text{NNS}}/\text{Mean}_{\text{NS}}$	84.8%	90.7%	94.4%	94.1%	---

As we can see from Table 2, there was no statistically significant difference between the percentages of NNS in any of these immersion groups who derived the expected message from the entire set of 22 items. But if we consider only the mean scores for the test as a whole in making these comparisons, the analysis that we achieve is rather superficial. Instead, we need to look also at the difficulty the different types of implicatures posed for each of the different groups in the study. When we do that, we see that some implicatures seem to be easier for the international students to interpret than others. For example, one in every four NNS were unable to interpret the implicatures in Table 3 appropriately when they first arrived on campus. In fact, except for items 2 and 23, these implicatures were still troublesome to the immersion groups on being retested after from 17 months to 7 years spent at the university. Also, for the most part, these implicatures tended to belong to clearly defined sets, i.e., those based on the *Pope Q implicature, Indirect Criticism, Irony, Sequence* and *scalar implicatures*[3]. These implicatures we will refer to as *The Tough 10.*

Table 3: Implicatures that Proved Difficult for NNS Initially and Tended to Remain So After Immersion

///	ARRIVAL	NNS IMMERSION GROUP			NS	TYPE
Item	304 NNS	After 17 mo	After 33 mo	After 4-7 yr	//// ////	///////// /////////
23	75	88	89	94	95	Relevance
2	65	82	94	94	99	Indir crit
15	60	76	71	76	100	Indir crit
22	52	52	68	91	64[a]	Indir crit
11	65	76	86	65	91	Sequence
17	79	82	86	92	100	POPE Q
1	48	62	71	53	86	POPE Q
18	47	53	60	56	75[a]	Irony
6	51	53	57	76	84	Irony
24	74	74	74	86	70[a]	Scalar
Mean	61.9	73.8	79.3	78.5	89.1	/////////

Note: All results are expressed as the percentage of the group selecting the expected interpretation.

In contrast with the implicatures set down in Table 3, those in Table 4 proved relatively easy for the NNS to interpret when they first took the test. What's more, after the NNS had been attending the university for some time, with one exception, even those items that had been moderately difficult at the outset (i.e., items 8, 13, 20, 21, 25) grew easier to handle with the simple passage of time. These easier implicatures, with two exceptions, were those based on Relevance and on the Minimum Requirement Rule.

Table 4: Implicatures that Proved Relatively Easy for NNS Initially and Tended to Remain So After Immersion

///	ARRIVAL	NNS IMMERSION GROUP			NS	TYPE
Item	304 NNS	After 17 mo	After 33 mo	After 4-7 yr	//// ////	///////// /////////
19	98	94	100	100	100	Relevance
16	99	100	100	100	100	Relevance
4	92	100	100	100	97	Relevance
10	94	97	94	94	100	Relevance
5	89	85	91	97	100	Relevance
13	86	91	94	94	97	Relevance
21	83	82	94	82	96	Relevance
25	78	88	89	91	94	Relevance
12	87	74	89	85	81	Min Req R
20	82	82	82	83	82	Min Req R
7	88	97	94	82	99	POPE Q
8	80	91	91	99	91	Indir Crit
Mean	88.0	90.1	93.1	91.8	94.8	/////////

Note: All results are expressed as the percentage of the group selecting the expected interpretation.

Before leaving these two tables, we need to make two other observations. First, although there is little difference between the percentages of NNS and NS who derived the expected message from the relatively easy implicatures in Table 4, that is not at all true with regard to the *Tough 10* in Table 3. While, 8 of the *Tough 10* remained tough for the NNS throughout the study, there was very little difference in the performance of the NS no matter which of the two sets of implicatures they were faced with. As a result, it seems that the difference between the performance of the NS and that of the NNS on the *Tough 10* may be responsible for the sizeable difference between the mean scores of the NNS and NS for the test as a whole ($p < .0001$).

Second, though there was no statistically significant difference between the overall performance of the three immersion groups on the test as a whole, the results with regard to specific items listed in the two tables suggest that the 17 month group tended to lag somewhat behind the other two. For instance, on 7 of the *Tough 10* items and one item from the easier set, fewer than 75 percent of the 17 month group answered as expected. This compares with a total of 5 items for the 33 month group and 6 for the 4-7 year group. In addition, there were a total of 4 other items on which the number of NNS interpreting the implicature as expected was 10 percent less than that for the NS, while for the 33 month group this was true of only one other item and for the 4-7 year group, only 2. All in all, then, the 17 month group seems to have developed somewhat less of a mastery of the different types of implicature than the other two immersion groups had.

And so, from these two tables, we can see that given sufficient time, NNS international students do increase their ability to interpret implicatures in American English. But the process seems slow: there are a number of implicature types that remain systematically difficult for the entire period covered by this study; others were mastered only after several months or years. It was these facts that motivated the last part of this study: Can the skills required to interpret implicatures be developed more rapidly by focusing on them in the ESL classroom?

The subjects in the pedagogically oriented component of the study were international graduate students who were required to take the university's advanced ESL course; their TOEFL scores averaged approximately 550. Four sections (55 students), taught by 4 different teachers comprised the experimental group, and 7 sections (109 students) acted as the control group.

The scheduled instruction for the experimental group totaled 6 hours over a 6 week period; in addition, an instructor might occasionally use examples of one implicature or another as the focus of an informal 5 minute *warm up period* at the beginning of the class. The approach taken involved what might be called consciousness raising with regard to the use of implicatures in English. Each type of implicature covered in the study was described and illustrated and its possible uses discussed. Students were encouraged to think of similar implicatures from their own languages, to listen for other instances of the same type of implicature in conversations that went on around them, both inside and outside the classroom, and to make up examples of their own. The sections in the control group were not given any explicit instruction related to implicature that they would not normally have had, which would amount to very little if any. Both the experimental and the control sections were tested at the beginning and end of the 6 weeks using the same instrument as both pre- and posttest.

The results of these tests, which are given in Table 5, were surprising in two different ways. First, the two types of implicature that were uniformly quite easy for the NNS when they arrived on campus -- those based on Relevance and on the Minimum Requirement Rule --which one might have thought would be easy to teach turned out not to be. In fact, as we see from the top half of Table 5, there was no progress whatsoever by the experimental group in interpreting these implicatures. On the other hand, most of those implicature-types identified as belonging to the Tough 10 and found in the bottom half of Table 5 proved highly susceptible to instruction. (The only exception to this generalization was the Scalar implicature, which was uniformly difficult for NNS and NS alike.) While the number of those in the control group that could derive the expected message from these more difficult implicatures rose by only 3.3%, the same figure for the experimental group showed an average increase of 27.1%. Furthermore, this improvement was seen to at least some extent in relation to each of the different implicatures: there were none for which there was not at least a 15% rise in the number of subjects responding as expected. Clearly with regard to the type of implicatures in the *Tough 10*, the instruction was effective.[5]

Table 5: Comparison of the Increase in the Ability of Experimental and Control Groups to Interpret American English Implicatures. (Expressed in Percentages of each group answering as expected.)

	Generally easy to learn; otherwise hard to teach						
Item	CONT1	CONT2	C2-C1	EXP1	EXP2	E1-E2	Type of IMPLC
4	92	96	+4	87	93	+6	Relevance
5	90	91	+1	89	85	--	Relevance
10	92	95	+3	95	95	--	Relevance
13	89	88	-1	89	89	--	Relevance
16	94	97	+3	100	100	--	Relevance
19	96	97	+1	98	98	--	Relevance
21	78	77	-1	84	76	-8	Relevance
23	75	77	-2	76	73	-3	Relevance
25	82	76	-6	71	78	+7	Relevance
12	83	90	+7	84	91	+7	Min. Req.
20	83	80	-3	84	78	-6	Min. Req.
24	76	72	-4	75	76	+1	Scalar
Avg	84.9	85.1	0.5	86.0	86.0	0.0	

	Hard to learn; easy to teach						
Item	CONT1	CONT2	C2-C1	EXP1	EXP2	E1-E2	Type of IMPLC
1	51	65	+14	55	85	**+30**	Pope Q
7	94	94	--	76	96	**+20**	Pope Q
17	81	81	--	80	95	**+15**	Pope Q
2	67	76	+9	53	96	**+43**	Indirect Crit.
8	81	84	+3	67	93	**+26**	Indirect Crit.
15	52	49	-3	42	78	**+36**	Indirect Crit.
22	61	70	+9	53	84	**+31**	Indirect Crit.
11	61	62	+1	58	80	**+22**	Sequence
6	44	44	--	36	69	**+33**	Irony
18	50	57	--	49	64	**+15**	Irony
Avg	64.2	68.1	+3.3	58.5	83.3	**27.1**	---

The improvement in the performance of those in the experimental group as compared to that of the control group can be seen easily from Table 5, but to put their growth in a broader, more meaningful perspective, we also need to compare it with that of the NNS in the immersion groups mentioned earlier. This has been done in Table 6. What we find there

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is that there was no significant difference between the overall performance of the experimental group and that of any of the three immersion groups. If we then look just at the mean scores of the different groups found in the bottom half of Table 6, we notice that, for the 4 types of implicature found there, the experimental group had actually performed better than the others. There seems to be no doubt that with those for types of implicature, explicit instruction can speed up the development of pragmatic competence. The skills needed to interpret such implicatures in the Tough 10 apparently can be taught. With these students, the improvement came quickly and with relatively little energy.

Table 6: Comparison of the Percent of the Experimental and Immersion Groups and NS Answering as Expected on the Various Implicature Sets

Item	On Arrival Aug 1990	EXPERIMENTAL		IMMERSION			NS	TYPE
		EXP	EXP	17mo	33mo	4-7yrs		
4	92	87	93	100	100	94	97	Relevance
5	89	89	85	85	91	97	100	Relevance
10	94	95	95	97	94	94	100	Relevance
13	86	89	89	91	94	94	97	Relevance
16	99	100	100	100	100	100	100	Relevance
19	98	98	98	94	100	100	100	Relevance
21	83	76	73	82	94	82	96	Relevance
23	75	71	78	88	89	94	95	Relevance
25	78	84	76	88	89	91	88	Relevance
12	87	84	91	74	85	85	81	Min Req. R
20	82	84	78	82	83	82	81	Min Req R.
24	74	75	76	74	86	68	70	Scalar
Avg	87.5	87.0	86	89.2	93.0	92.1	94.1	
1	48	55	85	62	71	53	86	POPE Q
7	88	76	96	97	94	82	99	POPE Q
17	79	80	95	82	86	91	100	POPE Q
2	65	53	96	82	94	94	94	Indir. Crit
8	78	67	93	91	91	99	91	Indir. Crit
15	60	42	78	76	71	76	100	Indir. Crit
22	52	53	84	76	76	91	64	Indir. Crit
11	65	58	80	76	86	65	91	Sequence
6	51	36	69	53	57	76	84	Irony
18	47	49	64	53	60	56	75	Irony
Avg	64.3	58.5	83.3	74.7	79.3	77.4	86	

Of course, there is still need for further study in this area. We cannot be sure, for example, why the Tough 10 were so easy to teach, while the relevance-based implicatures proved totally impervious to such efforts. One possible explanation lies in the formulaic nature of the different implicatures in the Tough 10. These formulas could be taught and practiced. The relevance-based implicatures, on the other hand, depended on the interpreter's being alert to all of the different cultural elements underlying each particular implicature -- requiring an immense amount of knowledge, the details of which cannot be easily taught or generalized. If this proves to be the explanation, then our best course of action would seem to be a continuing investigation into the large set of implicatures that we have called *relevance-based*, with the goal of finding other formulas that may underlie some of them. If such formulas can be found, then they, too, can be taught effectively in the ESL classroom.

Also, as we look further into how specific types of implicature work, we need to find a way of determining the frequency with which each of them are used and the contexts in which they are likely to occur. Such information is a necessary input into the process of determining which implicatures should be taught and in what pragmatic frames they should be couched. How to carry out such a study is not at all clear, but it must be done. At the same time, we must find ways of integrating appropriate instruction into ESL programs around the country. ESL texts still pay little attention to implicatures, and even those course in which this study was conducted has returned to its earlier format and includes little or no explicit instruction related to the use of implicature -- partly because of too few materials and too little understanding of implicatures on the part of the instructors. But if Green (1989) is right that "conversational implicature is an absolutely unremarkable and ordinary conversational strategy" (p. 92) and, therefore, essential to the communicative competence of any NNS of English (or any other language), then the failure to include it within the scope of our ESL courses is to leave an important gap in our students' communicative competence -- one that we have shown to be closed only slowly with the passage of time.

Pragmatics and the Teaching of Speech Acts: Invitations

Although very little work has been done with regard to the distribution of different types of implicature, the same is not true of some speech acts. Wolfson (1981, 1983a, 1983b, 1989), for example, has provided us with thorough discussions of both compliments and invitations, and her work has been replicated and extended by numerous others (Herbert, 1990; Holmes, 1986; Davidson, 1984; Isaacs and Clark, 1990). Through work of this sort, we have a relatively thorough understanding of the form, the function, and the distribution of both compliments and speech acts. And this information can and should provide the foundation from which ESL texts build the substantive component underlying their presentation of these speech acts.

As an example of what pragmatics can contribute to the teaching of invitations, for example, we will look at one of the better presentations of this speech available today -- that in Wall's (1987) *Say It Naturally*. Furthermore, it was published either before or at essentially the same time as several of the articles just mentioned. None the less, because of the information provided in those articles, teachers who have read them can modify Wall's presentation and improve what it offers by bringing it more in line with what we know about how invitations are actually used.

Speech acts taught in an ESL classroom should approximate those used in real life in both form and distribution to the extent that this is made possible by the proficiency of the students involved. Though Wolfson's description of invitations evolved slowly over decade in which she wrote about them, she seemed to see invitations as divided into three sets depending on their form and function: ***unambiguous invitations***, which are direct and to the point and always mention a definite time, place, or activity; ***ambiguous*** (or ***negotiable***) ***invitations***, which tend to involve both participants in the conversation in the development of the invitation; and the ***non-negotiable non-invitation***, which may function as a positive politeness strategy rather than as an actual invitation, often expressing a sincere desire to further the relationship that exists between the people talking (1983).

In terms of the context to which each of these different invitations is appropriate, Wolfson (1985) finds the likelihood that the unambiguous variety will be used in any particular situation depends on the extent to which the relative status and social distance between the participants seems to be static to the person doing the inviting. "Speakers whose relationship is more ambiguous tend to avoid direct invitations with their inherent risk of rejection, and instead negotiate with one another in a mutual back and forth progression which, if successful, will lead to a social commitment" (p.29). And the nonnegotiable invitation is, as we noted, primarily a positive politeness strategy employed during leave takings.

Given our assumption that the presentation of speech acts in an ESL text should approximate authentic speech as far as we can describe it, from what we have said, it follows that such a text should present all three types of invitation that we have discussed and that the frequency of their occurrence in examples and dialogues might approximate their distribution in real life. As Table 7 indicates, however, Wall's presentation does not do this. Where Wolfson tells us that only 26 percent of the invitations in her data were ***unambiguous***, 80 percent of the examples given by Wall fall into that category. Where Wolfson's data indicate that 41 percent of the invitations one can expect to meet are ***ambiguous***, only 8 percent of the examples in Wall are of that type. And there are no examples of the nonnegotiable invitation even though these comprise fully a third of Wolfson's data. Furthermore there is no discussion at all of the contexts to which these different types of invitation might be appropriate or of how to react when such invitations are offered.

Table 7: The Distribution of the Three Types of Invitation in Wolfson and Wall.

	Wolfson data	Wall examples
Unambiguous invitations	26%	80%
Ambiguous (negotiable) invitations	41%	8%
Non-negotiable non-invitations	33%	0%

CONCLUSION

Wolfson, of course, goes into considerable detail as to the components of the different types of invitation that she describes, including the responses that are appropriate to each, how a person can try to turn a nonnegotiable invitation into an actual one with a successful conclusion. What's more, similar studies that can be of value to teachers and textbook writers alike are available in relation to other speech acts. The purpose of this paper has been to raise the consciousness of all concerned with second language teaching and learning as to the importance of pragmatics and what it can offer to the development of communicative competence in the language classroom. The mass of information about how we interact with each other in various contexts is accumulating rapidly. The challenge to investigator and to teachers alike is to find ways of incorporating that information, explicitly or implicitly, into the language education process.

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NOTES

[1] The revisions removed those questions from the original test that had proved unreliable and attempted to provide a more balanced representation of the different types of implicature among the test items. It was also shortened to 25 questions overall, including 3 distractors. As a result of these modifications, the revised test proved to be slightly easier than the 1986 version from which it had been adapted.

[2] To insure that these various immersion groups were representative of the larger 1986 and 1990 groups, respectively, the mean scores of each of the immersion groups were compared with each other and with the group from which they were drawn and no statistically significant differences were found between any of the groups. The one exception to this is the 4-7 year group, for which such a comparison was impossible, since they took the implicature test only once, at the end of their 4-7 years of residence in the university community.

[3] All of these various implicature types were illustrated above in (5)-(10).

[4] Although the NS scores on three of the items were 75% or bglow, those items were retained because of their reliability ratings as determined by the UIUC OIR. Items with a reliability coefficient in the mid 20's (e.g., 0.26) are acceptable and those with a coefficient in the 40's or higher are rated as excellent to outstanding. The reliability coefficient for item 0.42, 0.44, and 0.26, respectively.

[5] It should be emphasized at this point that none of the actual items that appeared on the pre- and posttests were discussed in any way in the classroom. Instructors were provided with a number of other examples based on the same general principles, but differing significantly from the test items in both form and substance. All were aware of the importance of not dealing directly with any of test items. Every effort was made to insure that any improvement made by the experimental group should result from their ability to generalize from the examples brought up in class discussion to those on the test itself.

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PRAGMATICS AND LANGUAGE TEACHING: BRINGING PRAGMATICS AND PEDAGOGY TOGETHER

Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig

The research in interlanguage pragmatics provides a needs-assessment for pragmatics and language teaching. The research clearly shows that language learners have difficulty in the area of pragmatics, regardless of their level of grammatical competence. This paper explores the classroom as a source of input, and the role that classroom activities and pedagogical materials as part of that input.

The goal of this paper is to explore the notion of teaching with respect to pragmatics, the role that pragmatics research plays or should play in bringing pragmatics into the language classroom, and the job that each of us whether language teachers, teacher educators, or researchers should play in such an endeavor. I titled the original plenary address on which this paper is based "Pragmatics and Language Teaching, Bringing Pragmatics and Pedagogy Together" because I believe that bringing pragmatics into the classroom successfully will require the joint effort of many professionals involved in different endeavors related to pragmatics.

Needs Assessment

First, I would like to address the question, "why bring a focus on pragmatics into the classroom?" For many participants of the Conference on Pragmatics and Language Learning throughout the nine years of our meetings, it has been a fundamental assumption that what we discovered in pragmatics and language learning would ultimately be beneficial to the classroom. Others, both researchers and teachers, have taken a more wait-and-see attitude. Whatever one's attitude toward the relationship of the study of pragmatics and language acquisition to language teaching at the outset, I believe that the results are now back on this question. The inquiry undertaken by the participants in this conference and throughout the field of interlanguage pragmatics provides us with a clear needs assessment: Learners show significant differences from native speakers in the execution of certain speech acts and in conversational functions such as greetings and leave takings.

We have found this to be the case with a variety of first languages and with learners at a variety of levels of grammatical proficiency. That is to say, a learner of high grammatical proficiency will not necessarily show concomitant pragmatic competence. We have also found at least at the higher levels of grammatical proficiency that learners show a wide range of pragmatic competence. Advanced nonnative speakers are neither uniformly successful, nor uniformly unsuccessful, but the range is quite wide. They are more likely to be less successful than native speakers on the same task where contextualized reaction data is available (as in the case of conversations and academic interviews).

There are many ways in which learners differ from native speakers. I will divide the differences between learners and native speakers into four main categories and then give an example of each: native and nonnative speakers may use different speech acts, or where the same speech acts are used, these may differ in form, semantic formula, or content. First, learners may perform different speech acts than native speakers in the same contexts. For example, in our work on the academic advising session, Beverly Hartford and I have observed that native speakers produce more suggestions than nonnative speakers per advising session, whereas nonnative speakers produce more rejections per advising session than native speakers do. So, in the same context, native speakers exert control over their course schedules by making suggestions; in contrast, the nonnative speakers control their course schedules through rejections, by blocking the suggestions of their advisors (Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford, 1993a).

The second way in which nonnative production may differ from the native speaker norm is in the form of a speech act. In a longitudinal study of pragmatic development in the advising session, we found that in early sessions native and nonnative speakers differed in what speech acts they produced, whereas in subsequent sessions they produced the same speech acts, but these differed in form (Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford, 1993a). In the subsequent advising sessions, nonnative speakers increased their use of suggestions showing that they recognized that such a speech act is expected. However, while frequency of use of suggestions moves toward the native speaker norm, linguistic form is much slower to develop. Learners often do not use the mitigators used by their native speaker peers, and often use aggravators which are never used by native speakers.

For example, native speakers make suggestions as found in (1)-(3).

(1) Perhaps I should also mention that I have an interest in sociolinguistics and would like, if I can, to structure things in such a way that I might do as much sociolinguistics as I can.

(2) I was thinking of taking sociolinguistics

(3) I have an idea for spring. I don't know how it would work out, but..

In contrast, in the nonnative sessions we often hear the suggestions found in (4) and (5).

(4) In the summer I will take language testing

(5) So, I, I just decided on taking the language structure.

A third way in which native and nonnative speakers differ is in the choice of semantic formulas. For example, we found that native speakers and nonnative speakers in the advising sessions and in discourse completion tasks which role play the advising sessions, both used more explanations than any other semantic formula when making rejections. However, only native speakers used alternatives, and in fact, they used these next most frequently, ranking just after explanations (Bardovi-Harlig, 1991, 1993b; Hartford & Bardovi-Harlig, 1992).

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A fourth way in which native and nonnative speakers differ is in the content of semantic formulas. In the case of rejections, we have found that both groups use the explanation most frequently, but native speakers and nonnative speakers differ in the content of their explanations. In an experiment designed to test differences in the content of rejections based on the natural data collected from the advising sessions, we gave native speakers reasons for rejecting courses which included several reasons given in nonnative advising sessions, but not in native speaker sessions. These included reasons such as a course being too difficult, too easy, or even telling the advisor that his or her own course was uninteresting. Native speakers in the experiment invented other reasons to reject the courses whereas nonnative speakers used the reasons given in the experiment, reflecting their production in the actual advising sessions (Hartford & Bardovi-Harlig, 1992).

Beebe, Takahashi & Uliss-Weltz (1990) have also found differences in content in conversation where English speakers and Japanese speakers of English use different content in explanations following refusals. The Americans are characterized as providing more details and the Japanese as being a bit vague compared to the American norm. When refusing an invitation for example, an American might say "I have a business lunch that day" whereas a Japanese speaker might say "I have something to do." In a very telling example Beebe reports that a Japanese graduate student declined an invitation by saying "I have to go to a wedding" which certainly seemed quite definite in its content, until they learned some weeks later that the wedding had been the woman's own. And thus, the refusal once again seemed vague when judged by American expectations.

We see differences then in at least four areas, use of different speech acts, and differences in form, semantic formulas, and content. In sum, we have evidence from a variety of sources that learners differ noticeably from identifiable native-speaker norms. From a pedagogical view, this can be interpreted as a needs assessment.

There are at least two reasons why learners typically show different patterns of realization than natives speakers do. First, cross-cultural pragmatics has shown that different mature first languages have different realization patterns, and second, and I think at least equally important, is the fact that learners are learners. They do not have the full range of linguistic devices at their disposal. It is the second source of differences that is particularly susceptible to change in the course of acquisition and potentially through instruction.

The Importance of Input

Regarding the issue of language acquisition, one question that comes to mind for both researchers and teachers is whether learners are exposed to appropriate and sufficient input. In our work on learnability in pragmatics, we have hypothesized that at least in part, learners either don't receive the relevant input or don't receive it from sources they consider relevant, or they may not notice the relevant input due to either lack of pragmatic awareness or possibly even grammatical competence. (We take this issue up more fully in our forthcoming paper on input in the institutional setting (Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford, in press).

Classrooms as sources of input. If at least part of the problem is input, and I believe that it undoubtedly is, then one of the goals in facilitating the development of pragmatic competence is providing pragmatically appropriate input. And classrooms are indisputably good sources of input. For foreign language learners they may be the sole source of input (depending of course on the learner). I will return to ways to further exploit the classroom toward the end of this paper.

Pedagogical Materials as Input. In this section I would like to continue with the idea of input and extend it to pedagogical materials. I am going to refer specifically to published textbooks. Now, I realize that published materials are often conservative and not as innovative as teachers' own materials, but textbooks do play an important role in providing input and moreover, they are easily accessible, widely available and let's not forget that--to the learners--they are high prestige sources of input.

By and large, textbooks containing conversations or dialogues do not present pragmatically accurate models to learners. As an illustration, I offer the results of a survey of textbooks we did as part of a pedagogical article on teaching closings (Bardovi-Harlig, Hartford, Mahan-Taylor, Morgan, & Reynolds, 1991). The survey examined the presentation of closings by twenty current ESL textbooks which contained dialogues. In surveying the textbooks we discovered that only 12 included what we considered complete closings represented in at least one of the dialogues and that very few did so on a consistent basis. Only one text, Improving Oral Communication, had several examples of complete closings. Textbooks typically represent conversations as getting only as far as shutting down a topic and occasionally as far as a preclosing. As an example, consider this conversation from Lado (1989).

(6) Incomplete closing (shutting down the conversation)

Stanley: Hi, Dick.
Dick: Hi Stanley. Did you go to the football game yesterday?
Stanley: No, I went to the movies with my kids. Did our team win?
Dick: No, they didn't. They lost.
Stanley: Did they lose by much?
Dick: They lost by twelve points.
Stanley: Oh, that's awful. I'm glad I didn't go.[1] (Lado , 1989)

Over the years, since 1989, graduate students in the TESOL Methods course at Indiana University have been collecting examples of a variety of speech acts and comparing them to a number of ESL/EFL textbooks for a range of skills. The criterion for textbook selection is the use of dialogues by the textbooks. These include listening, conversation, and grammar textbooks, as well as multiskills textbooks. The textbooks, even the new ones, are found lacking in at least two ways. First, it is often the case that a particular speech act, or language function is not represented at all. Evidence is lacking. This is quite frequent. Next, other speech acts are poorly represented, that is, they are not realistic. For example, in his plenary address, to this conference, Larry Bouton showed that 80% of the invitations in one ESL textbook used a form of invitations which appeared only 26% of the time in a published corpus on native-speaker invitations. As another example, requests are plentiful in textbooks. They are perhaps the easiest to find of all the speech acts or conversational functions. Yet, they don't occur with even as little as an attention getting "Excuse me" or variation according to the imposition of the request.[2] The textbook situation is in fact bleak, but it is not hopeless.

There are a few new books which do try to present relevant information to learners. One such book is Speaking Effectively: Strategies for Academic Conversation, by Janet L. Kayfetz which includes a chapter on requests. Important characteristics of this chapter are that the speech act (requests) is clearly labelled, that a variety of models for realizing requests are given, and that extended practice is provided through various scenarios. Learners are provided with models and encouraged to try their own requests through a series of role plays based on scenarios. The scenarios are all situated in the academic setting (a setting in which academic bound ESL/EFL students will need to function), and the students always play themselves (students) when making requests. The author provides examples of responses to requests as well, and interprets them for the learners as in Example (7). The responses in Example (7) reply to a request for an extension of a due date.

(7) Responses to requests (Kayfetz, 1992, pp. 48-49)

Firm denial

a. I'm sorry, but that won't be possible. I want all papers on the due date.

Softened Denial

b. I'm sorry, but that won't be possible. I was hoping to get all the papers on the due date. I do not want to make exceptions unless an individual case warrants it.

By providing responses and interpreting them, the textbook prepares learners for responses to their requests and helps them understand whether they have been accepted or not, or are still being considered. The learner can then determine his or her next course of action: to thank the interlocutor, to continue to negotiate, or to even give up for the time being.

This textbook has gone a long way toward remedying some of the common flaws in textbook presentation. I think it provides a good model of what we should consider when selecting a textbook for a course or when developing pedagogical materials.

It also has some shortcomings which should be addressed in the context of providing input for learners. As I mentioned earlier, one strength of the chapter is it provides learners with alternate request forms, but a corresponding weakness is that it does not rank the request in anyway for the students. Consider the list of request formulas provided under the heading "Making Your Request" as shown in Example (8) (Kayfetz, 1992, p. 48).

(8) Making Your Request

a. I would like to request ________________________________
b. I request that you ____________________________________

c. With your permission, I want to ______________________________
d. I am requesting that you ______________________________
e. Would it be possible for you to ______________________________
f. Would it be possible for me to ______________________________

Although all of the forms listed are, in fact, possible realizations of requests, only some are likely to be used by students who are native speakers of American English when they address faculty, the scenario established by the textbook. Moreover, the alternatives given are not ranked in any way for the students by the author. In our study of authentic student requests to faculty (Hartford & Bardovi-Harlig, 1995), we found that students do use the formulas "Would it be possible for me" or "Would it be possible for you" and even less often "I would like to request..". But we saw no occurrences of "I am requesting that you do something," nor would I ever expect a graduate student to approach me as either an advisor or a faculty member with a request formulated in such a way.

If the first main area for improvement is to provide learners with some indication of why speakers select different request forms, the second main area of interest concerns the content of the request itself. The content of the request is frequently discussed in the literature as part of the imposition of the request (Blum-Kulka, House, & Kasper, 1989; Kasper & Blum-Kulka, 1993). The range of imposition of requests is somewhat limited by the academic setting, and the requests do not show great swings in imposition which are possible in the world at large, such as borrowing someone's car or asking them to babysit a child for a weekend on the high end, to passing the salt or reporting the time on the low end. Nevertheless, in the academic setting, the degree of imposition of requests does vary. Some of the requests which are used in this chapter from the textbook have the potential to be high imposition requests. In a survey of 32 graduate students (half native speakers, half nonnative speakers of American English), we asked respondents to rank commonly received requests as either "high" or "low" imposition. Twenty-eight out of 32 students we surveyed ranked asking for an extension of term papers and other due dates as high imposition. Yet, there is no attempt in this chapter to rank impositions. In its list of requests to role play, the chapter also includes asking the instructor for an A- rather than a B+. This is viewed by faculty as being a very risky request to teach and practice, especially without explanation or elaboration.

Another text, Communicating in the Real World: Developing Communication Skills for Business and the Professions by Terrence G. Wiley and Heide Spruck Wrigley, does discuss the weight of certain requests in the business setting. It further tells students that bosses do expect to have explanations for certain requests and even cautions against inventing explanations.

In Example (9) we see an excerpt from a full conversation provided in the chapter entitled "Language Functions" (Wiley & Wrigley, 1987, pp. 26-27).[3] The textbook glosses the turns of the interlocutors by providing what are essentially semantic formulas. The learners are taken through an extended negotiation of Ms. Ibrahim's request for a day off, to a compromise, and finally, a closing.

(9) "Let Me Tell You About My Situation"

Ms. Ibrahim: Excuse me, Mr. Winting. Could I talk to you a minute? *(request for permission to interrupt)*

Mr. Winting: Sure, go ahead. *(permission granted)*

Ms. Ibrahim: I have a problem. My parents are arriving form Kuwait tomorrow and they need to be picked up at the airport because they don't speak any English. *(explanation of problem: reason for request)* I would like to take a personal holiday so that I will be able to get them. *(request for permission to take the day off)* I am caught up on my work, and Ms. Sindaha knows what to do if there are problems. *(assurance that work will not be interrupted because of personal problems)*

Mr. Winting: Well, as you know, we have a contract due in a few days, and we really could use every person in the office in case any last-minute problems come-up. *(stalling; appeal for the other person to withdraw her request)*

[Conversation continues for seven turns]

The conversation is followed by several short sections which discuss issues related to making requests in the workplace, such as "Making Requests and Asking for Permission," "Tips for Taking Requests and Asking Permission" (this section includes "Look at the Overall Situation," "Don't Fabricate (Invent) Emergencies," "Keep a Low Profile", and "Giving Reasons and Making Excuses."

This text also serves as a promising model for materials development. However, I suspect that the degree of pragmatic and situational detail in this textbook stems from the fact that it is addressed to novice business students (who happen to be language learners) who cannot be expected to know the rules of interaction in a new setting. In contrast, materials developed exclusively for language learners tend to shy away from telling learners, particularly adult learners, how to behave. This is yet another complex issue, but the approach developed by Wiley and Wrigley does offer an avenue for exploration in materials development.

Neither of these books is representative of the available published materials. Although they may have shortcomings, they are significant attempts to help learners to prepare for interaction in specific settings.

Why are dialogues and other examples of invented language use so hard to get right? As Wolfson told us over the years, it is because pragmatic or sociolinguistic competence is not amenable to introspection (Wolfson, 1989). Although it may be possible to introspect on one's own grammatical competence, it is not possible to do the same for language use. The bottom line is that we need to observe language use in order to provide reasonably authentic--and representative--models of language use.

Although I personally consider it unlikely that good textbooks and materials alone will be sufficient for learners to increase their pragmatic competence, I consider it even more unlikely that they will do so without good materials which comprise a significant portion of the positive evidence to which learners are exposed.

The Role of Research

How can research help in the development of pragmatically appropriate materials? Cross cultural pragmatics research and interlanguage pragmatics research has resulted in a number of quite reasonable descriptions of potential target languages for specific speech acts and conversational exchanges. Cohen and Olshtain estimate that "the research literature provides relatively detailed descriptions of realization strategies for perhaps eight speech acts in a variety of situations (i.e., apologies, requests, complaints, disapproval, refusals, disagreement, gratitude, compliments)" (1993, pp. 34). As yet, English is still the best represented language, but Japanese, Chinese, German, Hebrew, French, and even Kiswahili are becoming increasingly available.[4] The data which the research offers as potential models are not exhaustive, but they are available and useful. For example, Omar (1995) in Kiswahili and Takenoya (1995b) in Japanese have already brought the result of their research into the foreign language classroom.

It should not be thought at any time in this discussion that research has the answers to all the questions in pragmatics and language learning. Far from it. Although the descriptions of some speech acts, for example, are fairly complete, there is still more to do. We are now beginning to ask new questions such as "How does pragmatic competence develop?," "Which speech acts really matter in terms of getting them right--and in which areas does deviation from the norm exact the highest price from learners?" Some of these questions could be answered by observing learners in classrooms.

Speech Acts Framework

At this point in the paper I would like to consider the analytic framework in which this paper is situated. In this paper so far, I have explicitly adopted a speech acts framework to which I've added conversational functions of openings and closings. This is not the only possibility, of course, but it is one I use in teacher education and also in collaboration with teachers.[5] I use the speech act framework in teaching both for its accessibility and for the availability of descriptions of language use in that framework.

The most important point is the accessibility of the notion of speech acts to both teachers and language learners. As speakers, as communicators, as language users, we know many of the terms already. We are aware of the intended effect of utterances, what we call the illocutionary force, and we can and do refer to illocutionary force in daily conversation. We have all heard utterances such as those in Example (10) in which a speaker names a particular speech act.

(10) Colloquial naming of speech acts

a. George is so stubborn that he won't apologize.
b. You owe me an apology.
c. I wrote my father-in-law to thank him for the gift.
d. It's OK, you don't have to thank me.
e. He refused to do it.
f. I'm going to call and complain.

In addition to the accessibility of the notion of speech acts, what we might have called "psychological reality" in the 1970s, there is a large body of research in the speech act framework, as I've already mentioned. Such descriptions are rich resources for materials development.

I should also note that there are different ways of analyzing conversations and that the speech act framework represents only one way of looking at language use. Examples of very impressive training programs in pragmatics can be found in some International Teaching Assistants programs. These typically do not take a speech act approach. Reports of methods and research carried out in these programs can be found in the work of Catherine Davies at the University of Alabama (Davies, 1994; Davies & Tyler, 1994) Andrea Tyler in her work at University of Florida (now at Georgetown) (Tyler, 1992, 1994), and Jessica Williams at the University of Illinois at Chicago (J. Williams, 1992; Hoejke & Williams, 1994).

Goals

Before we go into the classroom let us examine the goals of bringing pragmatics and pedagogy together. I have tried very hard not to say "Let's teach pragmatics." I do not want to evoke the image of the teacher-centered classroom where the teachers "tell" and the learners "receive" the information. I think our endeavor instead, is one in which we help learners increase their pragmatic awareness.

Over the years working with a number of language-teacher colleagues, especially, Becky Mahan-Taylor, Alwiya Omar, Dudley Reynolds, and Shona Whyte, Beverly Hartford and I have developed and led in-service workshops in pragmatics at university ESL programs, and at state, regional, and national conferences. The teachers who have attended these workshops have challenged us all to clarify our thinking about the outcome of focusing on pragmatics in the classroom.

By increasing pragmatic awareness we mean a variety of things--we hope to help learners listen to interactions, to watch for reactions, to consider what may result from one choice of words over another. Offering a model of an American manner of performing particular speech acts is only one part of increasing pragmatic awareness on the part of the learner. It is up to a learner whether he or she attempts American-style compliments, complaints, or closings, for example. A focus on pragmatics in the classroom also offers learners tools to interpret and to respond to a variety of speech acts when they are addressed to them. Our chief goal is increased pragmatic awareness; this may include but is by no means limited to production alone.

Addressing pragmatics as part of language pedagogy empowers students to experience and experiment with the language, using the language class as an opportunity for learners to expand their communication across cultural boundaries and to thereby participate in the very purpose of language, which is communication. I think that the mood of ESL teachers with whom I've worked is that it must be left up to the learners how far they want to go in adopting certain linguistic behaviors. This is a source of some debate in the field as is indicated by the lively discussion at the conference which followed Takenoya's presentation on the acquisition of address terms by American learners of Japanese (Takenoya, 1995b). In retrospective interviews, American males learning Japanese as a foreign language reported that they were hesitant to use certain features of the Japanese address system which they considered sexist. After one member of the audience ventured that successful language learners must give up part of themselves, the audience broke into earnest discussion concerning whether learners could establish limits for themselves and still be successful learners. This is an issue which teachers and researchers alike must seriously address, and not a matter which can be resolved here.

Language-Teaching Methods

I am going to briefly touch on language teaching methods here. Part of what is going to help us help learners reach this goal are current methods of teaching and more important the attitudes and principles which are the basis for those methods. Language classrooms are becoming increasingly learner-centered, with learners viewed as knowers and discoverers. Learners are increasingly being asked to take responsibility for their own learning. Language acquisition is increasingly viewed as a significant force in the language teaching classroom. We now recognize--as a result both of second language acquisition research and classroom innovation moving the focus from the teacher to the learner--that classroom input, in both second and foreign language classrooms, can never fully specify the target language input for learners. Moreover, for any individual learner input always underdetermines eventual competence. In addition, I see classrooms in which teachers function both as facilitators and co-learners with their students. And this practice will prove to be quite fruitful in our quest to bring pragmatics into the classroom.

Evaluating a Speech Act Framework for Pedagogy

Against these goals and assumptions I would like to evaluate two frequent objections to a speech-act framework as a basis for pedagogy. I tackle these problems here to bring them to the reader's attention, so we can dismiss them, and so that the reader will not say later "she didn't tell us about these."

A potential problem in pedagogical pragmatics is the sheer number of speech acts, as Marion Williams (1988) and John Flowerdew (1990) observe. M. Williams argues that the large number of language functions and speech acts makes the teaching of specific acts an unattainable goal and instead suggests that "the focus should . . . be . . . on using language in ongoing discourse, in a particular context, for a particular purpose, and as part of a strategy" (M. Williams, 1988, p. 46). Although one might agree with M. Williams that it is impossible to teach all language functions or speech acts, I further claim that there is also a large number of language contexts and purposes, and that teaching these is equally prohibitive. It is impossible to prepare students for every context or even all of the most common situations they will face in natural language settings.

Materials development and input will never be exhaustive. The point of having pragmatically accurate materials is to have classroom materials which are easily accessible and high prestige sources, representing authentic interaction. But the materials will never represent every speech act in every possible situation. Not because it is too enormous a task--and it is--but because we don't believe that learners acquire language that way. We use authentic language and representative cases as input--as triggers--for learners to acquire more. If we believed that learners only learn what is modeled and what they memorize, then we would have an enormous task indeed. The input would have to fully specify any and all of the expected output.

Our position, therefore, is that the real responsibility of the classroom teacher is not to instruct students specifically in the intricacies of complimenting, direction-giving, or closing a conversation, but rather to make students more aware that pragmatic functions exist in language, specifically in discourse, in order that they may be more aware of these functions as learners. We as teachers must be knowledgeable of these speech acts and their component parts in order to determine what is naturalistic input for our students, but it would be impossible to impart this knowledge concerning every speech act explicitly. We believe that if students are encouraged to think for themselves about culturally appropriate ways to compliment a friend or say goodbye to a teacher, then they may awaken their own lay abilities for pragmatic analysis.

Flowerdew also points out that there is no teaching order specified by speech act theory. This is absolutely true. Unlike generative grammar which claims to be a theory of acquisition, no comparable claims were made by speech act theory. Thus, I would say that it is not the responsibility of such a theory to suggest either an acquisition order or an instructional order. In fact, I will even go so far as to question such a concept as ordering speech acts. It suggests to me a structural syllabus which hardly seems appropriate to such an inherently communicative notion as a speech act. And yet, we all need starting points. Where shall we begin?

Starting Points

There is probably no "best" or "most crucial" speech act for instruction. Selections should be made according to learner needs or interests and by current or future type of target language contact. As I see it, there are two potential starting points. We can identify a speech act for instruction either through observing students' conversational or written language use, or by asking students to identify areas of difficulty. One of the earliest TESOL Quarterly articles to treat the use of specific expressions which differ pragmatically was a paper entitled "Excuse me and I'm sorry" by Borkin and Reinhart (1978). This paper came out of the classroom work of two ESL teachers who noticed that their learners were having difficulty in using these two expressions and in distinguishing them from each other.

Another option is to ask learners what they want to be able to do with words. One of the teachers in the Intensive English Program at the Center for English Language of Indiana

University regularly does this. He believes that learners know what they want to learn to do. One semester his class wanted to know how to order a pizza over the phone. This may seem simple, but before dismissing this as unworthy of classroom time, consider what goes into the act of ordering a pizza. In ordering a pizza, learners engage in minimal greetings (this is a service encounter so greetings are appropriately short), state the request, answer questions posed by the order-taker as to size, type, additional purchases such as drinks or bread sticks, and then provide an address and perhaps directions to the student's residence.

The answers to these two questions, "What do teachers see learners struggling with?", and "What do learners want to learn?" are potentially important to research as well. We know that learners often differ from the native speaker norm on a variety of speech acts. What we do not know, by and large, is how much it matters. I owe this observation to Gabi Kasper (Kasper, 1995). We need to distinguish between trivial and consequential deviation from the norm. In teaching, the difference between aesthetics and communicative necessity is important. Where should we use our limited resources and time? For research, the answer to the question "Which differences matter?" will reveal yet other important facets of language use, highlighting problematic variation.

In rereading Flowerdew's critique of speech act theory as a basis for pedagogy, I was struck by the absence of any mention of the learner. No matter how good the materials or how tightly structured and articulated the syllabus, raising pragmatic awareness must involve more than materials and a syllabus. Methods of language teaching and our view of language acquisition clearly play a role.

Clearly, the goal of getting pragmatics into the classroom represents a huge materials development project. But some of the materials don't need to be developed, instead they need to be collected. Even if we collected authentic dialogues and played them and had learners listen and repeat until the dialogues were memorized we would still not achieve our pedagogical goals or meet our learner's communicative needs. Utilized in this manner, I believe that even authentic materials would be doomed to failure.

In contrast, the learner must take a key role in the discovery process, and because no one knows all the answers, the teacher and the researcher go along on the journey. Good materials are not sufficient. New techniques for developing noticing which necessarily involve the learner must also be devised. One easy recommendation is to have learners be their own ethnographers--to have them do their own observations. That is an excellent suggestion, as far as it goes. I find it to be a suggestion that comes up too often and too easily. It is a goal to which we can aspire, and learners at most levels can collect their own data--but only if they have been prepared. One job of the language classroom is to help learners be successful. What lies between pushing learners out of the classroom-nest to collect their own input on the one hand, and the dialogue rut on the other?

Into the Classroom

I will conclude with a few concrete examples of activities which we have used at Indiana University which are designed to increase pragmatic awareness. Activities are important because good materials are necessary, but not sufficient.

What I am going to say here, I owe to my language-teacher colleagues.[6] Keep in mind that some materials can be developed for the classroom, some are collected, and some can be produced live, before your students' eyes and ears.

One way of introducing a speech act and encouraging students to think about how it functions is to examine that function in their own language and culture, as suggested in the ESL text The Culture Puzzle. In developing activities for our paper on teaching closings (Bardovi-Harlig, et al, 1991), we found that a successful discussion concerning closings was easily generated and did not require the introduction of technical vocabulary. This type of activity gives students not only a basis of comparison, but also the opportunity to share a speech act, at which they are clearly expert, with their classmates. Through guided discussion students become aware of the pragmatic rules governing their native language and the ramifications of enacting such rules appropriately and inappropriately. The awareness of communication goals that this activity generates can then be applied to the target language in the instructional setting.

The students in one class in which the activity was conducted, agreed that their languages, like English, require speakers to announce their intention to close. They maintained that in their native languages abrupt closings were impolite, as were speakers who refused to respond to other speakers' attempts to shut down a conversation.

Natural language samples can be incorporated into the classroom in a variety of ways. For beginning students, activities such as "The Classroom Guest" help develop listening, speaking, and pragmatic skills. In the "Classroom Guest" the instructor arranges for someone to interrupt the class--to deliver a message, ask a question, or make any other brief and believable exchange. Before the preplanned interruption, the instructor turns on a tape recorder that can pick up the voices of both the teacher and the visitor and records the entire exchange. When the visitor leaves, the teacher asks the students what was said. After the class discussion, two students are asked to recreate the scene through role play, with help from the rest of the class. The teacher also records the reenactment. Next, both exchanges are played to the class and the differences between the "real" exchange and the students' reenactment are discussed.

I want to consider a further example of the "classroom guest" in Kiswahili which was adapted for Kiswahili by Aliwya Omar. As Example (11) shows, greetings are typically very long in Kiswahili (Omar, 1992a, p. 22).

(11) Two acquaintances pass each other and greet

X:	Shikamoo	Shikamoo
Y:	Marahaba. Habari?	OK. News?
x:	Nzuri.	Good.
Y:	Hujambo?	Are you fine?

X:	Sijambo.	I am fine.
Y:	Habri za kwenu?	News of your home?
X:	Nzuri.	Good.
Y:	Watu wote hawajambo?	Is everybody fine?
X:	Hawajambo.	They are fine.
Y:	Watoto?	The children?
X:	Hawajambo.	They are fine.
Y:	Haya bwana.	OK, bwana.
X:	Je, salama?	Peaceful.

It is important that learners observe native speakers in action, because when such extended greetings are addressed to them, Omar reports they think that they have already answered the question (1992b). An additional interpretation that comes to mind is that they may think that such rephrasings are addressed to them because they are learners. On the contrary, the Kiswahili speaker who addresses multiple greeting turns to the learner treats the learner as more competent than he is, and the learner, by not replying, actually short circuits his own input. The teacher or native speaker interlocutor cannot continue to greet if the learner cannot hold up his end of the conversational opening. Thus, in cases such as this, where learners lack the competence to keep input coming, it is particularly important that they have native speaker models. When a learner observes native speakers engaged in a greeting, they have the opportunity of observing a full greeting sequence which is neither limited by cultural expectations nor their own ability to provide the requisite responses.[7] In another activity we developed for closings, learners reconstruct closings from a series of conversational turns presented on individual strips of paper. The class is divided into pairs or small groups of 3-4 learners. Each group is given a set of paper strips, with one sentence from a closing written on each strip. Each group is assigned a different situation, and uses the strips to reconstruct a "goodbye." Typically we include a topic shut down, a preclosing, and the terminal pair, with optional arrangements as in Example (12).

(12) Sample Scrambled Closing

Shut down	A:	Well, That's the news about my sister, then.
	B:	Yeah, she has quite a life.
Preclosing	A:	Well.
	B:	All right.
Arrangements	A:	I'll pick you up on Thursday at 1:00.
	B:	Okay, see you then.
Terminal Pair	A:	Goodbye.
	B:	Bye.

For more advanced students, closings in more than one register can be mixed and learners can be given different situations. They then reconstruct closings appropriate for their particular situations. For example, the group writing a closing between a professor and a student would use strips with more formal expressions than would the group writing a closing between two friends. After the groups finish writing, two members from each group act out their closing. Following the presentations the appropriateness of each dialogue is discussed. This technique can be used with other conversational exchanges and speech acts as well.

One technique that was suggested to us in the course of a workshop on pragmatics that we did at Midwest TESOL in 1993 is to have learners observe native speaker role play. The teacher reported that she had her ESL learners who were living in dorms with native speakers ask them to role play certain situations. In that way, the learner was in control of the situation and could ask for repetitions, could ask the NS questions about his or her performance, and could anticipate in advance when the targeted speech acts or function would occur.

Teachers of intermediate and advanced learners may find that asking students to gather linguistic data outside of the classroom is a challenging follow-up to in-class activities. Students may be asked to focus on specific speech acts by gathering examples themselves. After classroom work which prepares the learners, learners may begin their collection of data from recorded sources such as radio, television, video tapes and movies, as well as books and plays. These offer alternative sources for foreign language students as well. Next, learners can move to observing live conversations. Once these samples have been recorded (either taped or written down from memory), students can compare different ways of saying goodbye in different contexts.

Teachers should be aware of limitations which are inherent in the data collection process. For example, some acts or conversational functions are more easily observed than others. Apologies, for example, are most often done privately. In other cases, such as conversational closings, an untrained or unsuspecting observer cannot observe a closing from the beginning because by the time a casual observer hears the actual closing, or the terminal pair, "Goodbye/Goodbye" or "Goodbye/Seeya" or other alternatives, the important turns leading up to the closing which form an integral part of the closing are long gone. (See Example 12). In contrast, openings, or greetings, are relatively easy to observe. As speakers approach each other, we expect them to greet and we can be prepared to observe from the beginning.

These are but some activities which we have used, and there are others. Holmes and Brown (1987), for example, offer many possibilities for learning about compliments. Pragmatics can also be integrated when focussing on various skills too, as Frescura's 1991 article on listening comprehension shows. Frescura develops a listening comprehension lesson in Italian (as a foreign language) whose content is disagreement. Materials and activities can and have been developed, but they have been relatively isolated occurrences among the vast array of pedagogical materials.

There is also preliminary evidence that instruction in pragmatics has a desirable affect. Morrow (1995) showed in his conference paper that instruction in complaints and refusals helped learners achieve long term goals in clarity and somewhat less impressive improvement in the use of politeness markers. Bouton has shown dramatic effects of instruction on implicature where learners who received only six hours of instruction--that is, one hour a week for six weeks--surpassed learners who had not received instruction on implicature, but who had been students at the university for three years! (Bouton, 1994, and this volume).

In closing, what do we need at this point? I would like to consider what needs to be done at the present to bolster the joining of pragmatics research and language teaching. We need continued work in description of pragmatics, to increase both our range of speech acts and the range of languages. We need to develop preliminary materials based on authentic language to serve as input to learners. The materials should not only utilize authentic language, but must take into account distribution and frequency of occurrence of the alternative forms presented to learners. Through collaboration we will need to determine how learners best learn pragmatics. And above all, we need to continue to share our findings, whether at conferences such as Pragmatics and Language Learning, TESOL, or ACTFL, or by establishing pragmatics files for language programs.

There is clearly a meaningful task for everyone interested in working on pragmatics, whether your specialty is second language acquisition, materials development, innovations in language teaching, methods, classroom oriented research; whether you are a researcher, teacher educator, or language teacher; whether the language you teach is English, Italian, Japanese, or Kiswahili. With joint effort, we can bring pragmatics and pedagogy together, together.

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NOTES

[1] If the ending of this conversation doesn't strike you as odd, have two students read the dialogue, then walk away from each other when they reach the end. The effect is immediate and obvious. I use this demonstration in teacher-preparation courses and with learners. It is a good way to begin a discussion on how to end a conversation.

[2] See also M. Williams (1988) for a comparison of language used in business meetings and the language models in business-English textbooks.

[3] In addition to requests, this chapter includes some examples of eight functional categories, expressing lack of comprehension, asking for clarification/double checking,

making a suggestion, making an offer, expressing disagreement, expressing dissatisfaction, responding to criticism, and showing sympathy.

[4] Among the studies of languages other than English, see for example, for Japanese, see Kasper (1992), Takenoya (1995a, 1995b, & in press), Rose (1994); for Chinese, Kasper (in press); for Kiswahili, Omar (1991, 1992a & b); for Hebrew, Blum-Kulka (1982), Olshtain & Weinbach (1987); for German, House & Kasper (1981); see also, Blum-Kulka, House, & Kasper (1989).

[5] This is not the only framework we have used in our research in which we use both a speech act framework and discourse analysis to interpret the conversations in which the speech acts are realized. See Hartford and Bardovi-Harlig (1995b) for explicit discussion of the analytic framework.

[6] I would especially like to thank Rebecca Mahan-Taylor, Alwiya Omar, and Dudley Reynolds for their insightful collaboration over the years.

[7] Such models may, of course, be provided on videotape or by computer (which would have the advantage of being reusable), but I particularly like the immediacy of having the interaction take place in front of the learners. It is the presentation of models, not the medium, which is the focus of this activity.

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CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND INTERLANGUAGE PRAGMATICS: AMERICAN VS. EUROPEAN REQUESTS

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This paper focuses on interlanguage pragmatics and cross-cultural communication by examining requests uttered by native and non-native speakers of English and Spanish. Specifically, it describes the request strategies and the use of mitigating supportives by European and American speakers in English and Spanish. Participants were American and European university students who were attending Spanish and English language courses at the University of the Basque Country during the academic year 1993-94. The data were collected via a Discourse Completion Test and codified according to the CCSARP coding manual (Blum-Kulka, House & Kasper, 1989).

The results show some differences in the use of request strategies by Americans and Europeans both in English and Spanish. It was also found that the use of mitigating supportives is more common among advanced non-native speakers and that it is closely related to linguistic competence.

INTRODUCTION

The study of speech acts from a linguistic perspective, comparing either the linguistic realization of speech acts in different languages (*contrastive pragmatics*), or the speech acts produced by native speakers and second language learners (*interlanguage pragmatics*) can be relevant for several reasons. First, it can contribute to theoretical pragmatics because it can shed light on the universal principles which govern the production of speech acts and the degree to which these rules of language use vary from language to language. Second, cross-linguistic comparisons of speech act realizations can also contribute to studies in cross-cultural communication. The study of speech as a cultural phenomenon and its role in cultural identity has shown that different communities vary in their production and interpretation of linguistic behaviour (Gumperz, 1982). The linguistic approach to the study of speech acts can not only identify but also provide a detailed description of the interactional styles corresponding to different speech communities (deKadt, 1992; Omar, 1992; Eslamirasekh, 1993). Finally, the cross-linguistic study of speech acts can also contribute to the development of second language acquisition research by identifying the strategies used by learners in the production of speech acts. This approach is commonly referred as *interlanguage pragmatics* and has been defined as "the study of non-native speakers' use and acquisition of linguistic action patterns in a second language" (Kasper & Blum-Kulka, 1993, p. 3).

The analysis of speech acts from a linguistic perspective has focused both on the perception and production of speech acts in experimental and natural settings (Kasper &

Dahl, 1991). It has been suggested that there is a universal and a language specific component in the realization of speech acts. The universal pragmatic knowledge is shared across languages and explains, for example, that the same basic strategies (direct, conventionally indirect and nonconventional indirect or hints) are used in the realization of requests (Blum-Kulka & Olhstain, 1984). At the same time, there are different interactional styles and important cross-linguistic differences in the selection, distribution and realization of speech acts. For example, German speakers are more direct than British English speakers when uttering requests (House & Kasper, 1981) and Hebrew speakers are more direct than American English speakers (Blum-Kulka, 1982). Nevertheless, the universality vs. culture-specificity issue is still controversial (Fraser, 1985; Wierzbicka, 1991) particularly, when non-Western languages and cultures are considered (Kachru, 1994).

Interlanguage pragmatics is related to the concept of communicative competence and specifically, to that of pragmatic competence (Bachman, 1990). Pragmatic or actional competence is a component of communicative competence that has been defined as "the ability to convey and understand communicative intent by performing and interpreting speech acts and language functions" (Celce-Murcia, Dornyei & Thurrell, 1994). Lack of pragmatic competence or pragmatic failure is more easily observable than pragmatically competent language use. Pragmatic failure can take place at different levels (Blum-Kulka, 1991; Thomas, 1983). In the case of pragmalinguistic failure the learner uses linguistic elements which do not correspond to native forms and can produce breakdowns in communication or socially inappropriate utterances. At the sociopragmatic and cultural level, the learner produces an inappropriate utterance because he/she is not aware of the social and cultural rules affecting speech act realization in a particular language. These rules can involve a different perception of social psychological elements such as social distance, relative power and status or legitimization of a specific behaviour.

Pragmatic failure differs from other types of failure because it is not easily recognizable by interlocutors who may judge the speaker as being impolite or uncooperative or attribute the pragmatic errors to the speaker's personality. Moreover, pragmatic failure is common not only among students with low proficiency in the target language but also among advanced language learners presenting a good command of grammatical and lexical elements (Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford, 1990).

A speech act that has been the focus of attention in interlanguage pragmatics is that of requests. Requests are pre-event acts which have been considered *face-threatening* (Brown and Levinson, 1978) as they impose the speaker's interests on the hearer. Requests can be regarded as a constraint on the hearer's freedom of action and for this reason, requests in different languages present a rich variety of strategies and modifiers necessary to mitigate their impositive effect. Requests are complex speech acts which involve a relationship of different elements. These elements have been identified by Blum-Kulka (1991) as the *request schema* which includes requestive goals subject to a cultural filter, linguistic encoding (strategies, perspective and modifiers), situational parameters (distance, power, legitimization) and the social meaning of the request according to cultural and situational factors.

The cross-linguistic comparison of requests uttered by native and non-native speakers has revealed that there are similarities and differences in the selection and distribution of linguistic elements. Non-native speakers have been reported to use a more restrictive and less complex requesting repertoire than native speakers (Blum-Kulka, 1982, 1991; House & Kasper, 1987; Faerch & Kasper, 1989; Niki & Tajika, 1994). When the requesting strategies of native speakers and learners have been compared, learners have been found to be more direct than native speakers in some studies (House & Kasper, 1987; Tanaka 1988; Koike, 1989; Fukushima, 1990) but not in others (Blum-Kulka 1982, 1991). Learners' requests have been consistently reported to differ from native speakers' in the fact that learners modify their requests externally by adding more mitigating supportives than native speakers. The most common mitigating supportive is the grounder, which provides reasons and explanations to justify the need to make a request. This behaviour, known as the *waffle phenomenon* affects the length of the utterance and has been observed in interlanguage behaviour in Hebrew (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1986); English (House & Kasper, 1987; Faerch & Kasper, 1989) and German (Faerch & Kasper, 1989). Learners have also been found to share with native speakers sensitivity to contextual constraints when they select requesting strategies (Blum-Kulka, 1982; Kasper 1989; Niki & Tajika, 1994).

The most common explanation for pragmatic failure is pragmatic negative transfer (Thomas, 1983) defined as "the influence of L1 pragmatic competence on IL pragmatic knowledge that differs from the L2 target" (Kasper & Blum-Kulka, 1993, p. 10). Pragmatic negative transfer can take place at the pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic levels but cannot account for all types of pragmatic failure. In some cases, such as the *waffle phenomenon*, learners present pragmatic behaviour that is different from both the L1 and the L2 and seems to be characteristic of interlanguage. Pragmatic competence and pragmatic failure can reflect interlanguage processes which are common in second language acquisition such as overgeneralization, simplification and reduction. Pragmatic competence is also interrelated to other dimensions of communicative competence and pragmalinguistic or sociopragmatic failure can be caused by lack of linguistic or sociolinguistic competence.

Research in contrastive and interlanguage pragmatics and particularly, the Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Project (CCSARP) (Blum-Kulka, House & Kasper, 1989), have proved to be relevant for the study of second language acquisition, cross-cultural and theoretical pragmatics. Nevertheless, further studies including different first and second languages are still necessary in order to confirm previous findings and provide a deeper understanding of pragmatic competence in cross-linguistic communication. The requesting behaviour of European and American speakers in English and Spanish can be extremely relevant not only for its contribution to interlanguage pragmatics but also for cross-cultural studies on the language behaviour in European-American communication.

This paper aims at investigating the similarities and differences in the requesting behaviour presented by American and European speakers in English and Spanish. The specific research questions address those aspects of requesting behaviour which have received more attention in the literature: requesting strategies and mitigating supportives. The research questions are the following: i) Do European and American speakers use the same request strategies in English and Spanish? ii) Do European and American speakers modify their requests in the same way by using mitigating supportives?

METHOD

Participants were 106 university students, 29 Americans and 78 Europeans with various first languages (Swedish, Spanish, Norwegian, Italian, French, Greek, Danish, German, Portuguese). American and European (non-Spanish) subjects attended Spanish language courses at the University of the Basque Country while Spanish subjects were undergraduates majoring in English Studies at the University of the Basque Country. Non-native speakers of English (European, including Spanish) reported a higher level of proficiency in English than non-native speakers of Spanish (European non-Spanish and American) in Spanish.

The data were obtained via a general background questionnaire and a discourse completion test (DCT), based on the CCSARP. All the participants completed the DCT both in English and in Spanish. English was an L2 for all Europeans (n=78) while Spanish was the L1 for some Europeans (Spanish subjects, n=48) and an L2 for the rest of the Europeans (n=30). In the case of Americans (n=29), English was the L1 and Spanish the L2. The DCTs necessarily produce more stereotyped responses but they allow comparability among different groups because the contexts in which speech acts are produced are controlled. The DCT used in this research contained the following request situations: a) A teacher asks a student to get a book from the library; b) A student asks a teacher for handouts given in a previous class; c) You ask a colleague to make a long distance phone call from his/her apartment; d) A traffic warden asks a driver to move his/her car. The DCTs were codified according to the CCSARP coding manual (Blum-Kulka, House & Kasper, 1989). Only two aspects of request behaviour will be analysed in this paper: the request strategy and mitigating supportive moves.

RESULTS

The general results corresponding to the use of requesting strategies in English and Spanish by all the subjects in the sample (n=106) were the following. The most frequent strategy used in English and Spanish when uttering requests was the conventionally indirect, that is, "procedures that realize the act by reference to contextual preconditions necessary for its performance, as conventionalized in a given language" (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984, p. 201). The conventionally indirect strategy was used in 85.2% of the English requests and 72.9% of the Spanish requests and included preparatories (Can I..?, Could I..?), and suggestory formula (How about..?). The direct strategy, which is more explicit, is "realized by requests syntactically marked as such (...) or by other verbal means that name the act as a request" (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984, p. 201). This strategy was used in 10% of the English requests and 25.37% of the Spanish requests and included mood derivables (Give me...), explicit performatives (I am asking..), hedged performatives (I must ask) and locution derivables (you must/should/have to). The nonconventional indirect strategy (strong and mild hints) realize "the request by either partial reference to object or element needed for the implementation of the act or by reliance on contextual clues" (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984, p. 201). This strategy was used in 4.8% of the English requests and 1.72% of the Spanish requests. The specific percentages corresponding to the distribution of the conventionally indirect strategy in English in European and American requests are presented in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1



It can be observed that in English, both native and non-native speakers use the conventionally indirect strategy less frequently in the '*car*' situation, in which a policeman asks a driver to move his/her car. American speakers use this strategy less often than European speakers in the four situations. Native speakers of American English tend to use more direct strategies in requests not only because they use the conventionally indirect strategy more often but also because they use the direct strategy in 17.47% of their requests and Europeans in 7.8%.

The use of the conventionally indirect strategy in Spanish by European native and non-native speakers and by American non-native speakers is presented in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2



The situational variation is less consistent in Spanish requests. European non-native speakers of Spanish use the conventionally indirect strategy less often in the '*car*' situation, Americans in the '*book*' situation and European native speakers (Spanish) in the 'handout' situation. As compared to the English data, a different pattern is found in Spanish requests. In the case of Spanish requests, native speakers use the conventionally indirect strategy more often than non-native speakers. Native speakers of Spanish also use the direct strategy less often (13.12%) than American (34.1%) and European (33.8%) learners. Thus, American and European non-native speakers present a similar pattern when choosing their request strategies, a pattern which is different from that of European native speakers.

The percentages pertaining to the use of mitigating supportives by European and American speakers of English are presented in figure 3.

FIGURE 3



Non-native speakers of English use more mitigating supportives than native speakers in the four situations when uttering requests in English. Both groups use fewer supportives in '*book*' situation in which the teacher asks a student for a book than in the '*phone*' and '*car*' situations. The following examples of the '*phone*' situation (1) show that non-native requests tend to be longer because they include more mitigating supportives.

(1) American Native Speakers

-I have to make a really important, long distance phone call. Might I borrow your phone?
-I need to call California, don't worry I'll charge it to my credit card.
-I need to make a really important call to the States. My wife is in the hospital.

European Non-Native Speakers

-I need to make a long distance phone call. I would be very glad if I could phone from here, and of course, I will pay you the call.
-I need to ask you for a favour, it's very important. Would you mind letting me use your telephone for a long distance phone call?
-I really need to make a phone call to my mother in Sweden. She's in the hospital. It's a collect call.

-I would like to call my brother in Denmark. Could you please let me use your phone, of course, I'll pay.

The percentages corresponding to the use of mitigating supportives in Spanish are presented in Figure 4.

FIGURE 4



In Spanish fewer supportives are also used in the '*book*' situation and more in the '*phone*' and '*car*' situations. Native speakers of Spanish use more mitigating supportives than non-native speakers and European non-native speakers of Spanish use more supportives than Americans. Americans use fewer supportives than Europeans both in English and Spanish and non-natives use more supportives than natives in English but not in Spanish. Some examples of the 'phone' situation in Spanish are the following (2):

(2) Spanish Native Speakers

-Necesito hacer una llamada. ¿Te importaría que usase tu teléfono? Te pagaré la conferencia. (I have to make a call. Do you mind if I use your phone? I'll pay for the call.)
-Tengo que hacer una llamada al extranjero. Si quieres te doy luego dinero porque es muy importante que la haga ahora. (I have to phone abroad. I can pay for that later but it is important for me to make this call now)

-¿Puedo hacer una llamada al extranjero? No te preocupes por el dinero, luego te lo daré. (Can I phone abroad? Don't worry about money, I'll pay you later)

Non-Native Speakers (European and American)

-Perdón. ¿Puedo hacer una llamada al extranjero aquí? (Excuse me. Can I phone abroad from here?)
-¿Podría usar tu teléfono, por favor? (Could I use your phone, please?)
-Por favor, ¿te molesta que use tu teléfono? (Please, do you mind if I use your phone?)
-Teléfono extranjero por favor. (Foreign phone, please)

DISCUSSION

The analyses of the request strategies and mitigating supportives used by Americans and Europeans in English and Spanish show some interesting patterns along the cross-cultural dimension of Americans vs. Europeans, and the interlanguage dimension of native speakers vs. learners.

Regarding the cross-cultural dimension, it can be observed that even though the conventionally indirect strategy is the preferred strategy, Americans use more direct and fewer conventionally indirect strategies than European speakers in English. Moreover, Americans use fewer mitigating supportives both in English and Spanish. These two characteristics of American requests could produce an effect of directness in American speech. European English has been defined as "the use of English by Europeans to communicate with other Europeans" (Berns, 1995, p. 24), and it includes native (British, Irish) and non-native speakers (German, French, Swedish, Spanish, etc.). Non-native European English[1] seems to present some pragmatic characteristics which are closer to a native variety of European English (British English) than to American English. In fact, reports on the use of the conventionally indirect strategy by native speakers of British English are very close (about 90%) to the percentages found in this study (87%) (Faerch & Kasper, 1989; House & Kasper, 1987). Nevertheless, the use of mitigating supportives by Europeans is much higher (61.7%) than previous reports on the use of supportives in British English (23%) (House, 1989; House & Kasper, 1987) and would provide supporting evidence for the *waffle phenomenon*. Non-native European English would share some pragmalinguistic characteristics with British English and at the same time present others which seem to be typically associated with non-native requesting behaviour.

Pragmatic competence in European English has to be explained as related to the extensive use of English for communicative interaction among non-native speakers in Europe. English is the most common language in intra-European communication and it is not only a second but also a third or fourth language in multilingual Europe (Baetens Beardsmore, 1993; Cenoz & Valencia, 1994). European English is "a medium for expressing culturally and socially unique ideas, feelings, and identities to people in the world, native and non-native speakers alike" (Berns, 1995, p. 24). In this context, non-native European

English does not necessarily have to be considered as a deficient variety of American or British English but as a relatively stable non-native variety presenting its own pragmatic characteristics. Therefore, the way in which speech acts are carried out in non-native European English could be regarded as a *deviation* rather than a *mistake* (Kachru, 1992). Even though English is a foreign language in most European countries, non-native European English, the same as other non-native varieties of English (Indian, Malaysian, Nigerian, etc.) seems to present some specific features.

In the case of Spanish requests, the pattern that emerges is the opposite of English requests. Learners use the conventionally indirect strategy less often than native speakers and they also use fewer mitigating supportives. The use of more direct strategies by language learners is not surprising and has been reported in previous research involving language varieties which use a large proportion of conventionally indirect strategies (Tanaka, 1988; Koike, 1989; Fukushima, 1990; House & Kasper, 1987). The data on mitigating supportives in Spanish seems to contradict previous data in which learners with different levels of proficiency have been reported to *waffle* by producing more supportive moves than native speakers of either the first or the second language (House, 1989; Faerch & Kasper, 1989; House and Kasper, 1987; Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1986). We argue that the different behaviour presented by learners of English and of Spanish can be explained in terms of language competence and the interdependence of the different dimensions of communicative competence. Linguistic competence does not guarantee pragmatic competence but it is a necessary pre-requisite to pragmatic competence (Hoffman-Hicks, 1992). As it has already been stated, non-native speakers of English reported a higher level of proficiency than non-native speakers of Spanish. In fact, European non-native speakers of English are university students majoring in English studies (native speakers of Spanish) or European students who study Spanish as an additional third, fourth or fifth language after studying English for a large number of years. On the contrary, in the case of Spanish, non-native speakers' competence can be labelled as *lower intermediate* according to the learners' own reports and the language courses in which they are currently enrolled. Non-native speakers of English are expected to present the necessary linguistic resources to produce supportive moves and feel comfortable enough with the language so as to produce longer utterances. Non-native speakers of Spanish would have less linguistic resources at their disposal and prefer shorter utterances. A careful review of studies reporting that learners *waffle* shows that learners who waffle are at the intermediate or advanced levels (House & Kasper, 1987; Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1986) and that learners at the lower intermediate level have been reported not to waffle (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1986). Our study supports these findings and suggests that the interdependence among the different dimensions of communicative competence and the influence of linguistic competence should be regarded as crucial when explaining the *waffle phenomenon*.

As far as sociopragmatic competence is concerned, the comparison of native and non-native speakers of English and Spanish reveals that both groups are aware of the different situations and use different degrees of directness according to the context, as previously reported (Blum-Kulka, 1982; Kasper, 1989; Rintell & Mitchell 1989). The comparison of English and Spanish indicates that even though contextual influence is observable in both cases, the pattern is more consistent in English and could be affected by linguistic competence.

Another finding of this study concerns the use of the conventionally indirect strategy by native speakers of Spanish. The fact that this strategy is very commonly used (84.8%) emphasizes the need to refer to language varieties rather than languages as it contradicts previous data on Argentinian Spanish (Blum-Kulka & House, 1989) in which the conventionally indirect strategy was only used by 60% of the population.

This study underlines the need to examine pragmatic competence as related to other components of communicative competence. It also discusses the pragmatic competence of non-native Europeans who use English as a language of intra-European and international communication. These issues have important implications for language teaching. They highlight the need to teach the different components of communicative competence and to develop communicative activities in which these components are related. This study also raises the issue of the desirable model of pragmatic competence in foreign language contexts particularly, when non-native European English is considered. Rather than acquiring a specific model of pragmatic competence, students could benefit from developing pragmatic awareness in order to interpret the utterances produced by native and non-native speakers and to know the effect of their own productions on the hearer.

Further research involving observational data is certainly needed in order to confirm our findings (Hartford & Bardovi-Harlig, 1992). The analysis of other speech acts and implicatures could also help to develop our understanding of interlanguage pragmatics and to determine the pragmatic characteristics of non-native European English. Finally, research involving different levels of proficiency could also be useful in order to confirm the effect of linguistic competence on the *waffle phenomenon*.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors wish to thank English Philology students (University of the Basque Country) and students from the University Studies Abroad Consortium (UNR) living in the Basque Country in 93-94 for volunteering to participate in this study.

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NOTE

[1] The label '*non-native European English*' is used here in order to exclude European native speakers of English: British and Irish.

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APPENDIX: DISCOURSE COMPLETION TEST

1. You are a secondary school teacher and you ask one of your students (Peter Jones) to get a book from the library. What would you say to Peter?

2. You didn't come to class yesterday and you ask a fellow student (Ann) for her lecture notes. What would you say to her?

3. You are in Spain and you really need to make a long distance phone call. You are staying at Pedro's (your colleague) apartment. What would you say to Pedro?

4. You are a traffic warden and you see a car parked in front of the post office. There is a woman in the car. You want her to move the car. What would you say to the woman?

"AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE:"
A STUDY OF WRITTEN STUDENT REQUESTS TO FACULTY

Beverly S. Hartford
Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig

This paper analyzes e-mail requests from students to faculty. The requests were evaluated by the faculty for their positive or negative affect on the addressee. The analysis showed that those requests which had negative affect generally demonstrated a different interpretation of the rights and obligations of the parties involved than the positive affect requests: the negative affect requests frequently assumed a greater obligation to comply by the faculty member than did the faculty member. In addition, those requests with positive impact in general differed formally from those with negative impact. Differences also appeared in the content of the messages, especially in acknowledgements of the degree of imposition to the addresses, in the manner of presentation of time constraints related to the request, and in explanations for the requests. NSs and NNSs differed formally in that the NNSs used fewer downgraders in their requests with negative impact. In content, the NNSs used personal time needs more often than NSs, and acknowledged the imposition of the request on the faculty less often than the NSs.

INTRODUCTION

This paper looks at requests of native and NNSs of English in natural data: actual written requests from students to faculty. While there exists a fairly extensive literature on requests, including cross-cultural and interlanguage data (Beebe, et al, 1990; Blum-Kulka & House, 1989, inter alia), little work has been done on requests in institutional settings. In the present paper, we discuss such requests in keeping with our previous work on institutional language, where institutional roles and status play a part in determining the appropriate forms of language. All of the requests are from lower-status addressors (students) to higher-status addressees (faculty), and they involve topics related to the academic context in which these participants interact (Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford, 1990). Although the requests are generally institutionally sanctioned, they still constitute face threatening acts (FTAs), because they attempt to get the faculty member to do something he or she might not otherwise do (Brown and Levinson, 1978). Moreover, although in most cases the requests investigated in this paper were within the students' rights to make, and so in that sense do not put them out-of-status, it is not necessarily true that the faculty member has the obligation to comply (Blum- Kulka & House, 1989, p. 146.) Thus, in making such requests students risk their own positive face and the faculty's negative face. Since the faculty have institutional power to act in ways that can seriously affect students' lives, it is in the best interest of the students to assure that the faculty have positive assessments of them. By performing an act which imposes on the faculty, they may put themselves in some jeopardy. As a result, students must be able to judge the degree of imposition of such requests, to take into account the rights and obligations of the parties involved, and to choose the most effective ways to influence the faculty's behavior in the formulation of the request while addressing the face needs of the parties involved.

METHOD

E-mail requests to the two authors from both native and nonnative graduate students were randomly collected over a period of a year for a total of 34 NS and 65 NNS requests. The requests were then judged based on the affective response they produced from the faculty recipient. They were then also judged in the same way by the other, nonrecipient author. As a result, the messages were divided into two categories: those which triggered some negative affect (Negative Affect Requests, or NAR) and those which did not (Positive Affect Requests, or PAR). The former, NAR, were often judged by the authors to be rude, or inappropriate, perhaps producing some desire not to fulfill the request.[1] Interestingly, the authors agreed 100% on the categorization of the messages.

The requests were analyzed for linguistic forms employed, including the use of mitigators. They were also analyzed for degree of imposition. Finally, they were analyzed according to content, including references to time frames involved, acknowledgment of cost or imposition to faculty, and content of grounders or explanations. Because all of the requests were made through written communication with no potential for face-to-face strategies, they all employed direct or conventionally indirect strategies rather than nonconventionally indirect (Blum-Kulka, House, & Kasper, 1989, p. 4 and p. 19). As a result, level of directness is not addressed in this paper.

In order to determine degree of imposition, a questionnaire was devised which listed the most common topics, or goals, of the requests found in the messages. Eight faculty members in the Indiana University Department of Linguistics and Program in Applied Linguistics rated the degree of imposition of each topic. This served as a check on the original categorization of level of imposition by the authors.

RESULTS

Linguistic Forms

By linguistic forms we mean the syntactic frame used by the writer to realize the request. Such forms include I want to, I'd like to, Please+imperative, and statements using appreciate. Some differences in the use of linguistic forms may be found between the PAR and NAR categories and between NSs and NNSs (Table 1). In general, the NSs and NNSs do not differ greatly in the range of linguistic forms used, although the PAR requests by both groups show a different distribution of forms than the NAR requests.

Table 1: Distribution of Linguistic Form by Rating

NS PAR	21	NS NAR	13
I want to/ I'd like to	9.5%	I want to/ I'd like to	15.4%
Appreciate	9.5%	Appreciate	23.1%
Please + Imp	4.8%	Please + Imp	23.2%
Other	76.2%	Other	38.4%

NNS PAR	28	NNS NAR	37
I want to/ I'd like to	7.1%	I want to/ I'd like to	51.2%
Appreciate	14.2%	Appreciate	
Please + Imp	7.4%	Please + Imp	27.0%
Other	71.6%	Other	21.8%

Table 1 shows that Want statements are employed more frequently in NAR requests than in PAR requests by both NSs and NNSs. NSs show over a 50% increase (9.5% vs 15.4%) in their use of this form in the NAR messages, and NNSs show a 7-fold increase (7.1% vs 51.2%). Uses in NAR messages are illustrated in Examples (1) through (4).

(1) ...This is [student first name]. I would like to talk to you about the courses, English Dialect...If you can meet me before 2:00 PM, I want to see you. I am going to call your office if I can do, or call the TESOL office. [NNS-,[2] Japanese]

(2) Dear Prof [Last Name]
I want to discuss with you about my final paper before Thanksgiving break. Can I see you Tuesday after the class if you don't mind?...[NNS-, Korean]

(3) ...I simply want to take some courses in the Applied Linguistics and your course was recommended to me...[NNS-, Taiwanese]

(4) I need your memo saying like my outside minor department does not require an examination. [NNS-, Korean]

In these examples the students state the requests as their own wants and needs, not as negotiable preferences, nor as institutional requirements. The effect is to appear to give the faculty no choice in complying with the request, which puts the requesters out-of-status: generally, a higher status addressee should not be put in a position that allows no negotiation. In addition, these requests tend not to be mitigated as would be required in most such situations: the majority of the NAR requests using this category used I want or I need, rather than the I'd like to. In an institutional setting such as academia, the use of unmitigated, speaker dominant I want and I need forms by lower status requesters seems to elevate both the rights of the requesters and the obligation of the requestee. At the same time, however, these forms appear to remove the student requester from the framework of the institution to a more individual context, which makes it even less likely that the faculty member has the obligation to grant the request. The students' choice of the forms reflect an apparent overestimation on the part of the student of the faculty member's level of obligation to comply: a conflict of institutional rights and obligations (Blum-Kulka and House, 1989, p. 146).

The next linguistic form which differs between PAR and NAR requests is the Appreciate form. Interestingly, the NSs and NNSs behave differently in their use of this form. NSs use it more often in their NAR requests than in their PAR ones, while NNSs use it only in PAR requests. This difference can be accounted for by its actual function in the two types of messages. When used in PAR messages, it conveys a fairly general expression of gratitude for the time or trouble required of the faculty member, and is not part of the Head Act, as in Example (5) below. On the other hand, when it occurs in NAR messages, it functions as part of the request itself, as in Example (6). This usage is more like the Want formula in affect, and is conventionally used by higher status to lower status addressees.

(5) So, I guess what I'm asking is if you could write another letter of recommendation for me this week (it would need to be submitted to the main office by late Thursday afternoon or early Friday morning).
I apologize for the short notice - I should have checked over the application materials more carefully before our meeting last week Thanks very much. You know I appreciate all your help. [NS+]

(6) Subj: Incomplete
I would appreciate finding out if you've handed in that grade to the registrar. [NS-]

NAR requests also differ from PAR ones in their higher use of Please + Imperative by both NS and NNS. Example (7) illustrates a use of the Please + Imperative form in a PAR message, while Examples (8), (9), and (10) illustrate this form in NAR messages.

(7) Subj: L532: 1991 Fall
Dear Dr. [Last Name]:
...I am very sorry about bothering you at the end of the semester, but please kindly read my paper when you are less busy. Thank you very much for your kind understanding and patience.
Sincerely,
Student First + Last Name
[NNS+, Japanese]

(8) Today I brought the last section of my thesis and placed it in your mailbox, in addition to a rough draft of my thesis for Prof Last Name in her mailbox. Please read it and give me your comments. [NNS-, Japanese]

(9) Please consider it. [NS-]

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(10) Subj: About my oral defense
Hello. How are you? I would like to have my oral defense on the 25th of Aug. When I talked to you before, you said that you would be in town in the week of 24th, Aug. So I assume that this day would be fine for you. I have not decided on the exact time (morning or afternoon). If you have other schedule, please tell me. Also, please tell me whether or not this date "Aug, 25th" is OK to you. Thank you very much, Name. (NNS-, Japanese)

What makes Example (7) PAR is not any difference in the linguistic form from the NAR examples, but the inclusion on the part of the writer of an acknowledgement of the imposition on the faculty member and of the faculty's time. These factors will be discussed in detail later. (Notice also that in these examples, it is not a matter of Speaker (Writer)/Hearer (Reader) orientation. Each of the requests in Examples (7-10) is Hearer oriented.) NAR requests utilizing Please+Imperative, like the NAR Want requests, assume a higher level of obligation to comply by the student than by the faculty member. While Please indicates some faint possibility that the request might not be granted, it does not serve as a strong enough mitigator to soften the force of the Imperative. Students do not have the institutional status to issue Directives to faculty, and the use of this form puts them seriously out-of-status. As we have noted in our other work (Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford, 1990), such noncongruent acts in institutional talk require a fairly high level of mitigation which is not found in the NAR examples.

Finally, PAR requests from both NSs and NNSs utilize a variety of linguistic forms for which no pattern could be discerned: this is represented in the "Other" category where 71.6% of the NNS requests fall. These include using Query Preparatory requests which include "wonder" statements as in Examples (11) and (12).

(11) Subj: L522 Incomplete Paper
Prof. [Last Name]
I understand this is the busiest time of the semester, but I was wondering if you had a chance to look at my L522 incomplete paper, since you'll be on sabbatical soon? ... [NNS+, Taiwanese]

(12) I was wondering whether it would be possible for me to go to see you at your office anytime this week? ...[NNS+, Thai]

Query preparatory Yes/no and Information Questions are also frequently used as we see in Example (13).

(13) I would like to make an appointment with you. Would you please tell me when you are available and what I should bring? [NNS+, Taiwanese]

Downgraders

The use of downgraders was fairly consistent for NSs in both PAR and NAR requests (Table 2). The general category of downgraders includes both the use of syntactic downgraders such as interrogatives, conditionals, tense, and aspect, as well as the use of lexical and phrasal downgraders such as politeness markers (please, do you think), hedges, downtoners and cajolers (see Blum-Kulka, House, & Kasper, 1989). NNS PAR requests were comparable. Only the NNS NAR requests were noticeably different. As Table 2 illustrates, NS PAR and NAR and NNS PAR requests all utilize about 1.5 downgraders per request. Example (5) above illustrates a PAR message with a high number of downgraders, including the use of a conditional (if you could), aspect (I'm asking), and a subjectivizer (I guess), as well as an apology. However, NNS NAR requests use on average less than one politeness marker per request at .89 markers per request. Examples (8), (2), and (4), discussed previously, also illustrate NNS requests with minimal use of downgraders.

Table 2: Distribution of Downgraders per Request

NS PAR	1.62	NS NAR	1.54
NNS PAR	1.57	NNS NAR	0.89

We see, then, that although we do find some quantitative differences in the use of linguistic forms and downgraders which might help account for why some requests were perceived as better than others, these differences are primarily relative, not absolute. With the exception the complete lack of Appreciate in the NNS NAR requests, we cannot predict that the presence or absence per se of particular forms results in a request evaluated as PAR or NAR. With this in mind, we turn to an analysis of level of imposition and of content.

Level of Imposition

The possibility arises that the categories of PAR and NAR might actually reflect messages that differed only in their levels of imposition. In order to determine these levels, eight faculty members were asked to rank the topics of the requests found in the data. Examples of what were ranked Low imposition requests are those asking for routine information, asking for appointments which do not require any preparation on the part of the faculty, requesting bibliographic references, borrowing books, and writing short memos. Those which were ranked as High imposition include requests which ask for bending rules in some way, such as asking for Incomplete grades or to accept a late paper, asking for appointments which require extra work on the part of the faculty member, or which intrude on the faculty member's time, such as reading dissertation chapters during a sabbatical or defending a dissertation during summer break. As Table 3 indicates, for NS requesters, it is not the case that Low and High imposition correlate with PAR and NAR requests. Low and High levels of imposition are found in both the PAR and NAR categories at about the same ratio, so it doesn't appear that this factor strongly affects the evaluation of the requests of NSs. It appears, however, that level of imposition may play a role in evaluation of NNS requests. We can see that High Imposition NNS NAR requests are almost twice as frequent (64%) as their Low Imposition NAR requests (36%) (Table 3).

Table 3: Distribution of High/Low Imposition Requests by Rating

	NNS PAR	NNS NAR
High	44%	64%
Low	56%	36%

	NS PAR	NS NAR
High	53%	50%
Low	47%	50%

However, it doesn't seem likely that it is imposition alone which determines whether the request will be positively or negatively evaluated by the faculty member. Rather, it is the manner in which the request is formulated. As we saw in Table 2, NNS also used fewer mitigators in their NAR requests: thus NNS High imposition requests are more likely to be accompanied by fewer downgraders. This, however, cannot account for the evaluation of the NS data. As a result, we turn to an analysis of content.

Content

Three major Content categories are related to the evaluation of a request. They are 1) Time 2) Acknowledgement of Imposition; and 3) the proferred Explanation for the request.

Time. Many of the requests, especially the high imposition ones, involve commitments of time on the part of the faculty member. Since time is a precious commodity to faculty, and thus impingements upon it are impingements on negative face, we analyzed the requests in terms of whether and in what manner issues of time were dealt with by the students.

Table 4: Distribution of References to Time by Rating

	NNS PAR	NNS NAR	NS PAR	NS NAR
My Time (Student's)	5.5%	34.6%	4.8%	0%
Flexible Time Frame	16.6%	53.7% (40% = ASAP)	23.8%	36.3%
Your Time (Faculty's)	33.3%	3.8%	14.3%	9.1%
No Mention	44.4%	7.6%	57.1%	54.6%

Table 4 shows that both the NS and NNS PAR requests employed similar strategies in dealing with time: either they did not mention it at all ("No Mention"), which allows total determination of the frame by the faculty member, or they specifically leave time considerations to the faculty member's discretion ("Your Time"). The latter constitutes either a direct or indirect acknowledgement of the imposition of the request, thus minimizing it to some degree.

Examples (14) through (17) illustrate requests where the time frame was explicitly left to the faculty member.

(14) when you are less busy [NNS+, Japanese]
(15) when you are available [NNS+, Taiwanese]
(16) Please let me know what is the best time for you [NNS+, Mandarin]
(17) I could pick it up whenever it's convenient for you. [NS+]

Occasionally in PAR requests, students did specify times, but they were quite flexible or reasonable time frames (Table 4, "Time Frames") which offered leeway and therefore negotiation on the part of the faculty, or were institutionally accurate in terms of judging the actual time likely needed to comply. We can see instances of these time frames in Examples (18) through (20).

(18) anytime this week ...[NNS+, Thai]
(19) Would some time in the next week or two be okay with you? [NS+]
(20) ...I'm planning on being in Btn [Bloomington] from about the 14th to the 20th of December and would like to get together to talk about the diss [NS+]

The mentions of time in the NAR requests, on the other hand, show different strategies. In these requests, NSs and NNSs seldom explicitly leave the time totally up to the faculty. NSs only do so 3.8% of the time compared to 33.3% in their PAR requests. NNS NAR requests leave it up to the faculty only 9.1% of the time compared to 14.3% in their PAR requests. NS NAR requests fail to mention time about as frequently as their PAR requests (54.5% vs 57.1%). When they do mention time, they mention flexible time more often than in their PAR requests (23.8% vs 36.3%). However, these time frames tend to be less realistic than those in their PAR requests. In this regard NAR NNS requests, however, look strikingly different from NS NAR requests and from PAR NNS requests. In NNS NAR requests there is a considerable rise (from 5.5% to 34.6%) in student imposed, nonnegotiable times (Table 4, "My Time"), seen in Examples (21) and (22).

(21) I hesitate to ask you this, but can I receive your comments on chapter 1 and 2 before I leave for Japan? [NNS-, Japanese]

(22) But isn't there any way that you can give me a chance to defend before the semester begins, that is before Aug. 30? [NNS-, Japanese]

Finally, both PAR and NAR messages may refer to Institutional time frames. Example (23) shows a successful use of an appeal to institutional time, where the student mentions the date, but couches it as a reminder.

(23) I just would like to remind you that October 15 is the deadline for...I just would like to make sure that the Department of [ ] receives it by the deadline. [NNS+, Spanish]

However, in Example (24), evaluated as NAR, the student adds her own deadline along with that of the institution.

(24) Faculty First Name,
I finally made up my mind to apply for two jobs which have deadlines of Nov. 10. My placement file is not yet complete, however...so I put 2 stamped, addressed envelopes in your box for letters of recommendation. If you could print out 2 extra copies and mail them early next week, I'm sure they'll arrive in time. Thanks so much for all of your help.
Student First Name [NS-]

Cost to Faculty. The second content category examines how the student acknowledges the cost of the request to the faculty.

Table 5: Distribution of Acknowledgements of Imposition by Rating

	NNS PAR	NNS NAR
Acknowledge	17.6%	9.1%
Minimize	5.8%	18.2%
No Acknowledge	0.0%	45.5%
Challenge	0.0%	4.5%
Neutral	76.5%	22.7%

	NS PAR	NS NAR
Acknowledge	20.0%	10.0%
Minimize	10.0%	10.0%
No Acknowledge	10.0%	20.0%
Challenge	0.0%	0.0%
Neutral	60.0%	60.0%

Table 5 shows that both NS and NNS PAR requests contain higher percentages of acknowledging the cost to the faculty than do the NAR requests: 17.6% of the PAR NNS requests acknowledge the cost compared to only 9.1% of the NAR requests. Twenty percent of the NS PAR requests acknowledge cost with only 10% of their NAR ones doing so. Acknowledgements include apologies for impingement and expressions of appreciation and gratitude. Examples (25) through (29) illustrate requests which acknowledge the imposition or cost to the faculty. In fact, PAR requests often include such acknowledgments even when low in imposition as in Example (29).

(25) ...Would it be possible to write a letter for me on such short notice? and at the end of the semester? and before the holidays? I will be forever grateful.
Student First Name [NS+]

(26) Subj: I hate to inconvenience you, but...
Faculty First Name,
After our meeting last week, I spent some time thinking about the dissertation year fellowship, and I decided to go ahead and apply. But then I ended up catching that flu that's been going around, so I didn't get a chance to talk with [faculty name] until today. Well, she thinks I should apply, and she'll be happy to write a letter of recommendation for me.
[Information here about institutional deadlines 3 days away]
So, I guess what I'm asking is if you could write another letter of recommendation for me this week (it would need to be submitted to the main office by late Thursday afternoon or early Friday morning).
I apologize for the short notice - I should have checked over the application materials more carefully before our meeting last week.
Thanks very much. You know I appreciate all your help.
[Student first name] [NS+]

(27) I am very sorry about bothering you at the end of the semester [NNS+, Japanese]

(28) I've just finished a pilot study lately and wondered if I could come over and talk to you about it, should it sound interesting to you, and should you have time for it. [NNS+, Taiwanese]

(29) Subj: House and Kasper article
Dear [faculty first name],
I'm looking for a copy of the House and Kasper (1981) article on politeness markers that you and Professor [faculty last name] cite in your 1993 article on Learning the Rules of Academic Talk. The library book which contains this article is checked out and already has one recall on it, meaning I won't be able to get my hands on it for another month.
Professor [last name] suggested I e-mail you as she seemed to recall that you had a copy of the article. If you do have a copy that you wouldn't mind lending for a short time, I would be very grateful. I could pick it up whenever is convenient for you. Thanks!
[student first + last name] [NS+]

In looking at the NAR requests, we find that students often do not acknowledge the cost at all. This is especially true of the NNS: 45.5% of such requests do not acknowledge the imposition. Example (30) illustrates such a message.

(30) Today I brought the last section of my thesis and placed it in your mailbox, in addition to a rough draft of my thesis for Prof Last Name in her mailbox. Please read it and give me your comments. [NNS-, Japanese]

One other strategy which also appears fairly often in the NAR requests include Underrating the imposition, as in Example (3) above, and Example (31).

(31) If you could print out 2 extra copies (see Example 24) [NS-]

It seems that in an institutional setting where a lower-status individual makes a request of a higher-status individual minimizing the request is a risky strategy. If the requester misjudges the actual level of imposition of the request, thus showing some lack of institutional knowledge, then a minimization strategy may backfire.

Explanation. The final Content category looks at the types of Explanations students offer for making their requests. Two categories emerged: institutionally-oriented and student-oriented Explanations. Table 6 shows that these categories tend to correspond with the evaluation of the requests.

Table 6: Distribution of Explanations

	NNS PAR	NNS NAR
Institutional	80.0%	26.9%
Me (Student)	20.0%	73.1%
Others	0.0%	0.0%

	NS PAR	NS NAR
Institutional	36.4%	18.1%
Me (Student)	45.5%	72.7%
Others	18.1%	9.2%

Of those PAR requests that offered Explanations, NNSs most often offered Institutional Reasons (NNS 80%), as in Example (29) discussed earlier. Example (32) shows a NS institutional reason.

(32) Subj: books

> Dr. [last name], I was wondering if you'd have any objections to letting me have the use of the books you put on reserve with [first name] over the Thanksgiving weekend. I just found out that the office will be close as of noon on Wed. Of course, I'd be willing to share them with anyone else who wants to use them this weekend..Thanks & have a great weekend.--- [NS+]

NS offered such reasons fairly often (36.4%), but used other explanations as well. The interesting pattern that emerges, however, is that for both NNS and NS NAR requests, student-centered Explanations occur at a rate of at least 70%. These student-oriented Explanations tend to focus on student needs and wants, and, as might be expected from the discussion on linguistic forms, employ a high number of "want" statements. Example (33) is a series of requests in one message, which offers an exceptionally high number of student-oriented explanations.

(33) Date: June 28 [N.B. summer break]
Subj: DRAFT
Hi, how are you? I have finished revising the thesis and will send it to you tomorrow by mail and it will reach you in your office in a week. I wish you can take some time for it and give a go-ahead sign for distributing it to other members. I will be returning to Bloomington on July 10th but have to go back to Japan by the first week of Sept. This is a big problem....
I understand that you all will be very busy because of class preparation, meetings, advising, etc. But isn't there any way that you can give me a chance to defend before the semester begins, that is before Aug. 30?...
By the way, do you think that I can meet you in July? I know that you do not want to meet any of your students during your vacation, but this will be my last chance to get my thesis done this year. If I can, I believe that I can finish my thesis and be ready for my defense. I hope you understand my situation and help me with it. [NNS-, Japanese]

NAR student-centered explanations frequently occur with high imposition requests which ask the faculty to make exceptions to institutional rules. Such rules may be general university regulations, or established practice on the part of the faculty member. In these cases, as contrasted with cases which do not have such requestive goals, the student does not have the same level of expectation that the faculty should comply with the request. In fact, the student may also not truly have the right to make such a request. As a result, the student may resort to positive politeness strategies which call for some empathy on the part of the faculty member, as in the last line of Example (33).

Finally, let us compare Examples (24) and (26), which contain equivalent request goals (high imposition, letters of recommendation) under similar circumstances (short time frame, student's fault). The PAR Example ((26) contains what Blum-Kulka, 1989, p. 62) claims is typically English: the accumulated effect of deferential politeness by using a number of downgraders. Furthermore, the student acknowledges responsibility and apologizes for inconvenience, but also cites institutional reasons for the time deadline itself. These, accompanied by expressions of appreciation, do not assume compliance on the part of the faculty member. In short, the student has included most of the strategies in this one request which we have noted as those likely to result in a PAR message. The student in Example (24), on the other hand, uses minimal negative politeness strategies: apart from an expression of gratitude, the request contains little that would signal that the recipient might not comply. In fact, she includes information that she has already taken steps which assume compliance (putting envelopes in the faculty member's mailbox). No explanation is offered for the nearness to the minimally expressed institutional timeline, no acknowledgement of the potential cost to the faculty member -- in fact, a minimization of the cost -- all contribute to the NAR status of the request.

CONCLUSION

We can see that there are a number of factors which interact to produce a positive or negative evaluation of students' requests by their faculty addressees. Given the status difference and the institutional roles of the participants, the students are in the position of having to perform fact-threatening, potentially status noncongruent speech acts. They must be able to judge how much of an imposition any given request might be and determine a reasonable explanation for such a request. Since these are all institutional interactions, apparently an institutional explanation is more positively valued by the faculty than a noninstitutional one. Students must recognize the status of the faculty as institutional representatives, which also means that they must recognize that faculty have to meet many institutional demands, not just those of an individual student. Requests which do not employ sufficient mitigation or which fail to address that precarious balance of the faculty as institution vs the faculty as (over-worked) fellow humans risk negative evaluations. Student requestors who use personal needs and time frames remove some of the institutional nature of the request: they ask to be treated as exceptions to the institution. We find that when students do make such requests, they must also appeal to the faculty member as an individual, not just an institutional representative. Acknowledgement of the imposition, downgrading the request with mitigators, and generally allowing room for negotiation helps achieve this end.

To show that students can learn to become sensitive to these requirements, we would like to share with you Example (34),which is the text of a full message from a student received after the results of the research had been presented to one of our graduate classes.

(34)

> To: Prof Last Name
> Subj: Warning: the following is a high-imposition request (please read in good mood)
> Function: request
> subject: Student First Name (student)
> object: Prof Initials (professor)
> The internal process:
> Dear Professor,
> I demand that you write me a letter of recommendation for entry to the TESOL master's program by Friday. Thank you.
> (Hmm... seems a little strong)
>
> Take 2:
> Esteemed Professor Initials,
> I would like to request the honor of your writing me a letter of recommendation for entry to the TESOL master's program at your earliest convenience. Thank you very much.
> (Yes, much more polite, but a little formal)
>
> Take 3:
> Dear Nickname,
> Congratulations! I am happy to inform you that you have been selected to write me a letter of recommendation next week! Have a great time and enjoy!
> (Good, but maybe overly cheerful)

Take 4:
Dear Professor Initials,
I regret to inform you that you have been chosen to write me a letter of recommendation...
(definitely not-- too depressive)

Take 5:
Dear Professor,
I am so sorry to impose the onorous task of asking you to write a letter of recommendation for me. I know I am unworthy and do not deserve this, but would you please consider overlooking my defects and undertaking this burden? I will do anything you want in repayment. Thank you so much.
(come on Student First Name, have a little DIGNITY!)

Take 6:
Dear First Name,
Sometimes knowing the right pragmatic approach is difficult even for NSs! What I am trying to ask you is if you would consider writing me a letter of recommendation for entry into the TESOL master's program. The job market is competitive. I think I'm well-trained in language pedagogy and would like to be able to apply for jobs in French, English and Spanish. The masters in TESOL will verify my qualifications for teaching English, for those who need it...
As far as my application to the TESOL program goes, I don't need a letter immediately. I would just like to be accepted sometime before I leave IU (plus or minus ten years from now, when I have my dissertation finished). I will not be asking for an assistantship in the linguistics department right now, in case that's relevant. Thank you for your consideration. I know letters of recommendation are a pain in the butt--I detest writing them myself. But I will be eternally grateful if you would be willing to do it for me. Thanks again.
Student First Name

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NOTES

[1] It should be noted, however, that most of the requests were, in fact, granted, in spite of the affective response on the part of the recipient.

[2] "-" = NAR message; "+" = PAR message.

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CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN GENERAL CONVENTIONS OF COMMUNICATION

Yuliya B. Kartalova

The present study is devoted to cross-cultural communication between Russians and Americans. The objectives of the research are as follows: to collect linguistic and non-linguistic data on general communication conventions of Americans and Russians, i.e., following Clyne (1983), to explore how aspects of culture and its institutions are encoded in symbolic meanings of 16 cultural themes. The influence of differences in these symbolic meanings on reported instances of Russian-American communication will be identified. The additional purpose of the research is to elicit and interpret national stereotypes which are hypothetically created by inadequate interpretations of the above-mentioned themes.

A qualitative conceptual ethnographic approach has been chosen to gather and interpret reported data on cross-cultural differences in symbolic meanings of money, space, possessions. Written questionnaires were distributed to 18 American university exchange students studying in St. Petersburg, Russia and to 20 Russian university exchange students studying in Iowa, the U.S. After the completion and analysis of the questionnaires, 17 (10 American and 7 Russian) additional subjects agreed to comment on the typicality of cultural differences observed by their Russian/American counterparts in order to test the relative validity of the findings.

The findings show that there are indeed marked differences in the symbolic meanings of all the 16 themes. However, as reported by the subjects, an awareness and successful interpretation of these differences may reduce miscommunication.

The different symbolic meanings of these themes revealed different attitudes of Russian and American subjects to independence, involvement, personal space, emotionality. The Russian subjects value personal involvement in communication, whereas the American subjects place more emphasis on personal space and independence.

The results of the study provide data for interpretation and highlight direction for further research in the area of cross-cultural communication.

INTRODUCTION

The present study is devoted to cross-cultural communication between Russians and Americans. The purpose of this research is to collect linguistic and non-linguistic data on Russian and American general communication conventions, i.e., following Clyne (1983), how aspects of culture and its institutions encoded in symbolic meanings of concepts such as time, money, space, courtesy, etc., are expressed in language, and to account for their functioning in intercultural communication.

Clyne (1983) divides communicative competence rules into two major categories: "pertaining to general cultural concepts influencing communication, including trust, honor, time and hospitality," and "specific rules, or individual formulae for speech acts" (p. 147). General rules deal with the sociopragmatic aspect of communicative behavior. This paper suggests incorporating the term "general conventions" instead of "general rules" due to a certain negative connotation of prescriptivism associated with the word "rule": "I argue that it is essential to avoid prescriptivism in this very sensitive area of language in use" (Thomas, 1983, p. 90). The focus of investigation will be cross-cultural differences in general communication conventions and how these differences influence face-to-face cross-cultural interaction both linguistically and extralinguistically.

As some cross-cultural studies (e.g., Carbaugh, 1983; Meier, 1992) show, different cultural attitudes towards such relatively universal concepts as time, money, self-determination, small talk, etc., provide possible explanations for observed cross-cultural differences in pragmatic behavior. Therefore, a conceptual interpretative approach, i.e., elicitation and interpretation of observations on cross-cultural differences in symbolic meanings of 16 concepts, or cultural themes, such as money, personal space, courtesy, friendship, as well as reported instances of personal communication illustrating cross-cultural differences in attitudes to these concepts, was used in this study. The additional purpose of this research is to identify national stereotypes which are possibly created by inadequate interpretation of different cultural concepts underlying general communication conventions.

Written questionnaires were designed to elicit personal experiences of miscommunication between Russians and Americans in the U.S. and Russia regarding both instances of miscommunication (linguistic and/or non-linguistic) and observed cultural differences in attitudes to such concepts as money, time, possessions, space, etc. (see Appendix A for a questionnaire sample designed for the American subjects. The questionnaire designed for the Russian subjects was identical except for the substitution of the words "Russia", "Russian" for "the U.S.", "American," and vice versa.) It is hoped that the latter data will enable researchers and language instructors to predict certain problematic areas in cross-cultural communication.

The subjects involved in the study are 18 exchange students from America studying in St. Petersburg, Russia, and 20 Russian exchange university students studying in Iowa, U.S.A. American English was chosen as the language of the questionnaires due to the fact that the American subjects involved are undergraduate students with a relatively low level of proficiency in Russian, whereas the Russian subjects are graduate and undergraduate students with a relatively high level of English proficiency (see, e.g., Table 1 for comparison of the length of previous language instruction of the American and Russian subjects.) Another reason for choosing English was to avoid additional subjectivism on the part of the researcher connected with the task of translation with regard to the choice of words used by the subjects in order to describe the observed cross-cultural phenomena and personal communication.

One of the limitations of this study is the relative subjectivity of both the researcher and subjects in data elicitation and interpretation, which is, however, inherent in any pragmatic research (Knapp, & Knapp-Potthoff, 1987). It is hoped that the number of subjects involved and their direct exposure to a given culture and its language will have a positive effect in achieving the study's objectives and providing current data for further observation and interpretation. See, e.g., Thomas (1983):

> Helping students to understand the way pragmatic principles operate in other cultures, encouraging them to look for the different pragmatic or discoursal norms which may underlie national and ethnic stereotyping, is to go some way towards eliminating simplistic and ungenerous interpretations whose linguistic behavior is superficially different from their own. Such techniques, I would suggest, are desirable both pedagogically and politically (p. 110.)

It is thus hoped that this research will improve Russian-American communication by informing the teaching of both Russian and English.

METHOD

Ethnographic Conceptual Framework

LeVine (1984) defines culture as "a shared organization of ideas that includes the intellectual, moral, and aesthetic standards prevalent in a community and the meanings of communicative actions" (p. 67). However, the author emphasizes that formal descriptions cannot clarify the nature of culture. He argues that this clarification can only be approached through ethnography.

Ochs and Schieffelin (1979) use the term "ethnographic" as pertaining to "descriptions that take into account the perspective of members of a social group, including beliefs and values that underlie and organize their activities and utterances" (p. 283). The term "general conventions of communication" was adopted for this study as referring to interculturally shared views and beliefs of society members with regard to perceived desired behavior. Therefore, ethnographic descriptions of values underlying general communication conventions of a given society can serve as a starting point of cross-cultural research and be used as a means of data-elicitation.

Written data on cross-cultural differences in symbolic meanings of 16 cultural themes, such as money, personal space, courtesy, and their influence on Russian-American communication as observed by the subjects was gathered and interpreted.

Subjects

The subjects of this study consisted of 38 university exchange students between the ages of nineteen and twenty-six. The subjects were represented by 27 females and 11 males. All the subjects had some previous second language instruction in English or in Russian and were studying in the U.S. or Russia under the auspices of the American Council of Teachers of Russian exchange program at either graduate or undergraduate levels. Most of the students were majoring in Humanities and Fine Arts. The length of the stay of the subjects both in the U.S. and in Russia at the time of administration of the questionnaires varies from one month to two years. All the subjects were nonpaid volunteers.

Table 1: The Subjects of the Study (First Questionnaire)

Demographic Factors	American Subjects	Russian Subjects
1. Average Age	20.8 years	21.4 years
2. Sex		
Females	13 (72.3%)	14 (70%)
Males	5 (27.7%)	6 (30%)
3. Length of Previous Language Instruction	3.6 years	11.1 years
4. Length of Stay in Russia/the U.S.	2.5 months	6.5 months

As one can see, the groups were more or less homogenous as to their age and sex. However, they were less so with regard to their language proficiency and length of stay in the country of a studied language.

Materials and Procedures

Two identical written questionnaires were designed for the American and the Russian subjects. The first one was designed to elicit the subjects' observations concerning cross-cultural differences in the symbolic meanings of cultural themes and instances of personal miscommunication experiences (see Appendix A). The second questionnaire was used to elicit native-speakers' reactions to the observations gathered by the first questionnaire (see Appendix B).

English was chosen for both questionnaires due to the American subjects' relatively low proficiency in Russian (some of the American subjects could not express themselves in Russian in writing). The researcher aimed to avoid direct translations from one language to the other and to ensure that the elicited data with regard to the themes and expressions used by the subjects in their descriptions of the observed phenomena was comparable from one group to the other.

The first questionnaire dealt with differences in attitudes toward cultural themes as observed by the subjects. I have adopted 16 cultural themes, described as recurrent in American values ("time," "money," "work," etc.) as data-elicitation tools (see question 13 in Appendix A.) This choice was in part due to the relative availability of data on these (see, e.g., Stewart & Bennett, 1991; Althen, 1988) for Americans.

A question concerning positive/negative traits of the American national character (see question 18 in Appendix A) was included in the questionnaire in order to elicit cross-cultural differences in values and assumptions underlying positive and negative personal characteristics in both cultures, and to investigate grounds for possible creation of some positive/negative national stereotyping.

Questions concerning age, gender, degree of proficiency in English/Russian, and length of stay in a culture of a studied language were designed in order to ensure some low-level statistical information about the subjects (see, e.g., Table 1).

At the end of the questionnaire, the subjects were encouraged to make any additional personal comments concerning the research in progress.

The questionnaires were distributed to the Russian and American subjects in person and via ACTR representatives in Russia. The subjects were given approximately a month to fill out the questionnaires. They were encouraged to take note of all instances of miscommunication and different attitudes to the cultural themes during this time.

The second questionnaire (see Appendix B) attempted to test the relative validity of the findings and to elicit additional cultural values and assumptions inherent in the ones previously discussed. The interpretative method implemented by Ertelt-Vieth (1990) in the contrastive analysis of West German and Russian perceptions was adopted for this purpose. Following this method, observations elicited by the first questionnaire were selected on the basis of the frequency of occurrences of these or similar observations. Ten subjects from the U.S. and seven subjects from Russia agreed to comment on the typicality and accuracy of the description of cultural differences, observed by the Russian/American counterparts. The subjects of the second questionnaire were Russian and American volunteers who had not participated in filling out of the first questionnaire. These volunteers were hard to find, and unfortunately their unequal numbers limit interpretation of their commentaries. However, it was possible to develop a list of observations and commentaries revealing cross-cultural differences in some general communication conventions and in the symbolic meanings of cultural themes. It is this list which will receive more detailed analysis here.

Limitations

The findings of this study cannot be viewed as pertaining to the American and Russian cultures as wholes. Being one of the first studies to involve Russian and American students living abroad in each other's countries, this research dealt with a limited and unequal number of participants, who were relatively hard to find. Therefore, this study is not intended to establish generalizations concerning "typical" Russians and Americans. Moscow and St. Petersburg, for example, do not represent the entire Russian culture. A larger study of this kind is needed to verify and evaluate the findings, which can at this point be viewed as at least suggestive. However, the findings of this research do provide directions for further study of culture-specific values and their functioning in language and communication.

In addition, the relative subjectivity of both the researcher and subjects with regard to data-elicitation and interpretation must be kept in mind. Prior to designing and completing the research, the researcher observed certain differences in the cultural themes chosen for the study. Other individuals might have noticed and viewed as important other cultural themes and dimensions valuable for cross-cultural research.

Another important limitation of the study is the relative heterogeneity of the American and the Russian groups with regard to language proficiency. The comparatively limited proficiency of the Americans in Russian could have reduced the amount of authentic cross-cultural contact as compared to the Russians in the U.S. In addition, the results may have been influenced by the choice of words used to describe some culture-specific concepts, e.g., "small talk," etc.

Despite the limitations described above, the findings of the study are valuable in providing insights for cross-cultural research. They provide insights into the cultures under study and point to important areas for further research employing an ethnographic framework.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section will provide a brief overview of data elicited, followed by a discussion of some selected findings which illustrate the nature of the present qualitative ethnographic research.

Cultural Themes

All the American subjects presented at least four responses to the cultural themes presented in the first questionnaire. The largest number of responses (sixteen, which constitutes 10.2% of the total number of American observations) was elicited by the theme "food." The smallest number of observations (four, or 2.5% of the total) dealt with the dimension of "planning."

All Russian subjects responded with at least nine observations on all the themes offered. The largest number of responses (eighteen, or 8.6% of the total number) concerned the topic "money." The smallest number of responses (nine, or 4.3%) was elicited by the theme "dating."

The frequency distributions of the American and Russian observations of differences in attitudes toward the cultural concepts are shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Frequency Distributions of American and Russian Data on Cultural Themes

American Responses		Russian Responses	
Themes	Observations	Themes	Observations
1. food	16 (10.2%)	1. money	18 (8.6%)
2. money	15 (9.6%)	2. food	17 (8.1%)
3. space	15 (9.6%)	3. work	17 (8.1%)
4. possessions	14 (8.9%)	4. courtesy	15 (7.1%)
5. work	12 (7.6%)	5. studying	15 (7.1%)
6. courtesy	11 (7%)	6. possessions	14 (6.6%)
7. marriage	11 (7%)	7. small talk	13 (6.2%)
8. friendship	10 (6.4%)	8. time	13 (6.2%)
9. dating	8 (5.1%)	9. leisure	13 (6.2%)
10. studying	8 (5.1%)	10. religion	12 (5.7%)
11. time	7 (4.4%)	11. planning	11 (5.2%)
12. humor	7 (4.4%)	12. marriage	11 (5.2%)
13. small talk	6 (3.8%)	13. humor	11 (5.2%)
14. leisure	6 (3.8%)	14. space	10 (4.7%)
15. religion	6 (3.8%)	15. friendship	10 (4.7%)
16. planning	4 (2.5%)	16. dating	9 (4.3%)

Note: The total number of American observations is 156; the total for the Russians is 209.

"Positive" and "Negative" Traits of American and Russian "Characters"

Both the American (72%) and the Russian subjects (95%) stated their views on traits of Russian and American characteristics that they considered positive and negative. A complete list of "traits" mentioned by the subjects is provided in Appendices E and F.

Ethnographic Conceptual Framework for Studying Cultures

Though individual and contextual variation present in any sample survey may prevent a researcher from drawing any conclusions concerning the thoughts, feelings, and behavior shared by members of a community, there are grounds for establishing a conceptual

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framework for cross-cultural research. As LeVine (1984) states, individual members of a community "hold in common understandings of the symbols and representations through which they communicate" (p. 68). The findings of this study suggest that symbolic meanings of relatively universal human concepts, such as time, work, money, etc., may be culture-specific and highlight cross-cultural differences in views and values, underlying these concepts.

Though the observations collected from the American and Russian subjects differ a great deal in personal, contextual and situational aspects, there are certain systematic similarities in the concepts used by the subjects from both countries in order to describe differences between Russian and American attitudes to such cultural themes, as "food," "money," and "personal space." These concepts pertain to general communication conventions viewed as appropriate in a given society due to the underlying values shared by its members. In the American case, these are the concepts inherent in the symbolic meaning of the value of "independence": self-reliance; choice; respect of personal boundaries; informality; security; self-determination; self-control; individual responsibility; individual success; punctuality; friendliness. In the case of Russian subjects, these are the concepts of the value of involvement; hospitality; generosity; trust; concern; sincerity; directness; intimacy; loyalty; emotional commitment; spontaneity; flexibility; "inner" freedom of feelings and thoughts pertaining to morality.

These lists of concepts are open-ended, as they contain only the notions which were used by the subjects of this particular study. The terms, sometimes used interchangeably by the subjects in order to describe the above concepts, are not claimed to be the optimal ones until a larger study on these is mounted.

The American Heritage Dictionary (1992) provides further support for the choice of terms of "involvement" and "independence" characterizing the values underlying the American and Russian observations of cross-cultural communication. Some of the meanings of the adjective "independent" are : "self-governing"; "self-reliant"; "self-supporting"; "not determined by someone or something else." Some of the lexical meanings of the verb "to involve" are: "to connect closely"; "to influence or affect"; "to make complex or intricate"; and inherent in the adjective "involved" are such meanings as "curled inward"; "confused"; "emotionally committed." This led to the conclusion that the concepts, chosen by the subjects in order to describe in English cross-cultural differences in attitudes toward cultural themes, pertained at least partially to the broader values of independence and involvement.

In the following section I will analyze some of the examples from the data in order to illustrate how the values of independence and involvement influence the Russian and American general conventions of communication. Some of the observation and commentaries of the Russian and American subjects are provided in the Appendices C,D,E, and F. A complete list of responses is available upon request.

Independence and Involvement

Hospitality and choice. The topics of "food" and the symbolic act of "eating" elicited the most observations on cross-cultural differences between Russians and Americans. Cross-cultural differences in symbolic meanings of the act of eating seem to be the major source of misunderstandings and interpersonal conflicts for the Americans studying in Russia. As one can see from the American and Russian students' observations (Appendices C,D,E,F), offering food to others in one's house is viewed by Russians as an act of displaying courtesy and hospitality to a guest. Refusal to eat is often perceived as impolite and even rude by Russian hosts.

One can see a clash of different symbolic meanings inherent in the act of eating for Russians and Americans. The American values of independence and choice (see, e.g., Althen, 1988) are being violated by the Russian desire to express hospitality and concern towards the guest, and Russians feel that their hospitality is being rejected (see, e.g., U.S. observation 5; Russian comment 3). As a result, both parties perceive the other as acting inappropriately. According to the data elicited, Russians are thus viewed as "pushy" by Americans and the latter as being "rude" when refusing to eat.

One may hypothesize that some of the "negative" traits of the "Russian character" as described by American subjects (see, e.g., "insistence that their way is the right way," "It is difficult to say 'no' to them," "no respect for personal space and privacy") were to some extent triggered by different symbolic meanings of food and eating, reflecting different attitudes towards independence and involvement in these two cultures.

On the part of the Russian subjects, the American's concern for the "independence" and "choice" of others, as reflected in the way Americans offer their guests food, is viewed as unwillingness to share (see Russian observation 5).

External and internal personal boundaries. As the findings of the study suggest, the relative importance of personal boundaries as a means of preserving one's independence underlies most of American communication conventions. Wierzbicka (1991) claims that the concept of "privacy" is characteristic of Anglo-Saxon cultures: "It is assumed that every individual would want, so to speak, to have a little wall around him/her, at least part of the time, and this is perfectly natural, and very important" (p. 47).

Closely connected with the concept of "privacy" is "personal space," which was used in the American data to describe physical and psychological distance between individuals. It seems to also pertain to possessions, thereby "marking" personal boundaries. This can be illustrated by Russian observation 7 on "personal space": "Once I left one of my books on my roommate's desk. She asked me never to do it again, because it's her desk and she wants to keep it only to herself."

There are no direct lexical equivalents to such concepts as "privacy" and "personal space" in Russian. "Privacy" is associated with "private life" and refers to male-female romantic relationships. The concept of "privacy" for Russians can also imply the "inner world" of a person, one's "personality" or "soul."

The data shows that symbolic meanings of "personal" are also different. "Americans consider things 'personal' only if they relate to the individuals immediately involved" (Stewart & Bennett, 1991, p. 103). The concept of "money" is described in the American data as "personal", that is, relating to a persona, and therefore inappropriate for discussion. From the American point of view, questions about money and salaries seem to endanger a person's need for "independence" and "security."

According to the American data, they are not viewed as such in Russia: "People don't seem to think money is a very personal matter" (U.S. observation 1). "Russians have no qualms about giving money out to friends and acquaintances," states an American student (U.S. observation 2). She illustrates this statement with the description of a situation in which her Russian host mother asked her if she had a substantial sum of money to give to her neighbor. "There was no talk of when it would be repaid." As Russian commentary 2 suggests, "Russians lend money, but they usually expect it to be repaid. It is implied. You don't speak of it." Thus, speaking about the conditions of repayment might violate the value of "trust" for the Russians.

Borrowing money can be viewed as quite appropriate by Russians as it instantiates the values of "trust," "concern" for another person, and "generosity" of the person lending the money. Thus, the symbolic meaning of borrowing money serves to establish involvement with another person. "Relationships" are perceived as a more "personal matter" by the Russian subjects than is money (see, e.g., Russian comment 1 on U.S. observation 1, where money is described as a "personal" matter by an American subject, whereas a Russian subject applies the adjective "personal" to relationships for cross-cultural comparison of values.)

From this point of view, close personal relationships may not be an appropriate conversational topic with a group of "acquaintances" ("friends" in American English). As the data shows, Russians may consider things "personal" if they pertain to their "inner world." The topics of "dating" and "religion," for example, are described as too "personal" by the Russian subjects and require a certain intimacy, loyalty and emotional commitment between interlocutors.

This could explain some Russian comments to the effect that American college students mention their girlfriend/boyfriend "at every appropriate and inappropriate occasion" (Russian observation 10). The topic of dating is "a more intimate matter, not to be discussed casually." The latter data leads to a clash of such concepts as "informality," "friendliness," and "intimacy" in Russian-American communication.

Friendliness and intimacy. Wierzbicka (1991) claims that democratic values underlying communication conventions in American society place an emphasis on informality and overall friendliness, thus weakening the need for intimacy. Intimacy can be described as an intense involvement with another person, both physical and emotional. This type of involvement is considered one of the most essential constituents of symbolic meanings of such themes as "friendship" and "dating" in Russia, according to both Russian (9,10) and American (9,10) observations.

"Here they don't even think of saying 'no' to a friend," an American student observes (10). Indeed, the involvement is "intensive," according to the American data. A young Russian woman gets "in a fight" with her "boyfriend" and calls the American student's friend late at night. The young woman goes to her friend to help her. "When talking to my host family, I once called a male friend I was talking about 'my friend.' My hosts immediately thought the friend was very close to me and probably someone I loved." (U.S. observation 9).

According to the data, American college students do not get very much "involved" in either "friendship" or "dating." The broader meanings of such concepts as "friend," "boyfriend/girlfriend" in American English as compared to Russian can be explained by a more quantitative rather than qualitative type of involvement sought by Americans as opposed to Russians. "To have a steady boyfriend/girlfriend...is very important to American college students" (Russian observation 10). "Relationships define sexuality and so people that don't have mates are assumed to be homosexual or weird in some matter" (American comment 7 on Russian observation 10). To have "friends" and "mates" means "to be sociable" and "friendly" and capable of establishing informal relationships. In contrast, it is not viewed as "weird" not to have a lot of friends and dates in Russia.

Courtesy and respect. The themes of "money," "courtesy," and "dating" yielded Russian and American observations which highlighted cross-cultural differences in views on male and female roles in the two societies. An additional theme of "respect" as elicited from both American and Russian subjects proves to be beneficial for cross-cultural comparison.

There are certain "minor" connotations inherent in the symbolic meaning of "courtesy" for a Russian woman that dictate what she expects a man to do for her. As Russian observation 3 points out, opening a door or helping her put on a coat symbolizes the "respect" that a man should display towards a woman. The absence or a perceived lack of such behavior leads some of the Russian female observers to conclude that American men are not courteous. As American comments 3a, 3b show, the symbolic meanings of "respect" are different for Russian and American females. As opposed to Russian females, who view "respects" as being shown by certain "courteous" acts carried out by males, the American females consider these acts disrespectful. As American comment 3a claims, "Women in the U.S. don't want men "to take care of them", - they wish to show themselves to be "independent" and "want respect" not just because of their gender, but also because she is a valuable member of society" (American comment 3b).

The American value of independence again underlies the above observations on what is considered to be appropriate behavior of males towards females in the U.S. As to the Russian "courtesy code," male behavior is perceived as appropriate when it demonstrates involvement with a woman, be it opening a door for her or paying for her when going out.

These culturally different views on appropriate male and female behavior most likely contribute to the view that Russian culture is sexist, as characterized by some American subjects (see, e.g., a list of "negative" traits of the Russian national character in Appendix E).

The above values of independence and involvement underlying the Russian and American general conventions of communication point out to cross-cultural differences in views on successful communication, which will be described in the following section.

Differences in Views on Successful Communication

Some cross-cultural differences in Russian and American views on successful communication were revealed by the Russian and American observations and comments on such themes as "courtesy," "work," "small talk." The analyzed data suggest that the emphasis on preserving independence underlies general conventions of communication of the American subjects. As for the Russian subjects, the value of involvement is viewed as an essential component of successful communication. The observed cross-cultural differences in non-verbal behavior also seem to support this claim. Some examples from the data illustrate this point.

Both the American and Russian subjects claim that the notion of "small talk" may not be typical of the Russian culture. Russians were reported by some observants to either discontinue a "meaningless" conversation or "go more in-depth."

American ritualized exchanges of greetings were viewed by the Russian students as "phony" and "indirect." A typical stereotype of Americans as being "insincere" was evident in some cases (see, e.g., a list of American negative traits in Appendix F). In contrast with the American subjects' desire to display equal "friendliness" to everyone, Russians do not seem to view it as necessary. Moreover, friendliness displayed by smiling or exchanging greetings is often interpreted by Russians as a desire for a greater "intimacy" (see, e.g., U.S. observation 6 where the act of "smiling" is opposed to "working" by a Russian worker). Russians were described by the American subjects as friendly and open when they knew a person and "mean, pushy" when they didn't know one.

Direct and open expression of thoughts and feelings, be they positive or negative, is viewed by Russians as permissible and sometimes has the positive connotation of displaying concern and involvement with an interlocutor. Complaining about one's misfortunes is viewed as appropriate by the Russian subjects as it reinforces the values of "trust" and "sincerity." From the American perspective, such actions may violate the interlocutors' desire to preserve independence: "The 'non-answer' of 'I'm fine' is often used when one is not sure whether the person to whom one is talking is really interested in knowing a true answer to a question, which is often a 'non-question': 'How are you?'" (U.S. comment 2).

In most cases of cross-cultural misunderstanding, the American and Russian subjects faced differences in the interpretation of non-verbal messages and communication conventions. Both viewed the nature of conversation from different perspectives and sought topics appropriate from their point of view and inappropriate from the point of view of their interlocutors. Whereas Americans often felt a "threat" to their "personal space" and "security," Russians were equally offended by "indirectness," "insincerity," and "lack of depth" in conversations. Both had different expectations of successful communication due to the different values underlying general conventions of communication.

Cross-Cultural Miscommunication or Communication?

As seen from the above, there can be marked differences between Russian and American subjects with regard to their expectations of communication as informed by the

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underlying cultural values. In fact, one might wonder how any successful communication could have occurred. Following is an observation elicited from an American subject studying in Russia, which provides some insights to this question:

> I have always attempted to look at situations with cultural perspective, and cannot recall any one incident of serious (or even moderate) miscommunication. I often feel that my host family, especially my grandparents, do not realize what striking cultural differences we have, nor could they imagine my American way of life. But, being prepared to immerse myself in Russian culture, and having been somewhat aware of several differences, I have found that my expectations and willingness have made cultural communication much easier than finding the right case and aspect.

There are some solutions offered by the observer which are of crucial importance for successful cross-cultural communication. The first is the student's awareness of some cross-cultural differences. This made it possible to some extent to shape her expectations concerning Russian culture and people. The second point is of no less importance, i.e., the "willingness" to "immerse oneself" in Russian culture and "look at situations with a cultural perspective."

Another observation elicited from a Russian student is enlightening, too. She describes a change of her perceptions about Americans after her stay in the U.S. due to establishing grounds for successful interpersonal communication:

> My perceptions have changed. I found that Americans can be very close, in an informal personal way, but it takes time for them to know about a person, to start having special feelings towards people. I found that I was comfortable with this way of communication. At the beginning I did not feel it because people needed time to know me and treat me in the way they do now.

This observation suggests that equal effort is required from both the speaker and the hearer to adjust to communication styles of each other and to establish common grounds for achieving rapport in communication.

Other solutions offered by the observants were: overt discussion of cross-cultural differences (U.S. observation 2); developing pragmatic comprehension of non-verbal messages (Russian observation 2); deliberate speculation on cross-cultural differences (Russian observation 6).

It is impossible to predict all the situations and cross-cultural differences that could lead to interpersonal conflict. It is possible, however, to develop the students' awareness of cross-cultural differences and shape some of their expectations about cross-cultural communication.

It is also possible to provide the students with some strategies that they can use to achieve mutual understanding. I would like to suggest that such strategies can be successfully implemented by the speakers only if they share or are willing to share, through negotiation, some background and/or emotional experience and are relatively free from national stereotyping.

Another approach may be to treat communication breakdowns as expected and necessary in cross-cultural interaction, and as facilitative in developing communicative competence. After all, it is only through learning about differences in views that a person can become aware of her/his own assumptions and values. "A significant outcome of knowing about conversational style is knowing itself, knowing that no one is crazy and no one is mean and that a certain amount of misinterpretation and adjustment is normal in communication" (Tannen, 1986, p. 199).

CONCLUSIONS

The present study dealt with cross-cultural communication between Russians and Americans. A conceptual ethnographic approach was chosen to elicit cross-cultural differences of general conventions of communication in American English and Russian. Differences in symbolic meanings of 16 cultural themes, such as "food," "money," "work," and the influence of these differences on Russian-American cross-cultural communication were investigated.

The findings of the study suggest that there are significant differences in the symbolic meanings of all of the themes studied. Various examples of cross-cultural differences in attitudes toward choice, respect, trust, self-reliance provide guidelines to establishing hierarchies of values and assumptions inherent in different cultures. According to the findings, Americans place emphasis on independence and personal space, whereas Russians require intense involvement with a person. The concept of "personal" seems to vary cross-culturally.

Different cultural assumptions may underlie different views on what is "polite" and "rude." In some cases a "clash" in views leads to communication breakdowns and the creation of national stereotypes. In other cases, this "clash" is renegotiated through the mutual willingness of the interlocutors to establish a common ground for successful communication.

The findings of the study present substantial grounds for further analysis.

DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

It is hoped that the findings of this study will provide a basis for establishing culture-specific approaches to studying and teaching language-specific communicative competences.

The findings of this study can be also analyzed in respects to their typicality for Russian and American cultures and frequency of occurrence of various concepts used by the subjects in their descriptions of cross-cultural differences. This might provide additional data for cross-cultural comparison.

A more detailed analysis of communication encounters can highlight a variety of strategies used by interlocutors in order to renegotiate communication breakdowns and achieve rapport in cross-cultural interaction.

In general, the study and its findings may be of interest to linguists, social psychologists, sociologists, scholars of Russian and American cultures, and the general public on both sides of the Atlantic.

APPLICATION TO TEACHING CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION

The findings of the study point to the importance of learners' awareness-raising with regard to cultural values and assumptions underlying general conventions of communication in the target language. As suggested by the subjects of the study, awareness-raising can serve as a means of shaping the students' expectations concerning cross-cultural communication and providing grounds for establishing mutual understanding and rapport in authentic interaction.

There is a need to combine linguistic instruction with explicit discussion of cultural assumptions, values and etiquette norms of the target language culture as compared to the learners' own cultural and individual assumptions and views. This comparison may help the students to develop a relatively unbiased and stereotype-free outlook on a variety of cultural norms and communicative styles and to reject treating this variety "in terms of deviations from one 'basic', 'natural' model" (Wierzbicka, 1991, p. 455).

It is hoped that the findings of this study provide material for cross-cultural comparison of views and values underlying Russian-American communication and will therefore contribute to teaching Russian and American English communicative competences.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my special thanks to all American and Russian volunteers who participated in this study and served as my "eyes" and "ears" for observing cross-cultural communication both in the U.S. and in Russia during 1994-95 academic year.

I would also like to express my gratitude to my thesis advisor, Professor A.J. Meier, whose enthusiasm and timely guidance made this study possible.

Recognition is also due to Professor T.E. O'Connor for all the help he provided for me to carry out this study on both sides of the Atlantic.

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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE SAMPLE FOR AMERICAN STUDENTS

1. Age
2. Sex F M
3. American University/High school that you represent
4. How long have you been in Russia?
5. How long do you plan to stay in Russia?
6. What is the purpose of your stay in Russia? (Include both academic and personal expectations).
7. Do you feel that your expectations are being met? Explain.
8. Do you communicate in English, or in Russian most of the time? Explain.
9. How long have you studied Russian? Name the institutions, if any, where you studied Russian (e.g., high school, college/university, private teachers). Indicate whether your instructors were Russian or American.
10. What are the major purposes of your communication with Russians: academic, business, personal, etc.? Try to name as many as you can in order of frequency.
11. What age, sex, occupational groups of Russians do you find the most satisfying and interesting to communicate with?
12. What age, sex, occupational groups of Russians do you find the most unsatisfactory or boring to communicate with?
13. Have you made any personal friends/acquaintances with Russians? Indicate their age, sex, occupation. How do you spend your time with them?
14. Do you feel there are any major cultural differences between Russian and American attitudes towards the following:
    a) money
    b) possessions
    c) personal space
    d) work
    e) time
    f) leisure activities
    g) courtesy
    h) friendship
    i) studying
    j) dating
    k) religion
    l) food (eating)
    m) small talk
    n) self-determination (attitude to planning)
    o) marriage
    p) humor

    If you do, support it with at least one example, based on your own experience.
15. Can you recall episodes when the aim of your communication was not achieved due to misinterpretation by your conversation partner or vice versa? (Try to write down the dialog(s) word for word and explain what was wrong, in your opinion).
16. What, in your opinion, are the most positive and negative traits of Russian character? Briefly explain why you think so.
17. Are you generally satisfied/disappointed with cross-cultural communication you have experienced so far? Explain.
18. Have any of your perceptions of Russia and Russians changed after your stay in Russia? Try to be specific.

If you have any additional comments or ideas, you are more than welcome to share them with us. How would you have improved the questionnaire, if you were doing this research? If you think this questionnaire helped you to shape your own perceptions of Russian culture, please let us know. Thank you for your cooperation!

APPENDIX B:
SAMPLES OF EVALUATION GUIDELINES FOR RUSSIAN STUDENTS

Please read the samples of intercultural observations and/or personal encounters provided by American students studying in Russia as their illustrations of different attitudes of Russians and Americans to some cultural concepts mentioned below. Do you think these observations/episodes are typical of the Russian culture as you see it? Mark their typicality and adequacy of interpretation by the American students, and if their perceptions of the situations are either partially or fully different from yours, submit your own explanations of the observed phenomena. If you consider some of these pure generalizations and/or stereotyping, please feel free to say so, as the additional goal of this survey is to elicit and study national stereotypes. How would you have advised the American students to behave (say and/or do) to 'save' the situations in which, in your opinion, communication breakdowns occurred?

If you can, please provide description(s) of concepts (e.g., 'courtesy', etc.) with regard to what you think they symbolize to most Russians (or at least to you personally).

Thank you very much for your cooperation!

Please answer the following statistical preview questions:

1. Age
2. Sex F M
3. Main occupation
4. Main place of residence
5. Have you ever lived abroad? If yes, please specify.
6. Please underline your level of proficiency in English.
   poor adequate good excellent
7. Have you ever experienced personal communication with Americans? Please specify in brief.

APPENDIX C: U.S. OBSERVATIONS

1. money

Money matters are extremely different in Russia. My host mom/dad freely discuss their salaries (how little they make) with me. People also never give me my "personal space" when I'm changing money or getting cash advances at the bank. On numerous occasions people have leaned right on me over the counter where I'm getting money. People don't seem to think money is a very personal matter.

2. money

Russians have no qualms about giving money out to friends and acquaintances. Last year my host mother called me up and asked if I had 50,000 roubles (when it meant something) that I could give to a neighbor. I was taken a little aback and really didn't know what to say. Although I had the money I didn't want to get rid of it. There was no talk of when it would be repaid. I think she was a little offended at first. Then we talked about our different views in relationship to money.

3. courtesy

While caps and hats in the States can be worn now anywhere indoors in the presence of anyone, a Russian is expected to remove his "golovnoj ubor" [cap/hat] whenever under a roof. Whereas in the States, many, thanks to feminism, a woman is offended when a male opens the door for her, a Russian woman expects traditional, chivalrous mode courtesy.

4. possessions

I didn't understand the "If it's on the table, it's for everyone" mentality. I lost a lot of good cigarettes that way. Highly criticized for being "stingy" when I wouldn't share my bottled water with people straight out of the bottle.

5. food

Whenever I am a guest at a Russian house I have noticed that eating is almost required. A friend will ask "Would you like to eat?", but this really isn't a question, it is more a polite way of saying, "Sit down and eat what I have prepared for you." I once responded that I had just eaten at another friend's house and I was not hungry, and my hostess was very offended. She said she had worked all day to prepare the food and asked me whether or not I liked her cooking and then led me to the dinner table and piled a plate full of food for me. I now find it is better to just answer "yes" to the first question.

6. work (smiling)

People here seem to hate their jobs, and feel that they can't smile when they're working. For example, one lady (working behind the counter) began smiling for some reason, and a fellow co-worker told her not to smile, because she should be working. To them, work is just a place to make money.

7. small talk

I have noticed that my friends and host parents won't hesitate to talk about politics and economic and social problems with me. Perhaps it's because they know I am American, or perhaps it is just their form of small talk. I was a bit surprised when I asked a friend how she was and she responded by telling me everything that had gone wrong that day and what she had to do the next day. Americans usually respond with a meaningless "Fine," or "Good" and talk about the weather or the news.

8. small talk

With the discussion, even in passing, the Russians take more emotional investment with every word than the average American.

9. friendship

I think friendship is more important to Russians than it is to Americans. An American can get to know someone and within a few days call that person their friend. A Russian will call someone an acquaintance unless they have known someone for a very big time, or are related to them. When talking to my host family, I once called a male friend I was talking about "my friend." My hosts immediately thought the friend was very close to me and probably someone I loved. It was difficult to explain to them that he was only an acquaintance and not someone I would ever fall in love with.

10. friendship

I think friendship is very important here. They would do anything for each other with no ulterior motives and expectations. Americans are not so freely giving of their time and resources. Here they don't even think of saying "no" to their friends. If it is possible they do it. For instance, one of my friend's friend got in a fight with her boyfriend and called my friend late at night and of course she went to her.

APPENDIX D: RUSSIAN OBSERVATIONS

1. money

I think for Americans money is a very important concern, more than anything else. Sometimes it seems to me that making money is the purpose of their life. I knew one student who was smart and was getting excellent grades. When I asked him, what was the purpose of his studying hard, he said: "I want to make big money."

2. courtesy

A friend called me at the moment of her strong personal distress. After she greeted me, I asked: "How are you?" and she said, "I am fine, thank you." I said, "Your voice sounds strange. Is anything wrong?" and she said "Yes." Then she broke into tears and shared her problem with me. So, the phrase "I am fine" had no meaning whatsoever, although I took it literally and was ready to say that I was busy and "let us talk later," which would have been very impolite towards her at that moment. The Russian language is more direct in such situations and does not use phony phrases, which abound in English.

3. courtesy

The attitude towards girls and women is very different here from the one we have in Russia and in Europe. I'm more or less used that men let me go first or will open the door for me. I cannot say that American men do not do that at all, but very often they just slam the door in front of me. I want this minor courtesy not because I consider myself weaker than men or cannot do it myself, but because I expect respect from men.

4. possessions

American attitude towards material things is more serious (than Russian). They don't trust people, even those whom they know/live with. For example, when we were exchanging CD's with one of the residents of our House, he put his name in ink on the CD cover, thus spoiling it. He said, "Not that I don't trust you, but..."

5. food

Very often when Americans are hungry they just get food for themselves and rarely ask people around whether they are hungry or not.

6. food

The idea of "doing one's own thing" and "having it one's own way" is very important for Americans. I can see it the way Americans eat. I mean the idea "make your own dish."

7. personal space

Once I left one of my books on my roommate's desk. She asked me to never do it again, because it's her desk and she wants to keep it only to herself.

8. small talk

In the U.S., people would hate it but make small talk, because everybody else is doing the same. Small talk skills are very valued. Russians, in my observations, might not always bother to carry on a meaningless conversation; they would either quit or get more in-depth. In the U.S., conversations (especially between people who have just met) would never progress beyond small talk.

9. friendship
Friendship is not as an intense involvement with another person as it often is with Russians. One American would call another his "friend," and they would only get together a few times a year "to shoot ball." Besides, "friendship" is sometimes used by Americans as a euphemism for a romantic relationship. "He is just my friend" is used to stress that it is not a boyfriend/girlfriend type of relationship.

10. dating
To have a steady boyfriend/girlfriend and mention him/her at every appropriate and inappropriate occasion and be "going out with somebody" is very important to American college students. Even more so, than to Russians. Dating is always a conversational topic with strangers. It's not uncommon that Americans would ask you if you have a boyfriend one minute after they've met you. To Russians the whole boyfriend/girlfriend "stuff" is a more intimate matter, not to be discussed casually.

APPENDIX E: U.S. COMMENTS ON RUSSIAN OBSERVATIONS

1. money 1:
Americans are very money-conscious. We view money as security and freedom. We don't share our income amounts with others because we don't want to be embarrassed by how little we earn, or intimidating by how much we earn.

2. courtesy 2:
A key word here is the Russian student's use of "phony." This is rather judgmental. Each of the cultures shows courtesy in different ways. The "non-answer" of "I am fine" is often used when one is not sure whether the person to whom one is talking is really interested in knowing a true answer to a question, which is often a "non-question": "How are you?" By introducing the first part of a stock exchange, knowingly or not, the Russian elicited the stock response from the American.

3. courtesy 3:
3a: This deals with male/female relationships. Women in the U.S. don't want men "taking care of them"--they wish to show themselves to be independent.
3b: I want and deserve respect from men as well but not just because I am a woman but a valuable person and I don't need someone to hold a door for me to make me feel that respect. I would much rather have recognition for what I have said or done or a service I have provided. If you want the door held for you hold it for the men sometimes. They enjoy it too.

4. food 6:
This has to do with independence, not food! "Make your own dish" really means--"Cook what you feel like." It has to do with "choice." There is also the expression for parties of all sorts--"B.Y.O.B." ("Bring your own booze."). It has to do with choice again.

5. small talk 8:
Small talk is the act of communicating, although at times it may be annoying. It's being friendly. I'd rather have someone ask me a few general questions rather than just stare into space as if s/he weren't alive.

6. friendship 9:
"Friend" has a "loose" meaning in English. But if you have a "true" friend, s/he is called a "best friend" or "close friend."

7. dating 10:
At one time, we wouldn't have discussed it as openly, but relationships define sexuality and so people that don't have mates are assumed to be homosexual or weird in some manner. Asking if you have a boyfriend or a girlfriend can be a way of finding a boy or girlfriend, or a way of determining sexuality.

APPENDIX F: RUSSIAN COMMENTS ON U.S. OBSERVATIONS

1. money 1:
It has become proverbial, has it not? On the other hand, the Americans do not think personal relationship is a very personal matter.

2. money 2:
Russians lend money, but they usually expect it to be repaid. It is implied. You don't speak of it.

3. food 5:
That does seem to be a peculiar Russian way to show the guest that he is welcome,-- to stuff him with food. I agree. And of course, the hostess, for whom it is a chance to show that she is a good cook, and who, on the other hand, has undertaken more pains to prepare the treat than an American could probably realize,--would be offended, if she is just rejected flat. One just has to put up with it as with a "cultural phenomenon,"--and the person in question seems to have adopted the only right way.

4. possessions 4:
As for the first part, it is true: the cultural difference is really striking. I was very much surprised, when at the New Year celebrations every guest made his/her own contribution to the table (a box of chocolates, a bowl of salad, etc.),--and after the feast just wrapped up what remained of his/her contribution and calmly took it away with him/her! As for the second part, it seems to be quite logical from the hygienic point of view. I wouldn't share my bottled water with people straight out of the bottle either.

5. work 6:
In Russia people at the counter can smile without any attention from their fellow co-workers if they do not talk too much to customers. Work is the place to make money for the majority of people, not all. If a person doesn't often smile at work, it doesn't mean s/he hates it!

6. small talk 7:
In Russia people like talking politics as well as complaining about their troubles and misfortunes,--in a way that could puzzle Americans.

APPENDIX G:
A LIST OF AMERICAN "TRAITS" AS DESCRIBED BY RUSSIAN SUBJECTS

	"Positive Traits"	"Negative Traits"
1.	ability to relax and get fun	inability to concentrate
2.	informality; self-confidence	lack of self-criticism
3.	punctuality; friendliness; diligence; responsibility	too much pragmatism; pragmatic attitude to sex
4.	friendliness; readiness to help; politeness (sometimes too artificial)	too practical, rational; can suppress their feeling if they "can't afford it"
5.	independence; friendliness; self-respect	egotism; always think they are the best and unique
6.	independence (financial); kindness, willingness to help (when their interests don't clash with yours)	lack of depth and inability to go beyond one's frame of experience; adherence to rules and procedures
7.	friendliness; sociability, amiability; willingness to help	indirectness about what they expect you to do for them
8.	friendliness; ability to work hard; desire to be independent	not caring about anything but themselves; lack of sincerity; don't like to have a serious relationship
9.	self-confidence, self-reliance; independence; ability to adapt	over consuming; overexaggerated individualism
10.	friendliness	individualism and selfishness
11.	ability to work hard; politeness	indifference to anybody but themselves

APPENDIX H:
A LIST OF RUSSIAN "TRAITS" AS DESCRIBED BY AMERICAN SUBJECTS

	"Positive Traits"	"Negative Traits"
1.	culture, erudition	snobbery, supermicism
2.	ability to survive	no respect for personal space and privacy
3.	hospitality, honesty	self-depriciation
4.	friendly and open when they know you	mean, pushy when they don't know you
5.	faith and loyalty to friends	difficult to say "no" to them
6.	generosity	sexism
7.	honesty (friends are not afraid to say what they think), helpfulness	men carrying things for women (sexism)
8.	hospitality	insistence that their way is the right way
9.	warmth, hospitality, straight-forwardness, down-to-earth	prejudiced
10.	hospitality (not among young, though)	"I'm better than you" attitude
11.	love of culture, music, art, land; adaptation; hospitality	do not like to take risks (with money, feelings, thoughts); not hospitable if they don't know you
12.	interested in you emotionally and physically	can take it far and invade your space
13.	loyalty to each other (friend)	lack of outlook (no plans or goals)

FOREGROUNDING THE ROLE OF COMMON GROUND IN LANGUAGE LEARNING

Sara W. Smith
Andreas H. Jucker

The present paper argues that the negotiation of common ground is an important but neglected area of pragmatics and language learning. Samples of first and second language learners' conversations are analyzed in order to demonstrate the critical role of common ground in language learning, i.e., 1) that the interactions necessary for language learning are dependent on the common ground between the participants, 2) that learning to convey and to exploit the common ground is a critical part of language learning, and 3) that learning much of syntax, lexical choice, and prosody is driven by the need to convey assumptions about the common ground. Strategies used in the explicit and implicit negotiation of common ground are identified, and suggestions are made for more systematic research on the development of such strategies in first and second language learning. Finally, the implications of such analyses for second language pedagogy are discussed, including the suggestion that strategies for negotiating common ground be taught explicitly.

INTRODUCTION

The central thesis of the present paper is that much of acquiring a first or second language consists of learning to negotiate the common ground between participants in a conversation. By negotiation, we mean that the common ground is defined interactively as interlocutors continually convey, confirm, and exploit assumptions about each other's knowledge and beliefs. This is part of a larger claim that various aspects of language exist, not only to convey information or to express social relations, but also to enable partners to create and maintain a model of each other that serves as the basis for their current and future interactions.

We believe that most theorists, as well as most speakers, take for granted the role of common ground. While Stalnaker (1974/1991) presented the following claim over 20 years ago, little formal work has followed up its many implications:

> Communication, whether linguistic or not, normally takes place against a background of beliefs or assumptions which are shared by the speaker and his audience, and which are recognized by them to be so shared.... The more common ground we can take for granted, the more efficient our communication will be. And unless we could reasonably treat **some** facts in this way, we probably could not communicate at all. (p. 472)

We want to claim that common ground is especially critical for successful communication with a language learner but, even more crucially, that negotiating common ground is a necessary and inherent part of language learning. Further, we believe that much of what is learned is the use of various linguistic means for negotiating common ground, and that it is the need for such negotiation that drives the development of syntax, the lexicon, and prosody. Such negotiation may be explicit, as when interlocutors identify and repair a miscommunication; more often it is implicit, as speakers convey their assumptions to each other by various linguistic choices and then adapt subsequent language according to the partner's reaction. For example, the use of definite reference is a signal that the Speaker expects the Listener to be able to identify the referent. If the partner continues the topic, it is taken as a signal that the referent was adequately identified. We would argue that the interaction between partners creates the need for such signals and that language develops in order to meet these communicative goals more effectively; thus our model is both interactionist and functional.

We will not attempt to add to the data concerning language acquisition but rather will re-examine and integrate familiar data and analyses. Theorists working in several areas of first and second language acquisition have provided analyses that appear to depend on the role of common ground. We would like to strengthen the claims made separately and often implicitly by integrating them into an overall analysis in which the role of common ground is made explicit and central. And while we do not claim to present definitive tests of this interpretation in direct contrast to others, we hope the examples and arguments presented provide persuasive evidence of the role of common ground.

For several reasons, it seems easier to identify the role of common ground in first language learning (FLL) than in second language learning (SLL).[1] First, it is easier to identify the areas of common ground, as the prior experience of infants and children is both smaller and more easily identified than the prior experience of older children and adults. Second, the stages of FLL have been identified more specifically, so it is easier to identify the role of common ground as the child progresses from stage to stage. Finally, miscommunications are more transparent in interactions with children, as they are less concerned with saving face and have fewer strategies for avoiding or hiding communication problems. Thus, we will provide more analyses of FLL, though our goal is to understand stages and issues in SLL, as well as FLL.

Finally, we will argue that these analyses have important implications for SL pedagogy. The analysis supports the strategy of gradually and systematically moving from contextualized to decontextualized language, both in conversing and in writing. It also suggests that students need to learn to interpret and provide cues about common ground. We believe that it is both important and possible to teach meta-pragmatics (cf. Bouton, this volume; Cheng & Steffensen, this volume); that is, that students should and can learn to think about what assumptions we carry about each other and the role these assumptions play in our use of language. They need to understand why it is as **pragmatically** inappropriate to ask an American *Have you ever eaten a hamburger?* as it is syntactically inappropriate to ask *Has you ever eaten sashimi?* (cf. Bell, 1995).

DISCUSSION

Background

Previous writers in several fields have dealt with the concept of shared assumptions, using names that have grown out of different theoretical frameworks, such as pragmatic presuppositions (Stalnaker, 1974/1991); mutual knowledge (Gibbs, 1987; N. V. Smith, 1982) shared assumptions (Sperber & Wilson, 1986); and common ground (Clark, 1992). All seem to agree that speakers can never have any certainty about the knowledge and beliefs of their interlocutors, but that speakers do depend on their assumptions about their partner's assumptions. We use the term common ground to refer to those assumptions which are entertained by both partners in a conversation and which they assume to be mutual.

Clearly, such assumptions are easier to assess under some circumstances than others; as Clark (1992) has noted, we are most confident about such assumptions when both partners are jointly observing a common and salient event, but we often must make assumptions about another person's prior experience. Besides determining whether a partner has been exposed to information, a speaker must make assumptions about what lexical choices will make that information accessible to the listener. For example, the use of an unelaborated proper name assumes that the referent is known to the listener and is readily accessible via the name alone.

For adults who share a common culture, much common ground comes from culturally-shared activities, or scripts. A text like the following (Schank, 1984) activates a script that fills in the gaps in the description of events.

(1) John went to a restaurant. He asked the waitress for coq au vin. He paid the check and left. (p. 122)

To a large extent, a speaker works from assumptions based on judgments about membership in socio-cultural categories. Partners from a western country are assumed to share the same basic restaurant script, and partners from the midwest are assumed to share knowledge of snowy roads. If they went to dinner together last night, each assumes that they share memory for the salient events.

In addition, adults who share a native language ordinarily provide each other a variety of cues that assist in the on-line detection of common ground and facilitate the constant adaptation of their language to it. A variety of syntactic choices such as definite reference (e.g., Prince, 1981), left-dislocation (e.g., Ochs & Schieffelin, 1983), and tag questions (Houck, 1991) signal assumptions about the partner's knowledge. Discourse markers such as *you know* (Schiffrin, 1987), *actually* (Green, 1989) and *well* (Jucker, 1993) also convey assumptions and invite confirmation or disconfirmation of them. Finally, prosody (e.g., Hirschberg & Ward, 1995) may be used to negotiate such assumptions.

However, a child learning a first language has to develop a common ground of experience with others in the culture, as well as ways of retrieving that experience from others' reference to it (cf. Nelson, 1993). The child must first come to understand that others will have different representations of the world, based on their experiences in it (Perner, 1991). Then the child must learn to use cues from others in order to create a model of each partner's knowledge and to use that model in talking to the partner. And finally the child must learn how to convey to others what he or she knows or doesn't know, while preserving both partners' face.

For an older child or an adult learning a second language, some elements are easier. He or she understands that others may have different knowledge and has some basis for judging what that different knowledge might be. People from industrialized countries probably share many scripts and much general information; but, as Gumperz (1982) and others have noted, many miscommunications between people from different cultural backgrounds occur because interlocutors have difficulty determining exactly what is and is not held in common. This is partly because they simply have less experience in common, but we believe it is also because they have less skill with linguistic devices for conveying and testing their assumptions about each other during the course of an interaction.

First Language Learning (FLL)

FLL is commonly described as being heavily dependent on the context in its early stages and then gradually becoming decontextualized. Initially, an adult cannot assume any shared and accessible context other than that which is both present and salient. Gradually, however, the child learns both to store and to retrieve knowledge out of its original context (Nelson, 1993), and the partners develop ways to judge and convey their common ground.

Reference. One of the most basic aspects of language is the ability to establish joint reference, to know when we are talking about the same thing. Acquisition of the means to establish joint reference is developed over a series of intricate stages in which a) the common ground is expanded to include past events, b) the child comes to play a more active role in identifying the common ground, and c) the child learns the use of syntactic devices for identifying and conveying assumptions about the common ground.

For example, Foster (1979, as cited in McTear, 1985) described the stages in which infants initiate reference. As early as one month, infants appeared to attempt to initiate communication, but only by directing attention to themselves and depending on the adult to interpret what was being indicated. Next, an infant would attempt to direct attention to objects present in the environment, first by gesture and then by vocalization. Scollon (1974, as cited in Reich, 1986, pp. 65-66) provides a much-cited example from a conversation between Brenda at 1;3 and her mother.

(2) Brenda: *Fan* (looking at the electric fan)
Mother: (no response)
Brenda: *Fan*
Mother: *Hm?*
Brenda: *Fan*
Mother: *Bathroom?*
Brenda: *Fan.*
Mother: *Fan! Yeah.*

Brenda: *Cool!*
Mother: *Cool, yeah. Fan makes you cool.*

Notice that Brenda insisted on getting confirmation of the common ground as a condition of her next utterance, which, taken with the original utterance, formed a "vertical sentence." The common ground appeared to play a critical role in the bootstrapping of syntactic structure.

According to Foster, only at two years or older was the child able to refer to topics not present in the environment. Even then, as McTear (1985, p. 78) illustrated, many references to absent entities are unsuccessful. Conversation (3) is between Siobhan at 2;6 and her mother:

(3) Siobhan: [*daimng*] [*daimng*][2]
Mother: *what's a [daimng]?*

(Exchange repeated several times)

Siobhan: [*pa'teps] bus in house*
Mother: *oh Stephen*
Siobhan: *[daimng]*

Note that the reference (to the steps you have to go up and to the bus in Stephen's house) was finally resolved only because the partner shared specific experiences with the child and could also judge what might be salient to her.

As McTear (1985, p. 78) pointed out, "the child lacks devices such as fully developed relative clauses to say things like *the boy who lives in a house which is up some steps and who has a toy bus in his house*." In addition, she lacks the ability to say something like *You know Stephen, the one with the toy bus? Well he...*, i.e., to build an appropriate level of description into the first mention of a referent so that the partner can readily identify him. However, it is possible to identify some strategies for negotiating common ground even in these very young children. In both conversations, when the mother indicated she didn't understand the child's reference, the child didn't abandon the message but rather repeated it several times. Such repetition may serve as a strategy to express confidence her mother would be able to identify the referent eventually.

In conversation (3), the child used elaboration by association--*up the steps* and *bus in house*--in order to make the referent more accessible. Finally, she confirmed her mother"s identification of the referent by repeating the name.

It would be easy to blame the problem in the above example on the child's limitations in phonological production. But even when that is not a problem, the child's utterances may not work because the utterance assumes knowledge the partner doesn't have.

Siobhan at 3;8 was talking to a new acquaintance, Simon, about their ages. She then abruptly referred to a child who Simon had never met,

(4) *...but Heather's four now.*

At 4;6 she still sometimes had difficulty making the reference clear.

(5) Siobhan: *well these are going to be for Emily instead of you then?*
Heather: *who are they going to be for?*
Siobhan: *at the playschool*
Heather: *Emily?*
Siobhan: *yes*
Heather: *who's she?*
Siobhan: *the teacher at my playschool*

But, only weeks later, Siobhan was able to use an appositive structure to identify a new referent:

(6) Siobhan: *and my wee friend Andrea doesn't let me play with her toys.*

Her friend Heather at 4:10 was able to self-repair in order to provide an identification of a new referent:

(7) Heather: *guess what I was doing for Emma uh Siobhan's teacher*

Even in later years, when the child has an elaborate morpho-syntactic system available, the negotiation of reference remains a challenge. In a classic study, Flavell and associates (Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, 1968) found that when second-graders carried out a task with blindfolded adult listeners, they used pointing, deictics, and other means of reference that ordinarily depend on shared visual knowledge. Contrary to early interpretations of such results, Nelson (1979/1988, p. 267) suggested, "what has been generally termed egocentrism in the young child is a misplaced assumption of shared context by either or both participants in a dialogue." As Karmiloff-Smith (1979) pointed out, children (with our encouragement!) may assume adults are omniscient. Or children may make too-generous assumptions about the availability and accessibility of knowledge they have gained, as when a child assumes that everyone knows about an event because it was on television.

Other researchers such as Menig-Petersen (1975) and Sonnenschein (1988) found that, while children as young as three years may make identifiable adjustments in referring to experiences depending on whether the adult had shared the experience, skill in appropriate reference under such circumstances continues to develop for several years. This may result both from the child's developing ability to determine what adults can and cannot be expected to know and also, as Nelson (1979 /1988) suggests, from the development of conversational strategies that allow the child to "clarify the shared context," i.e., to negotiate common ground.

Conversations and strategies for negotiating common ground. In Bruner's (1983) model of scaffolding (or formatting), the development of adult-child conversations is dependent on the creation of rituals that integrate predictable cognitive, language and social structures, as in playing games or participating in daily routines. Consistent with Vygotsky's (1934/1986) concept of the zone of proximal development, Bruner argued that this structure makes possible a higher level of functioning than would otherwise be possible and that this serves as the basis of subsequent learning.

Nelson and Gruendel (1979/1988) pointed out that, because the child shares so many experiences and scripts with his primary caretaker,

> ...learning the structure of conversational exchanges takes place within a context in which the child's assumption of shared knowledge is justified.... We should go beyond this to suggest that it is within the support offered by contexts shared between mother and child that the child learns not only the turn-taking aspect of conversational structure but also the semantics and syntactics of conversational contingencies, such as topic sharing and contingent responding. (pp. 276-277)

They pointed out that the child may take the same assumption of shared knowledge with him into conversations with other adults or with peers. Often, this is a safe assumption, but these conversations require him to learn new strategies in order to identify those areas in which these assumptions do and do not work. While conversations with adults may depend principally on the adult's ability to interpret the child's contributions, conversations between peers require that the child develop strategies for negotiating common ground.

Nelson and Gruendel suggested that it is shared scripts that allow peers their first opportunities to move beyond discussion of the *here and now*. The following conversation is between two girls, G-1 (age 4;4) and G-2 (4;8).

(8) G-1: *And also, at nighttime, it's suppertime.*
G-2: *Yeah, at nighttime, it's suppertime. It is.*
G-1: *It's morning.*
G-2: *At morning, it's lunchtime.*
G-1: *At morning, we already had breakfast. Because at morning, it's lunchtime!*
G-2: *RIGHT!*
G-1: *Yeah, at morning, it's lunchtime.*
G-2: *At morning, it's lunchtime.*

The conversation proceeded smoothly when it built on a shared script. The girls used three basic strategies to confirm the partner's assumptions about that script: direct confirmation with an Acknowledgment Particle (*Yeah)*, Repetition of the partner's utterance *(At nighttime, its suppertime)*, and Continuation of Topic introduced by partner *(At morning, its lunchtime)*.

However, the conversation rapidly became awkward when there were differences in the script held by the participants.

(9) G-1: *But FIRST comes snack, then comes lunch.*
G-2: *Right...Just in school, right?*

G-1: *Yeah, right, just in school.*
G-2: *Not at home.*
G-1: *Well, sometimes we have snacks at home.*
G-2: *Sometimes.*
G-1: *Sometimes I have snack at home.*
G-2: *Sometimes I have snack at my home, too.*
G-1: *Uh-hum. Because when special children come to visit us, we sometime have snack. Like, like, hotdogs, or crackers, or cookies, or, or something like that.*
G-2: *Yeah. Something. Maybe cake.* (Laughs.)
G-1: *Cake.*
G-2: *Cake. Yeah, maybe cake.*
G-1: *Or maybe, uh, maybe hotdog.*
G-2: *Maybe hotdog.*

The girls were able to detect the mismatch of scripts only gradually, as various means of checking indicated problems. First, there was an attempt to Qualify the Initial Assertion *(Just in school...)* and to check the qualification by the use of a Tag Question *(..., right?)* The Discourse Marker *well* signaled the need to reassess the assumption of the original assertion (cf. Jucker, 1993), *(Well, sometimes we have snacks at home.)* And the repeated use of Qualifiers *(Sometimes.., Maybe, uh, maybe....)* indicated that the original assertion was not part of shared knowledge. These strategies allowed the girls to negotiate the common ground to a limited extent; that is, they identified the lack of common ground, but they did not come to a formal resolution (as in, *Oh, I see you have snacks regularly at home but we only have them on special occasions, as when company comes.*).

Next, the conversation threatened to fall apart when elements appeared that were not common ground. Ordinarily, the use of a proper name, e.g., Michael, conveys the assumption that the partner can identify exactly what person is being referred to. Thus, an unintroduced reference to Jill and Michael produced confusion.

(10) G-1: *But, but, but, Jill and Michael don't like hotdog. Don't you know, but do you know Michael and Jill?*
G-2: *I know another Michael.*
G-1: *I know, I know another Michael.*
G-2: *No, I know just one Michael. I just know one Michael.*
G-1: *Do you know Flora?*
G-2: *NO! But you know what? It's a, it's one, it's it's somebody's bro...it's somebody's brother.*

It is important to note that the speaker herself showed her awareness of the potential problem; she began explicit negotiation by asking, first *Don't you know...?*, which implies that the partner **should** know, then the less presumptuous direct question *...but do you know Michael and Jill?* The girls resolved the problem only in that they established that they did not know the same Michael. However, they were never able to get a common understanding of who Michael was, and the topic ended unsatisfactorily, with a string of dysfluencies--*But* *you know what: It's a, it's one, it's it's somebody's bro...it's somebody's brother.* At that point, the conversation returned with obvious relief to the safer common ground.

(11) G-1: *Are you eating your dinner?* (Laughs) *but not for real.*
G-2: *Not for real.*
G-1: *Because at morning it's lunchtime.*
G-2: *Right, at morning it is lunchtime.*
G-1: *Right, at morning it is lunchtime.*

Again, they acknowledged their common ground by the use of Repetition *(Not for real.)*, Topic Continuation *(Because at morning it's lunchtime.)*, and a Particle *(Right,...)*.

The conversation above provides evidence that, by the age of 5, children have identifiable strategies for detecting, confirming, or disconfirming assumptions about their common ground. The success of their conversation depended on their ability to exploit their common ground. They also appeared to have some ability to anticipate problematic references and some strategies for negotiating repairs.

However, children at that age apparently do not have an adult's set of strategies to prevent or more quickly resolve the confusions that arise. For example, if an adult speaker did not have good reason to believe the partner knew who Jill and Michael were, the speaker would have used some introduction such as, *I have some friends, Jill and Michael, who don't like hotdogs.*

During later childhood and adolescence, the child apparently learns more effective strategies for implicit and explicit negotiation of common ground. Unfortunately, these ages are relatively under-researched; it would seem fruitful to study the stages and means by which children develop the integrated linguistic and social skills necessary for adult communicative skills. It would also seem an excellent arena in which to study how cognition, language functions, and language structures bootstrap on each together.

Second Language Learning (SLL)

We believe that common ground also plays a critical but neglected role in SLL, that is, not only is common ground necessary for early communication but it is also critical to language learning itself. However, there are some important differences that should be noted concerning SLL by adults or older children. First, they already have a "theory of mind" (Perner, 1991), which includes the awareness that others may have different knowledge. Second, they have learned many pan-cultural schemas and scripts. And third, they have some beliefs about what members of the target culture should know.

Reference. For various reasons, researchers have not focused as much on the very earliest stages of second language learning. The development of first references would appear to be less complex, as the SL learner already has the cognitive and social skills necessary to establish joint reference. Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that the success of one's first spontaneous uses of reference are heavily dependent on the existence of a shared context, such as the presence of bread in a bakery or the use of a ticket-buying script at a ticket counter. When such context is lacking, the SL learner may be dependent on the native-speaker's ability to find an appropriate context for interpreting an inadequate production, as in the following example (Nelson, 1989 as cited in Tarone & Yule, 1989, p. 110):

(12) Learner: *I'm looking for [testel].*
E.N.: *Erica Tesdell? Her office is 110.*
Learner: *[testel]*
E.N.: *A woman teacher?*
Learner: *No, man. [testel]*
E.N.: *What does he look like?*
etc.

It turned out the learner was looking for a person named Ted Taylor. Unless the native speaker had known that person and known that he was someone ESL students might be looking for, she almost certainly would not have been able to interpret the utterance.

The SL learner with more linguistic skills and strategic competence is often able to supply a verbal context that establishes the common ground necessary for a listener to interpret a flawed reference production (Pica, 1987, as cited in Gass & Selinker, 1994, p. 221):

(13) NNS: And *they have the chwach there*
NS: *The what?*
NNS: The *chwach--I know someone that--*
NS: *What does it mean?*
NNS: *Like um American people they always go there every Sunday.*
NS: *Yes?*
NNS: *You know--every morning that there pr-that-the American people get dressed up to go to um chwach.*
NS: *Oh to church--I see.*

Sentences. The successful production of early sentences also appears to depend on the partners' ability to exploit the common ground. Ellis (1985, as cited in Gass & Selinker, 1994, p. 216) presented what was believed to be a young NNS's first production of a two-constituent utterance in English:

(14) NS: *I want you to tell me what you can see in the picture or what's wrong with the picture.*
NNS: *A /paik/* (= bike)
NS: *A cycle, yes, but what's wrong.*
NNS: */ret/* (= red).
NS: *It's red, yes. What's wrong with it?*
NNS: *Black.*
NS: *Black. Good. Black what?*
NNS: *Black /taes/* (= tires).

Gass and Selinker used (14) to illustrate their point that in SLL, as in FLL, conversational interaction drives syntactic development, rather than vice versa. We would add further that the common ground appears to be a necessary part of the interaction, both to provide the basis for the production and to enable the partner to comprehend the incomplete sentence.

In Wong Fillmore's (1979) study of young SL learners, their first sentences consisted of formulaic utterances that were first used contextually. For example, a child might use *How do you do dese*? to open a conversation in a variety of contexts and without knowing the meaning of the lexical items. As learners produced variations on these formulas, these variations were also used contextually and could generally be understood only by a person sharing the context, as when asking, *How do you do dese flower power?* to a child drawing flowers. Wong Fillmore argued that for SL learners, the syntax grew out of the interaction, and she argued further (p. 211) that the social use of formulaic expressions

> ...was extremely important because it permitted the learners to continue participating in activities which provided contexts for the learning of new material. This new material was learnable and memorable by virtue of being embedded in current, interest-building activities....

She observed that both the learner and the NS limited their conversation to the present context and argued that this allowed them to understand each other well enough to continue interacting. Thus it appears that the common ground provided by the context plays a critical role in the development of the second language.

However, Saville-Troike (1988, p. 266) observed that the "message-oriented" strategies that many children used to learn the SL in the preschool setting were not necessarily adequate in grade school classrooms. She argued that, as "academic language competence" involves context-reduced communication, the child must learn different strategies. More research is needed to determine how the child develops the ability to identify and exploit common ground that is more abstract in nature, both in and out of the classroom setting.

Conversations and Narratives. In SLL, as in FLL, early conversations are highly dependent on the shared context of the partners. With that apparently in mind, researchers in the European project on Second Language Acquisition by Adult Immigrants devised a task to study SL development of narratives. The NNS informant and a Target Language Researcher (TLR) watched the first half of a Charlie Chaplin video together. Midway through, the TLR left and later asked the NNS what happened after he or she left, participating only as much as was necessary to maintain the conversation. In the conversation below, Paula, a native speaker of Spanish, had been in France for about 6 months when she first participated in the task. She was described as having a French vocabulary of less than 50 words. The first part of her narrative is presented below as translated into English (Klein & Perdue, 1992, p. 260).[3]

(15) NNS: *unemployment + without work*
TLR: *without work yes yes and so who is without work?*
NNS: **el padre* father*
TLR: *the father?*

NNS: *the father of the children*
TLR: *there is a girl?*
NNS: *three*
TLR: *three or three small ones?*
NNS: *two small ones and a + woman? ...a girl*
TLR: *the girl she has what age?*
NNS: *fifteen*
TLR: *and she works?*
NNS: *no*
TLR: *what does she do?*
NS: *she is hungry*
TLR: *what does she do to eat?*
NNS: *[steal] *para* eat*
(Continued for 31 exchanges)

Paula lacked the skills to tell the story by herself; 22 of her 31 utterances were produced with "immediate reliance" on the TLR. Klein and Perdue describe TLR as providing scaffolding that played two roles, to prompt her and to help her learn appropriate lexical items and structures. Thus, even though the speaker lacked the skills for describing characters and actions and for tying episodes together, the prompts provided a structure that enabled her to create a narrative from sentence fragments. Second, Paula used words and phrases in her subsequent utterances that were first introduced by the TLR after she failed to use them when they would have been expected. Thus, while she originally used the broader term *children*, she eventually used *girl* after the TLR did. Other words similarly enabled by the TLR in the section above are *she*, *small*, and *eat*. We believe it is important to note that an interlocutor not already familiar with the video would not have been able to maintain the interview or create the context for learning appropriate forms, as he would not have been able either to supply the appropriate prompts or to understand her answers.

Development of strategies for conveying and exploiting common ground. According to our analysis (Jucker & Smith, 1995), speakers ordinarily convey and confirm assumptions about common ground through a variety of implicit and explicit strategies. Thus one important task for the SL learner is to learn those devices for doing so. In English, the article system serves to convey assumptions about whether a referent is already accessible to the interlocutor (through prior mention in the linguistic context or through shared knowledge) or is being introduced for the first time. For example, the phrase *the dog* instructs the listener to search for a known dog, while *a dog* tells the listener to establish a new canine referent. The article system is very intricate, and it is typically one of the last syntactic areas mastered by SL learners, especially those whose FL has no article system. When one first hears such speakers, it appears that they simply omit articles. Thus it seems surprising at first to find that SL learners develop systematic use of articles early in their mastery of English.

Klein and Perdue found that SL learners of English devised various ways to distinguish between common ground and new information. For example, Madan, a native speaker of Punjabi, used the zero article for many referents. While at first it might appear that he simply failed to use articles most of the time, closer examination revealed that his use of articles was quite systematic. While no article was used with characters that were in the first part of the video and were presumed to be common ground, *one X* was systematically used to introduce characters and objects that appeared in the video after TLR left (Klein & Perdue, 1992, p. 70).

(16) *girl stealing one shop*
one woman coming back

In later interviews, he continued to use *one X* for indefinite reference, but he also began to use *the X* to introduce new NP's as objects, e.g. (p. 76),

(17) *back door stand the policeman*

and then to use *that X* to reintroduce characters already known to the audience, e.g. (p. 79),

(18) *that girl she's accident with charlie*

Another informant, a native speaker of Italian, used *the* to introduce objects , e.g. (p. 98),

(19) *the boat go into the sea*

throughout the narrative, but rather than use *the/a* alternation the way a NS would, he created other devices to discriminate between familiar and unfamiliar characters. In an early interview, he used *that woman* to refer to the main character and *another woman* each time he referred to a second woman who appeared. Other new characters or important objects were introduced with *one*, e.g. (p. 98),

(20) *and he see this girl/her with one piece of bread burgled but one policeman*
see her with this piece of bread

Finally, *this* or *that* were used to refer to previously mentioned characters or important objects.

Similarly, Tarone (1985, as cited and discussed in Tarone & Yule, 1989) found that more advanced NNS's were quite accurate in their use of definite vs. indefinite articles in narrative tasks (83% and 91% correct for Japanese and Arabic speakers, respectively), even though they were not very accurate (56% and 38%) in paper-and-pencil tasks. In contrast, speakers were less accurate in the use of present tense first person singular *s* in the narrative task compared to the written one. Tarone and Yule (p. 84) argued that:

> In successfully narrating a story...the speaker must make sure that references to the various protagonists and objects which are crucial to the story line are clear; articles and pronouns are very important in maintaining this sort of clear reference.

One could continue the line of argument and suggest that it is the felt need to distinguish new from commonly held knowledge that drives the speaker's development of the forms that signal this distinction.

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In sum, speakers seem sensitive to the needs of the audience to distinguish new material from common ground. Thus, they appear to develop means to make such a distinction relatively early in their mastery of the language, and they are inventive in their use of a new language to do so.

Explicit negotiation of common ground. Second language learners also must find ways to explicitly negotiate meanings. This seems to show up especially in NNS-NNS interactions. Whereas the teacher or an adult NS may play the role of the near-omniscient partner responsible for doing the work of the interaction, learners talking with each other must learn strategies for identifying and exploiting the common ground.

They learn to ask directly about their partner's knowledge, even before they have mastered the nuances of the question structures (Gass & Selinker, 1994, p. 210).

(21) NNS: *I was born in Nagasaki. Do you know Nagasaki?*

They also learn to formulate and repair utterances in terms that are most likely to be common ground. In the examples below (Bialystok, 1990), 9-year olds learning French participated in an exercise in which partners were required to identify objects from an array of pictures in order to reorganize them. The Director was responsible for describing the picture so the matcher could select the correct one; all pictures were of items for which the classes had not learned the names, such as *spatula* and *hammer*. The English translation is given (Bialystok, 1990, p. 68).

(22) Director: *You use it for cooking.*
Matcher: *What do you cook with it?*
Director: *You can make pancakes and often scrambled eggs.*
Matcher: *Do you pick them up with this?*
Director: *Yes.*

In the example above, the director and matcher collaborated to identify a spatula by building on assumed common ground both in their knowledge of the world (cooking) and in their lexical knowledge (names for cooking, pancakes, etc.).

When a participant misjudges the common ground, partners are often able to find even more basic common ground in order to repair the reference (Bialystok, 1990, p. 69):

(23) Director: *When you have a nail and you want to put the nail in the wood.*
Matcher: *I don't know what a nail is.*
Director: *When you want to put two pieces of wood together you need a nail. It is a little metal thing. When you want to put it in the wood, you need something to put it in the wood.*

The repair (to identify first *nail* and then *hammer*) worked only because the Matcher already had the concepts involved, both the lexical concepts such as wood and metal, and world knowledge concerning ways in which wood is held together.

Problems in negotiating common ground. SL learners are certainly not always successful, either with other NSS's or with NS's. Hatch (1983, citing Butterworth, 1978) presented a conversation in which a NS and NNS who apparently shared some knowledge of soccer exchanged eight turns in an unsuccessful attempt to get the NNS to understand the question *Who is the best player in Colombia?* Although the NS appealed to presumed common ground, *Do, do they have someone like Pele in Columbia?*, he finally gave up and abruptly changed the topic. Varonis and Gass (1985, p. 332) described an interaction between a NNS and a NS who exchanged 25 turns during which the NNS attempted to get information about the purchase of a television set while the NS, answering the telephone for a repair shop, assumed the NNS owned a set he wanted repaired or sold.

(24) NNS: *Could you tell me about price and size of Sylvania TV color?*
NS: *What did you want? A service call?*
NNS: *Uh, 17 inch, huh?*
NS: *What did you want? A service call, or how much to repair a TV?*
NNS: *Yeah TV color.*
NS: *17 inch.*
NNS: *OK.*

While the NNS had adequate skills to purchase a set, had the two speakers been following the same script, he did not have the skills needed to determine that they had begun from completely different presuppositions about the function of the shop.

In fact, the negotiation of common ground may remain problematic long after speakers have near-native skills in syntax and lexical choices. A number of writers have indicated that miscommunications may result from mistaken assumptions regarding common ground when adult learners cross language and cultural boundaries (e.g., Gunthner, 1993; House, 1993; Kasper & Blum-Kulka, 1993; Tarone & Yule, 1989). While most SL teaching assumes that limited syntax and vocabulary is the main source of problems, these examples provide evidence that the negotiation of common ground remains a major challenge to SL learners after they have mastered much standard syntax and vocabulary.

In a series of essays, Gumperz (1982) discussed the need for interlocutors to determine the contextual presuppositions of an interaction, arguing that "interpretations are jointly negotiated by speaker and hearer and judgments either confirmed or changed by the reactions they evoke" (p. 5). He then described the ways in which people signal and probe for cues that will enable them to provide a sociocultural context for utterances, illustrating his points with various examples of miscommunications that resulted from seemingly small mismatches in wording and intonation. In Gumperz's examples, the interlocutors were usually southern Asians who were fluent in terms of English syntax and vocabulary but who used different culturally-based interpretative frames.

Working from Gumperz's framework, Gunthner (1993, p. 292) argued that contextualization also includes "the design of the utterance with an orientation to the background knowledge and cognitive state of the recipients." She further suggested that, for interlocutors from different "life-worlds," it is difficult for them "to assess what kind of social knowledge can be presupposed and what needs further explanation."

She analyzed conversations between native speakers of German and their advanced students or colleagues in China. Thus, in both cases below, the SLL was fluent in the target language by all standard measures. Conversation (25) was held in German between S., a German lecturer in China, and Bao, a Chinese teacher of German (the English translation is given).

(25) Bao: *we Chinese think, a a yeah a woman in power is not good. you*
see, like for example, ZIQI.
S: *ya? who is zi: eh ZIqi? who is that?*
Bao: *don't you know ZIQI?*
S: *no. Ziqi? no.*
Bao: *she was the king's widow during the ja QING dynasty.*
S: *when did she live?*

The NNS used an unelaborated proper name, which presumed, incorrectly, that the listener would be able to identify the referent by name.

Conversation (26) was held between Qin, who is Chinese and fluent in German, and M., a German who had been in China for 9 months.

(26) Qin: *also the reform of the university.*
M: *mhm*
Qin: *I believe before the cultural revolution:yeah you surely know + +*
the cultural revolution:
M: *haha/ha a very ((HI))common((HI))topic((HI))*
Qin: */hi hahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha*
M&Q: *hahaahahahahahahhahahahah*
M: *when you*
Qin: *yeah before; the cultural revolution yeah, then the graduates from*
middle school were sent yeah directly to university.

While one would expect that communication would be disrupted when the speaker overestimated the partner's knowledge as in (25), it is less obvious why it is also disrupted when Qin underestimated the partner's knowledge, in (26). Yet, as Gunthner noted, concerning (26), "Underestimating the knowledge of the recipient and consequently employing 'talking-down' techniques might turn out to be more face-threatening than overestimating their knowledge" (p. 293).

Thus, the negotiation of common ground is a delicate matter; if a speaker overestimates her partner's knowledge, he cannot understand what she is saying; but if she underestimates it, both partners may lose face. As important as these critical pragmatic skills are for both referential and social aspects of communication, they are ignored in models of second language learning and in formal language instruction.

In Gunthner's analysis, the problem consisted of the SL learner's under- or overestimation of the common ground. We would argue that the problem goes deeper. Even when native speakers are not certain of common ground, they are generally able to prevent the type breakdown that occurred in (25) and (26). Thus a major component of the problem for SL learners is that they also have very limited means for negotiating the common ground. For whereas Bao introduced Ziqi with a proper noun, a native speaker who was not certain the partner knew of a historical character might introduce her with elaborative phrases such as *the notorious empress of the Qing dynasty*, and/or an immediate comprehension check, *Do you know of Ziqi?* Further, in attempting to repair the miscommunication, instead of the neutral question form, Bao asked, *Don't you know Ziqi?* This seemingly small difference in the form of the question changed it into an apparent challenge, which probably made matters worse.

In (26), the speaker may have suspected the partner knew of the cultural revolution but did not know how to indirectly test that assumption. For a native speaker, there are a variety of ways to remind the listener without threatening face, including the use of expanded noun phrases *the cultural revolution during the 60's when...*, the use of discourse markers *during the cultural revolution, you know?*, and/or the use of intonation *during the cultural revolution?*.

In sum, a conversation with an SL learner may be awkward, not just because the learner has greater difficulty with his original assumptions about the common ground, but also because he has fewer devices for continually conveying and confirming them. As these skills are rarely taught explicitly, learners are left to figure them out on their own, which may involve a long period of trial and error.

Implications for pedagogy

Looking at SLL in terms of the role of common ground has direct implications for SL pedagogy. First, it provides affirmation for the current view that the culture needs to be taught along with the language. If structural choices depend on the common ground between interlocutors, teaching structure and teaching culture are integrally interrelated.

Second, SL instructors can identify and use commonly held scripts and knowledge as scaffolding for the SL learner. Most beginning lessons do so (including both textbook examples such as *I write with a pencil* and communicative exercises such as greetings). Similarly, sheltered English classrooms usually begin with material that can be demonstrated visually and which involves familiar concepts. The teacher's awareness of areas of common ground that students bring with them can help in planning crucial beginning lessons, and the teacher can deliberately develop classroom scripts and content areas that provide scaffolding for further development. Finally, encouragement of immediate student responses can help the teacher adjust classroom language to the students' actual level of knowledge.

However, more attention needs to be paid to the systematic decontextualization of language, both for comprehension and production and for oral and written language. While good teachers do much of this already, they would benefit from doing so in a more systematic way. For example, writing assignments could systematically progress from topics and target audiences for which SL writers can safely assume much common ground to those in which little common ground can be presumed. Students can be taught to analyze their audience's presumed knowledge before planning the content of a message.

In addition, we believe students should learn means for explicit negotiation of common ground, and that this should occur in appropriate stages. In the beginning stages, they can learn how to ask the interlocutor whether they know something before proceeding to talk about it (*Do you know Ziqi?*). In later stages, they can learn how to build confirmation checks into the text through intonation and structural choices (*There was a notorious empress, Ziqi?...who...*).

Finally, we propose that students should be explicitly taught the relation between structural choices and the assumptions we make about each other. Such metapragmatic learning would enhance the student's understanding of their new language and also give them a better understanding of language in general. While much past discussion of SLL has implied that conscious learning has little impact on performance, Schmidt (1993) argued convincingly that direct teaching of metapragmatics can facilitate language learning, and recent research provides clear evidence that both in SL comprehension (Bouton, this volume) and in writing (Cheng & Steffensen, this volume), such teaching can have a strong impact.

CONCLUSION

In our analysis, the common ground between the infant and a familiar person serves as the basis for the child's first communications. As a child attempts to communicate in broader contexts and to a broader audience, he or she must learn those aspects of language that allow him or her to identify and exploit the common ground that exists between partners.

We believe it is important to analyze more systematically the means by which children and adults negotiate common ground and the processes involved in the acquisition of this critical component of communication.

We believe that common ground plays an equally important role in SLL and that further research would demonstrate the stages and processes whereby critical pragmatic skills are learned.

Finally, we believe this analysis has several implications for second language pedagogy. For example, it is consistent with the advice that second language teachers attempt to move students from contextualized to decontextualized language. It also suggests that SL learners would benefit from learning to identify and produce on-line cues that signal assumptions about knowledge and beliefs held in common.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to express their appreciation to an anonymous reviewer for helpful advice as well as to conference participants who took the time to discuss the paper after its presentation. The first author would also like to thank Noel Houck for her encouragement of interest in this topic.

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NOTES

[1] We are not intending to distinguish between language learning and language acquisition for the purposes of the present paper.

[2] [...] encloses a phonological approximation of the utterance.

[3] The following transcription notations are used:
+ = pause
... = material uttered in first language
[...] = lexical item for which speaker required assistance

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THE PRAGMATICS OF UNCERTAINTY

Noriko Tanaka

At the earlier stage of the Speech Act Approach, it was not seriously considered that it may not be possible to determine the illocutionary force of any particular speech act. Later, however, the indeterminacy of force has been more carefully studied by some linguists.

This paper focusses on one of such linguists, Thomas, and introduces her concept *ambivalence* (Thomas, 1986b). Then, I will develop this concept and argue that there are different types of *ambivalence*: *ambivalence-strategic* and *ambivalence-genuine*. I will further point out that *ambivalence* may be realised not only at the utterance level but also at the discourse level.

Finally, I will argue that the realisation and the interpretation of *ambivalence* may differ from one culture to another, which may cause communication breakdown.

The Indeterminacy of Illocutionary Force

At the earlier stage of the speech act approach. When Austin first introduced his speech act approach, he basically presupposes that a single force is encoded in each utterance: 'illocutionary act which has a certain force in saying something' (Austin, 1980, p. 121 [1962][1]). As Thomas (1986a, p. 151) points out, 'he initially presented it as if a single force could be unproblematically assigned to any utterance'. Or at least he left out of consideration that an utterance may perform a more complex illocutionary act which has multiple or unidentifiable forces in it.

Searle (1969) further refined Austin's model and narrowed the scope. Later, Searle (1975) directed his attention to the fact that human beings often say one thing when they mean something different, and explored this issue in terms of *indirect speech acts*:

> In hints, insinuations, irony, and metaphor--to mention a few examples--the speaker's utterance meaning and the sentence meaning come apart in various ways. One important class of such cases is that **in which the speaker utters a sentence, means what he says, but also means something more**.
>
> (Searle, 1975, p. 59, my emphasis)

However, his approach to *indirect speech acts* is rather rigid and has 'the pigeon-holing tendency' (Leech, 1980, p. 87). His main concern here was to know 'how it is possible for the speaker to say one thing and mean that but also to mean something else' (Searle, 1975, p. 60). His argument presupposed that a speech act is determinable by some idiomatic convention (ibid., p. 76) and by inference. In other words, he did not take it into consideration that it may not be possible to determine the illocutionary force of any particular speech act.

A little before Searle (1975), Gordon and Lakoff (1975) [1971] also directed their interest to the fact that 'in everyday speech, we very often use one sentence to convey the meaning of another' (ibid., p. 83) and proposed 'conversational postulates' to explain how 'the meaning of another' is conveyed. They pointed out that an utterance could convey two different meanings:

> What is especially interesting about it is that the ambiguity of (30)[*Why are you painting your house purple?*] can convey two very different meanings, is not due to its having two different logical structures. Rather, the ambiguity is one of conveyed meaning, depending on context. In one class of contexts, the normal meaning of the question is conveyed. In another class of contexts, given certain conversational postulates, a very different meaning can be conveyed.
>
> (Gordon and Lakoff, 1975, p. 96)

However, like Searle (1975), they also presupposed that the 'meaning' is determinable according to the context; that is, a sentence can be grammatically ambiguous (see Thomas, 1986a, p. 152), but the context makes the meaning of the utterance clear. To them, (30) above is EITHER a question OR something else. About a different example, they argue:

> (52) I want to know where Harry went.
>
> Sentence (52) **either** can be taken literally as a statement of a desire for knowledge **or**, in contexts in which it is not taken literally, can convey a request by the speaker that the hearer tell him where Harry went.
>
> (Gordon and Lakoff, 1975, p. 100, my emphasis)

As Leech (1980) notes, neither Searle (1975) nor Gordon and Lakoff (1975) consider that the illocutionary force of an utterance can be indeterminable even in context, and the speaker may deliberately want it so:

> (19) Will you take out the garbage?
>
> is ambiguous. For Searle, (19) would be a request expressed by way of a question; for Gordon and Lakoff, it is either the one thing or the other. I find this consequence of their approach untenable, in that it conflicts with what I have already said about **the strategic indeterminacy** of such illocutions.
>
> (Leech, 1980, p. 87-88, my emphasis)

These earlier models ignored the fact that 'if one looks even cursorily at a transcribed record of a conversation, it becomes immediately clear that we do not know how to assign speech acts to the utterances in a non-arbitrary way' (Levinson, 1980, p. 20). In a different article, Levinson (1981) points out several inadequacies of speech act models. He throws doubts on:.

> (1) The existence and identifiability of unit acts corresponding to specific utterance units.
> (2) The existence and identifiability of utterance units corresponding to unit acts.
> (3) The existence of a specifiable function or procedure that will assign utterance units to unit acts (speech acts).
> (4) The assumption that sequences of utterances are regulated by conventional sequencing rules stated over speech act types.
>
> (Levinson, 1981)

Leech (1980) also points out the speech-act indeterminacy:

> First, it seems to me that the yes-or-no conditions imposed by Searlesque speech-act typology do not justly represent the shifting, continuously variable nature of pragmatic illocutionary force. Is it, for example, always possible to decide whether we're dealing with a request (where S has no authority over H) and a command (where he does)? Where does one draw the line between:
>
> (7) Sit down.
> (8) Will you sit down!
> (9) Please sit down.
> (10) Why don't you sit down?
> (11) Would you kindly sit down? etc.
>
> Clearly no line can be drawn, because authority (whether regarded as social or psychological) is a relative rather than absolute matter.
>
> (Leech, 1980, p. 84-85)

The development of the theory. The criticism of the earlier speech act model was the germ of a more flexible and dynamic view of communication. In the 1980s, linguists sought a more dynamic system of utterance description, rather than revising the original speech act model. Thomas (1986b) argues:

> What is needed is not a rigid framework which leads inevitably to a Procrustean distortion of the data, but rather a dynamic system of utterance interpretation which takes account of speaker goals and assigns to utterance not **a** meaning but meaning **potential**. It might not be tidy, but it would reflect more accurately the way people "make meaning" in interaction.
>
> (Thomas, 1986b, p. 38)

The dynamic view of interaction has enabled linguists to re-consider various aspects of communication; what was regarded as 'given' or 'discrete' is now viewed more flexibly. Candlin and Lucas (1984) argue:

> (...) acts are best placed on continua rather than seen as discrete and unproblematically identifiable phenomena.
>
> (Candlin and Lucas, 1984, p. 43)

With the dynamic view of interaction, the aspect which was regarded as 'untidy' or 'problematic' to the speech act model is now considered more positively. Leech (1980) not only points out the indeterminacy of a speech act, but also recognizes the strategic value of it: 'Surely an essential point about such indirect utterances is that they are not **meant** to be determinate' (Leech, 1980, p. 85). He points out that the speaker may intentionally keep the act indeterminate:

> In fact, the rhetoric of speech acts often encourages ambivalence:
>
> (40) Would you like to come in and sit down?
>
> Depending on the situation, (40) could be an invitation, a request, or a directive. Or, more important, it could be deliberately poised on the certain boundary between all three. **It is often in the speaker's interest**, and in the interests of politeness, to allow the precise force of a speech act to remain unclear.
>
> (Leech, 1980 p. 26, my emphasis)

Brown and Levinson (1987) [1978] also refer to the same strategic value of keeping the meaning open to negotiation:

> (...) if an actor goes off record in doing A, then there is more than one unambiguously attributable intention so that the actor cannot be held to have committed himself to one particular intent. (...) Linguistic realizations of off-record strategies include metaphor and irony, rhetorical questions, understatement, tautologies, **without doing so directly, so that the meaning is to some degree negotiable.**
>
> (Brown and Levinson, 1987, p. 69, my emphasis)

Leech (1983) also points out the negotiability of pragmatic factors, referring to an utterance made 'by an American hostage in Iran in 1980, when he was due for early release' (ibid., p. 23):

> *Considering that I am a hostage, I should say that I have been treated fairly.*
> (...) This may be an extreme case, but **it manifests an ambivalence and multiplicity of function** that is far from unusual as an exemplar of what language can do. The indeterminacy of conversational utterance also shows itself in the NEGOTIABILITY of pragmatic factors; that is, by leaving force unclear, S may leave H the opportunity to choose between one force and another, and thus leaves part of the responsibility of the meaning to H.
>
> (Leech, 1983, p. 23-24, my emphasis)

The dynamic view of interaction has made it possible to re-consider various linguistic models and to present more flexible and realistic views of discourse. From this flexible point of view, deviation from a 'rule' may itself have its communicative value.

Ambivalence

Different types of ambivalence. Thomas (1986b) develops Leech's concept of *ambivalence* and defines it as:

> *Ambivalence* in which the speaker does not make clear precisely which of a series of related illocutionary acts is intended
>
> (Thomas, 1986b, p. 9)

Although ambivalence is quite common in our daily interaction, why the speaker uses it and what s/he expects from the addressee may vary from one case to another. In order to understand clearly why we employ ambivalence, we need to explore different cases of ambivalence and to consider what factors make them different.

To examine the cases, I would like to follow Thomas (1992), who differentiates the different levels of intent in performing a speech act. I define each intent as follows:

Interpersonal intent: how S wants A to consider S's speech act.
or as what speech act S wants A to regard her/his utterance.
Perlocutionary intent[2]: what S wants A to accomplish by performing the speech act, or what perlocutionary effect S wants to have on A.

According to these concepts, *ambivalence* is understood as the case in which *interpersonal intent* is negotiable; S leaves unspecified what speech act s/he is performing, and leaves it to A how to take it. In the example we discussed in The development of the theory (Leech, 1980, p. 26), when S says 'Would you like to come in and sit down?', S presents her/his *interpersonal intent* in a indeterminable manner; in this case it does not matter very much what speech act A considers S's utterance as long as it is considered reasonably 'polite' in the situation.

On the other hand, in terms of *perlocutionary intent*, the cases vary. First of all, I would like to point out that perlocutionary intent may or may not be clear in S's mind. When it is clear, ambivalence is employed basically for some strategic reason; in order to achieve a certain perlocutionary intent, ambivalence is advantageous to S. When it is not clear, ambivalence may be rather the reflection of unclearness in S's mind. I will call each case:

Ambivalence-strategic:	S has a certain perlocutionary intent in mind, and uses ambivalence strategically.
Ambivalence-genuine:	Perlocutionary intent is not clear in S's mind, and the unclearness is reflected as ambivalence.

I would like to discuss some cases in each category, and to show a diversity of 'clearness' and 'negotiability' of perlocutionary intent in ambivalence.

Ambivalence-strategic. Ambivalence-strategic is further divided into two cases:

While interpersonal intent is negotiable,
(1) perlocutionary intent is clear in S's mind and not negotiable.
(2) perlocutionary intent is clear in S's mind but negotiable.

In the first case, regardless of A's reaction, S wants to achieve a certain perlocutionary effect on A, which is not negotiable; in other words, the motivation for ambivalence here is simply to present the intent in a less threatening manner, and S does not have the intention to give the option to A or to change her/his original intention.

In the second case, although S has a certain perlocutionary intent, S is ready to negotiate it according to A's reaction; the motivation for ambivalence here may be to probe the risk, and if the risk is high, to change the original intent to a less risky one, or if necessary, to abort it. Ambivalence may enable S to keep the original intent from A and to avoid the responsibility for it.

Perlocutionary intent is clear in S's mind, and not negotiable. For example, if I visit my supervisor's office for our regular meeting (to discuss my work for about one hour) and if she says to me:

(1) 'Would you like to sit down?'

I normally do not have the choice of saying 'No, thank you'; because of our relationship (supervisor and student) and because of the situation (our regular meeting), I am supposed to understand that she wants me to sit down and has authority to say so. In this sense, despite the 'offer-like' form, the actual meaning of the utterance is more like a 'command'. In other words, S's perlocutionary intent (what S wants A to do) is clear and not negotiable.

Yet, the 'meaning' of the utterance is not exactly the same as a 'command'; if S only wanted to convey the meaning of 'command', she would choose a clear form of command, such as 'Sit down'. The less command-like form conveys another intent of S: interpersonal intent (as what speech act S wants A to regard her/his utterance). S's choice of ambivalence shows that she wants A to regard her utterance not as a sharp-cut 'command' but as something between 'offer' and 'command'.

The motivation for ambivalence here is basically 'politeness'; S wants to present her perlocutionary intent in a less threatening manner. However, it does not mean that the perlocutionary intent is negotiable; she does not give me the option about my following action. In this case, it is clear to both parties.

S's intents at different levels may not always be understood by A. Take the following example, which is the conversation between my landlady (X) and me (Y). When I came into the kitchen, she told me that someone had phoned me, and gave me the telephone number of the caller. I went to the telephone in the kitchen, and picked up the receiver, then she said:

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

(2) X_1: *You can use the telephone in my room, if you like.* [there is the other phone in X's room]
Y_1: Oh, yes. Thank you. [still holding the receiver of the phone in the kitchen, looking at the memo of the telephone number]
X_2: [cooking] You can use the telephone in my room because I might be a bit noisy.
Y_2: I see. [hangs the receiver up, and goes to the other phone in X's room]

The form 'you can...' here is ambivalent; as Leech (1983) points out, the form allows various interpretations:

> (...) the statement beginning *You can* is an appropriate means of softening the effect of an impositive. It can best be regarded as a tentative version of *You must:* **by pointing out the ability of H to do the task, S in effect (by the Hinting Strategy) proposes that H do it.** It mitigates the force of *You will...* because as we have seen (...), ***You can...*** **carries the implicature 'You do not have to', and so offers H, on the face of it, a pretext for ignoring the hint.** Since it is formulated as a proposition rather than as a question, however, [51] [You can take me home] **does not overtly offer H the choice of saying 'No'**, and is in this respect less tactful than the corresponding question. **Its politeness derives, in contrast, from its ambivalence: its sense allows it just as easily to be a recommendation or a piece of advice (an illocution for the benefit of H) as to be an impositive.**
>
> (Leech, 1983, p. 122, my emphasis)

In the example (2) above, because of the form 'You can...', Y interprets X_1 as a piece of 'advice' or rather as an 'offer', thinking that X considers Y's privacy; it would be better to have a telephone conversation with nobody around. As Y is not concerned about privacy and also thinks it rather impolite to accept the 'offer' (which could mean that Y does not want X to hear the conversation), Y simply responds 'Thank you' to the 'considerate offer' and continues to use the phone in the kitchen (Y_1).

However, X's following utterance (X_2) makes Y realise that X_1 was actually not an 'offer', but more close to a 'request'. Although X uses the same form 'You can...', the fact that she says it twice makes a *cumulative effect* (Leech and Thomas, 1990, p. 198); the repetition makes her actual *perlocutionary intent* (what she wants Y to do) clearer and it also enables Y to 'assign value to an utterance in the light of what has gone before' (ibid., pp. 198-199). Y re-assess X's previous utterance, accepts it as a 'request', and complies with her perlocutionary intent (goes to the other phone)[3].

In this case, although the speaker has the interpersonal intent to present her utterance in a less imposing manner, the perlocutionary intent is not actually negotiable, which is not understood by the addressee; the negotiability of the interpersonal intent disguises the perlocutionary intent. The possibility of being misunderstood is a disadvantage of ambivalence, and the probability may be higher in cross-cultural interaction; native speakers may be less likely to misunderstand the speaker's perlocutionary intent in the example above (this point will be discussed in further detail in Mismatch 1: ambivalence → strategic simple speech act).

Perlocutionary intent is clear in S's mind, but negotiable. As example 2 shows, when perlocutionary intent is not negotiable, S has to reveal it if it is not understood by A. When it is negotiable, however, S may not reveal it even if the original perlocutionary intent is not achieved. Suppose the landlady (X) (in example 2) would prefer me (Y) to use the other phone, but does not really mind; in other words, the perlocutionary intent is clear in her mind, but it is negotiable. In this case, she may not reveal her original intent, even if I do not understand it:

(2)' X: You can use the telephone in my room, if you like.
Y: Oh, yes. Thank you. [still using the phone in the kitchen]

Especially when the original perlocutionary intent is risky, ambivalence is advantageous to the speaker. With ambivalence, the speaker may show the negotiability of her/his perlocutionary intent, and give high optionality to the addressee. This enables the speaker to take the result as *agreement* and to avoid the responsibility for it.

Weiser (1974) gives an example of a 'socially tricky situation':

> A runs into an acquaintance, B, who is a member of a committee making an investigation that is supposed to be closed to the public until it reaches a final conclusion. A knows that it would be unethical for B to talk about what went on in that day's hearing. But A **doesn't** know -- this is the crucial uncertainty -- how willing B is to stretch his ethics on occasion. To ask straight out (What went on?") would show that A entertains the possibility that B might be dishonest, which could be insulting if B is not. But if A says nothing, he loses the chance to find out what went on in the hearing in case B **was** willing to talk. So A says -- at the appropriate time, in the appropriate tone of voice -- "I'm curious about what went on at the hearing."
>
> (Weiser, 1974, p. 724)

In this case, A actually wants B to talk about the hearing; in this sense, the perlocutionary intent is clear in his mind. Yet, he does not want to achieve it at the risk of damaging the relationship with B; the perlocutionary intent is negotiable. Ambivalence enables A to show the negotiability and to give the option to B, as Weiser points out:

> If B is willing to talk, he can treat this as a request for information.
> If B is going to stick by his ethics, all he has to do is say, "Yes, I guess a lot of people are. The reporters would love to get their hands on a transcript." and it becomes clear that A has not made a request, but a simple statement about his state of mind.
>
> (Weiser, 1974, p. 724)

In Weiser's example above, if B is willing to accept A's 'request', A will be able to achieve his original perlocutionary intent. Even if not, however, A does not have to admit that he failed to achieve it; he may continue the conversation quite naturally, pretending that he never had such intent. Although B may suspect the intent, he will never be able to prove it; A may avoid the responsibility and save face.

In fact, in many daily interactions, it often remains unknown to the other person what perlocutionary intent S actually had in mind. In some cases, S may even achieve a certain perlocutionary effect, keeping it unknown whether s/he actually has the intent or not. Let me take an example. For Christmas, I (X) and my housemate (Y) gave some pretty animal-shaped candles to our landlady (Z). Z was pleased and said:

(3) 'Oh, W will be very envious!'

W is our cleaning lady who is supposed to come to clean the house the next day. Because she likes animals very much, she must love such animal-shaped candles and will be envious of them if she finds them under the Christmas tree; in that sense, Z's utterance above is just natural as a 'comment' on the present.

On the other hand, the utterance had a different perlocutionary effect on X and Y; it reminded them of another person (W) to whom they should not forget to give a present. They will never know if Z had such a perlocutionary intent (reminding) in mind because it was beautifully unclear and will remain unknown.

The ambivalence is advantageous to Z. Suppose Z had the intent (to remind X and Y to give a present to W); as a landlady, it would be preferable if her tenants give a little present to her cleaning lady and keep on good terms with her. However, her *sociopragmatic judgments* (Thomas, 1983, p. 104) may tell her that she has neither the right nor the obligation to tell her tenants to whom they should give a Christmas present; if she were their mother, she might. Therefore, if Z performed the speech act of 'reminding' clearly (e.g. 'Don't forget to give a present to W'), it would be considered 'imposing' by X/Y and interpersonally risky; the relationship between X/Y and Z might be affected negatively.

Ambivalence resolves the conflict; her perlocutionary intent (to remind X/Y) will never be known, but the perlocutionary effect (X/Y were reminded) was certainly produced. In fact, I still do not know if she actually had the intent or not. This example shows us that perlocutionary effect can be created whether the corresponding intent is present or not.

Ambivalence-genuine. In some cases, the perlocutionary intent itself is not clear even in S's mind. Although it may sound odd that S says something without knowing why s/he says it, I do think it may happen, and this is supported by examples below. In this case, ambivalence is not a strategy to mitigate or disguise a certain perlocutionary intent, but rather a reflection of the genuine unclarity in S's mind, which I call *ambivalence-genuine*.

Yet, I do not mean that ambivalence-genuine is always clearly differentiated from ambivalence-strategic; there may be gradation between them. How much S is clear about a certain perlocutionary intent in mind and how much s/he is aware of the strategic aspect of ambivalence may be a matter of degree. As Weiser (1974) states:

> But when I say that we use them, I do not mean that we plan them with complete conscious awareness. (...) the strategies I have been discussing are comparable in terms of level of awareness to many of the strategies of human interaction discussed in the works of Erving Goffman.
>
> (Weiser, 1974, p. 728)

With the level of awareness in mind, I would like to focus on relatively typical cases of ambivalence-genuine and to discuss how it works below.

Let me take an example from Thomas (1992): X (herself) and Y (her colleague) went for a walk with some students. Taking a rest, X offered Y a muesli bar, and Y responded:

(4) X: Do you want a Tracker?
Y: **I've got a banana.** (Thomas, 1992, my emphasis)

Y's utterance can be interpreted either a 'decline' to X's offer or a 'counter-offer' to X's offer, which implies that Y accepts X's offer. Thomas (X) told me in personal communication that she had not understood what Y meant and had asked him which speech act he had meant, and that Y had answered he himself had not known it clearly.

I do not think this example is exceptional. In daily interactions, we often come across the situation in which we do not know what we really want to do; we may not mind either, or we may not know clearly which option is interpersonally or perlocutionary beneficial or costly. In this kind of situation, we may simply keep our utterance open to multiple interpretations, let the other person choose one, and accept the result.

The following interaction is another example. X (a British student) and Y (myself) share a kitchen, preparing dinner:

(5) X_1: What's that? [looking at the seaweed which Y is washing]
Y_1: This is seaweed. *Would you like to try?*
X_2: *Just eat it as it is?*
Y_2: You can make it into salad, with lettuce, for example.

Y has a conflict. She thinks it better for her to make an offer; as X shows some interest in the seaweed (X_1), it may be unfriendly not to make an offer. On the other hand, she hesitates to make an offer; she is not sure if X wants to eat the seaweed, and if not, her offer would force X to eat it, which he actually does not want to do.

In fact, she does not mind at all whether X eats the seaweed or not; in other words, she does not care what perlocutionary effect her utterance makes on X. As a solution, Y uses ambivalence, leaving her interpersonal intent negotiable; Y can be interpreted as an 'offer' and also as a simple 'question'. She also keeps her perlocutionary intent negotiable; X may react either to an 'offer' or to a 'question'.

However, X's reaction is not clear, either; by saying 'Just eat it as it is?'(X_2), X may show his 'interest' in eating the seaweed or his 'reluctance' to do it. It is also ambivalent;

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X can be interpreted as an 'acceptance' or 'decline' to Y's 'offer', or it can also be interpreted as a simple 'question'. X may not be clear about his perlocutionary intent either; he may be neither keen nor very unwilling to eat it.

Not knowing whether X has a certain intent or not, Y decides to take X_2 as a 'question' and simply explains how to eat it, leaving other possible interpretations untouched. As a result, her 'offer' (as a possible interpretation) is left open-ended; it has been neither accepted nor declined.

In a light social conversation like this, the interlocutors often do not have strong perlocutionary intent; in the example above, whether X eats the seaweed or not does not really matter to Y (and probably to X, either). What matters more is the interpersonal aspect in the interaction; to show some friendliness or consideration to each other. In this sense, to perform a speech act (e.g. make an offer to show friendliness) itself is more important than the perlocutionary effect which the speech act may produce (e.g. the offer is accepted and X eats the seaweed). If the effect is interpersonally risky (e.g. the offer may be refused, or unwillingly accepted), they would rather not make any; ambivalence is a way to avoid the risk.

Ambivalence at a different level: discoursal ambivalence. I would like to point out that *ambivalence* may be realised not only at the utterance level but also at the discourse level. When S makes an utterance, s/he may have a certain intent at the discourse level, which I call *discoursal intent* and define as:

Discoursal intent:	what discoursal development S wants to create by the present utterance.

In *discoursal ambivalence*, S's discoursal intent is presented in a negotiable manner. Let me take an example. One of my friends bought a car and gave me a lift to the University. Next week, when we were talking on the phone, she told me that she would go to the University the next day, and I said:

(6) 'Oh, I'm also going to the University tomorrow.'

> First, at the utterance level, this utterance is ambivalent. My friend may simply take my utterance as a piece of information, and say something like 'Do you have a class?' If I am more fortunate, however, she may even take it as a 'request' for a lift and directly respond, such as 'OK. What time suits you?'

Second, at the discourse level, there are also two possibilities; the utterance may work as a 'pre-request' ('I'm also going to the University tomorrow, so could you give me a lift ?') and also as a 'pre-suggestion' of meeting together somewhere at the University ('I'm also going to the University tomorrow, so why don't we meet somewhere at the University and chat?'), which we sometimes do. Therefore, in this case, at least two 'discoursal intents' ('pre-request' and 'pre-suggestion') are presented in a negotiable manner.

The possible functions and responses are shown as follows:

'I'm also going to the University tomorrow'

DIFFERENT LEVELS	POSSIBLE FUNCTIONS		POSSIBLE RESPONSES
Utterance:	giving information	⇐	'Do you have a class?'
	request for a lift	⇐	'OK. What time suits you?
Discourse:	pre-request	⇐	'Shall I give you a lift?'
	pre-suggestion	⇐	'Shall we meet and have a chat?'

Discoursal ambivalence can be also used as a strategy. It is a common practice in our daily interaction that S deliberately presents her/his *discoursal intent* unclearly with other interpretations possible to A, and leave it to A how to develop the following discourse.

Problems Related to Ambivalence

I would like to point out that there may be some cultural differences in whether a certain utterance is understood as *ambivalence* or not, which could be a factor in communication problems in cross-cultural interaction. To consider this point, the concept of different kinds of ambivalence, which I have discussed, is useful, because the differentiation makes it clearer how the discrepancy between the speaker's expectation and the addressee's understanding may occur. I will show some examples in cross-cultural communication.

Mismatch 1: ambivalence → strategic simple speech act. First, I will focus on ambivalence-strategic, in which the speaker has a clear perlocutionary intent in mind. When both parties share the same convention of when and how ambivalence-strategic is used, the perlocutionary intent in the speaker's mind is often clear to the other person. Yet, this may not be expected in cross-cultural interaction. Without the same norms or conventions, the other person may take ambivalence-strategic as a simple direct speech act. Let us go back to the example 2 which I discussed in Perlocutionary intent is clear in S's mind, and not negotiable.

When my landlady said to me:

(2) 'You can use the telephone in my room, if you like.'

From the linguistic form 'You can..., if you like', I first took her utterance as a simple 'offer'. However, the following discourse revealed that her actual intention was more like a 'request'; she wanted me to use the telephone in her room, not the one in the kitchen. In other words, her perlocutionary intent was clear in her mind, but she employed *ambivalence* to encode negotiability at the interpersonal level in order to present the perlocutionary intent in a less imposing manner. I failed to notice the negotiability she offered, not to mention at what level it was offered.

I suppose that native speakers may not fail to understand her intention; in fact, some of my British friends pointed out that native speakers probably would not misunderstand her intention as I did. It should be also pointed out that the conversation above occurred soon after I went to Britain, and that if I were in the same situation now I would understand her intention better.

Staying in Britain longer, I have realised that there are some linguistic conventions which the speaker employs to make her/his utterance 'ambivalent'; some expressions, such as 'You can...if you like' 'Don't bother to...' or 'Would you like to...?', are often used when the speaker actually has a certain perlocutionary intent but wants to 'imply' it in a less imposing manner. As the example above shows, 'You can...if you like' is often used when the speaker actually wants the other person to do it. In the same way, 'Would you like to do the dishes?', 'Don't bother to lock the door', 'I don't mind having another cup' and 'I won't keep you any longer' often mean 'I want you to (help me) do the dishes', 'Keep the door open', 'I want to have another cup' and 'I want you to leave now' respectively.

Although these expressions are not so conventionalized as some more formulaic expressions such as 'Can you pass me the salt?', they are still regarded as conventionalized in the usage. Learners of English should be made aware of this kind of usage, which in my view is not sufficiently taught in the teaching situation. In fact, I did not know what the other person actually meant by these expressions before I learned from the experience staying abroad. 'Metapragmatic awareness' (Thomas, 1983, p. 91) should also be raised in this respect.

Mismatch 2: simple speech act ambivalence → strategic. The reverse of the above may also occur; the speaker's intention of a simple speech act may be misunderstood as ambivalence-strategic. Their communication norm, 'infer the other person's wish before s/he says it', may encourage the Japanese to do so. One of my British friends, who is staying in Japan, gave me an example. When she wanted to travel to a certain area in Japan, she asked one of her Japanese friends, who lives in that area:

(7) 'Do you know any good hotels?'

Although she simply intended a request for the information, she found later that the friend had made a reservation at a hotel for her; her simple question was misunderstood as ambivalence-strategic to convey her request for a reservation implicitly. This kind of unwelcomed 'kindness' seems to be quite a common experience to foreign people staying in Japan.

Sakamoto and Naotsuka (1982) also point out that a simple question, such as 'Do you know how I can get a kabuki ticket?', 'Is there any salt anywhere?' (at a cafeteria), or 'Has anyone seen my pen?', would 'result in a widespread flurry of activity that I had no intention of causing' (ibid., pp. 66-7). Although it should be noted that the reaction would not be the same if the question were asked by a Japanese (people may try to be particularly 'kind' to foreign people, thinking that 'foreigners' are powerless and need more help), it is still true that the mismatch may be caused by the difference of their norms in communication.

Mismatch 3: simple speech act → understood but different action. A mismatch may also occur even when the addressee understands the speaker's intent correctly. It may occur not at the understanding level but at the action level. In the example discussed above, being asked 'Do you know any good hotels?', the addressee may rightly understand that the speaker intends a simple request for information, but she may still think it will be more considerate or kind to reserve a room for her friend, following the politeness norm in her own culture.

When the other person shares the same norm, the unexpected action may be welcomed as something more than expected. Unfortunately, however, it may not be always welcomed and even considered impolite or patronizing, which is likely to happen in cross-cultural interaction. For non-native speakers, it is often difficult to know what action they should take.

Some knowledge we have about the other person's culture may confuse us even more. Hearing foreign people complain about 'imposed kindness' by Japanese, I tend to hesitate to do things for my foreign friends which I would probably do for my Japanese friends. For example, when one of my American friends showed interest in the toothbrush-cover I had bought from my dentist (i.e., cheap but not available at shops), according to my knowledge about English-speaking culture (make an offer explicitly and give the choice to the other person) I(X) asked her(Y):

(8) X: Would you like me to buy one for you?
Y: Well, I'm just interested.

If she had been a Japanese, I would have probably bought it for her in spite of her reply; it does not cost much anyway and I know that a Japanese would usually appreciate my 'favour' even if s/he did not intend to ask it. Although the American may also appreciate it, the possibility of a different reaction prevented me from doing it.

I know that the norm may be different, but the problem is that I do not know when it is different. In some situations, it is easy for me to anticipate the difference; for example, I know that English speaking people's 'No, thank you' to an offer such as 'Would you like some more?' at a dinner table is usually taken at face value, whereas a Japanese refusal (especially the first one) should not be taken as such but as a reflection of their social norm, 'Be reserved'.

However, it is not always the case. English speaking people also sometimes do more than what they understand the other person meant. For example, even when the other person says 'Just bring yourself' to an offer, 'Shall I bring something?' (to a party), they often bring something, not because they understand the other person wants us to bring something, but because they simply follow their social convention. Without sharing the social convention, I often do not know what to do; it will be embarrassing if everyone except me brings something, and also embarrassing if I am the only person to have brought something.

Mismatch 4: ambivalence → genuine simple speech act. Problems may also occur when the speaker intends *ambivalence-genuine*, in which the perlocutionary intent is not clear in the speaker's mind and the genuine negotiability is offered to the addressee. Although the perlocutionary intent is negotiable here, this does not mean the speaker will always welcome any move by the addressee. Conflict may occur when the addressee fails to see the basic message 'let's negotiate'.

When and how much we expect to negotiate our intent may differ from one culture to another. If the addressee has a different expectation about it, s/he may fail to understand the speaker's message of 'let's negotiate'; the speaker's intention of *ambivalence-genuine* may be taken as a simple speech act which does not need negotiation. To understand the speaker's intent correctly may be particularly difficult when the ambivalence covers not only the utterance level but also the discourse level.

Let me take an example from my own experience. My Canadian friend (X), who was staying in Japan, and I(Y) went out for dinner several times. Deciding where we should go, our conversation was carried out as follows:

(9) X_1: What would you like to eat?
Y_1: *How about you?*
X_2: I don't mind going to the same restaurant we went to last week.
Y_2: OK. Let's go there then.

My perlocutionary intent was genuinely negotiable in the sense that I honestly had no particular preference about the dinner. However, I(Y) actually felt that X expressed his own wish too soon (X_2) and too clearly in spite of the fact that he first asked me about my wish (X_1) and also used a less direct expression 'I don't mind...'(X_2). Having this kind of conversation several times, I complained, saying 'YOU always decide'. X was a bit offended, and said 'It was YOU who gave me the option', referring to my utterance 'How about you?'(Y_1). Although I knew that X's argument was completely right, I was still dissatisfied with the way the conversation had been carried on.

I wondered why, and realised that my dissatisfaction was probably caused by the discrepancy between X and me in the beliefs of when and how much negotiation we may expect from the other person. In other words, we had different intentions towards our own utterance, and then had a different expectation from the other person's response. X simply intended a 'question' by 'What would you like to eat?'(X_1), and understood my response 'How about you?' as the answer to his question; i.e. I had no idea and gave the choice to him. On the other hand, I intended *discoursal ambivalence* by 'How about you?'; although my utterance was in the form of a question, I understood it myself as a 'negotiation opener' and expected X to negotiate the discoursal intent rather than simply to answer my 'question'.

My 'unreasonable' expectation may be defended by my cultural background[4]. According to Japanese social norms, we are expected not to express our own wish straightaway but to ask the other person's wish first; therefore, in the example above, being asked 'What would you like to eat?', my automatic reaction is 'How about you?' rather than to answer the question and express my own wish. Between Japanese who share this norm, both parties employ *discoursal ambivalence* and try to settle on a certain conclusion through probes and negotiations.

Kinoshita (1988) gives an example of how a guest is supposed to 'express' her/his wish to the hostess:

Hostess:	Ofuro ga wakimashita. Oshokuji no yooi mo moo sugu dekimasu. **Dochira o saki ni nasaimasu ka.** (The bath is ready. The dinner is almost ready, too. **Which would you like first?)**
Guest:	Dochira demo gotsugoo no yoroshii hoo ni. (Whichever is convenient for you.)
Hostess:	Osuki na yoo ni. (Whichever you like.)
Guest:	Saa, doo shiyoo ka na.. ja, moshi osashitsukae nakattara saki ni ofuro o itadaki mashoo ka. (Well, what shall I do.. then, if you don't mind, I may take a bath first.)

(Kinoshita, 1988, p. 19, English translation and emphasis are mine)

As this example shows, the guest is supposed not to take the hostess' utterance *Dochira o saki ni nasaimasu ka (Which would you like first?)* as a simple question, but to take it as a suggestion for negotiation. Even when the guest is sure that the hostess is ready to accept either choice of the guest, s/he is still supposed to negotiate before expressing her/his own wish. This is regarded as a more considerate and appropriate response. Although this example is an especially 'polite' case, this kind of negotiation is still fairly common in Japanese interaction.

Mismatch 5: ambivalence-genuine ⇒ ambivalence-strategic. In the previous section, I pointed out that a different cultural norm may prevent the addressee from understanding the speaker's intention of ambivalence; as a result, s/he may take it as a simple speech act. It should be further noted, however, even if the addressee rightly understands that the utterance is not a simple speech act but ambivalence, problems may still occur; for example, the speaker's intention of *ambivalence-genuine* may be taken as *ambivalence-strategic*, and her/his main purpose of negotiation may not be achieved.

This is also likely to occur in cross-cultural communication. The stereotype which we have about the other person's culture may be a cause. For example, if someone believes that Japanese are indirect, s/he may take any ambivalent utterance by a Japanese as *ambivalence-strategic* even when the speaker actually intends *ambivalence-genuine*; as a result, the message of 'Let's negotiate' is not taken.

The *indirect* communication pattern in Japanese is often pointed out by people from other cultures, and I agree that the indirect way of communication is often employed in Japanese. However, I suspect that what others regard as *indirectness* (or *ambivalence-strategic* in my terms) may not always be indirectness but may actually be *ambivalence-genuine*; that is, the speaker's main purpose is to negotiate the perlocutionary intent itself, rather than to convey her/his intent in an indirect manner. Examples are seen in Schmidt (1983) who claims that Japanese speakers of English often employ *indirectness*:

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> (...) **This extremely indirect way** of conveying directives which may imply criticism is, from all reports, typically Japanese.
> 13. this is all garbage (put it out")
> 14. ah, I have two shirts upstairs (please get them while you're there")
> 15. uh, you like this chair? (please move over")
> 16. you like this shirt? (why don't you change it?")
>
> Examples 13 to 16 are all hints, specifying neither the task to be performed nor the agent who is to perform the action (...) There is an important difference, however, between hints 13 and 14, which imply the request message by mentioning a reason why an action might be desired, immediately comprehended as requests by the English native speaker address see, and hints 15 and 16 which were not understood as directitives by the hearer and apparently represent **transfer of a Japanese hinting pattern to English.**
>
> (Schmidt, 1983, p. 153, my emphasis)

In my view, 15 and 16 above are ambivalence-genuine (or at least the ambivalence-strategic which we discussed in Perlocutionary intent is clear in S's mind, but negotiable) rather than indirectness or hints; that is, the speaker wants to negotiate the perlocutionary intent with the addressee, and is ready to change it according to the reaction. The main purpose of these utterances is not to convey directives in an indirect manner, but to probe the other person's reaction itself.

In a different article, Schmidt (1993) explains the situation in which his subject employs this kind of 'hints':

> In looking at the development of pragmatic ability by my subject, Wes, I found that **he often use hints that native speakers of English, including myself, did not realize were intended as directives.** For example, once in a theater, Wes turned to me and asked me if I liked my seat. I responded that my seat was fine, not realizing at all that he was indirectly requesting that we change places.
>
> (Schmidt, 1993, p. 30-31, my emphasis)

Schmidt (1993) first took Wes's utterance as a simple question and responded to it ('my seat is fine'). Later he realised that it was actually not a simple question, and re-considered it a 'hint' or ambivalence-strategic.

However, this example again, in my view, is ambivalence-genuine. Although Schmidt does not explain how he 'realised' Wes' actual intention as an 'indirect request', I would rather think that Wes' main intention is 'negotiation' itself; that is, he wanted to change the place only if the other person also wanted to. This is different from an indirect request. I discussed this example with some Japanese friends and they agreed with my point.

In Japanese conversation, it is often even more important to show consideration to each other, rather than to achieve a certain perlocutionary intent. According to this communication norm, the interaction between the two above would be carried on, for example:

(10) A: Do you like your seat?
B: Well, my seat is fine, but how about yours? Aren't you comfortable?
A: Well, I'm OK.
B: Are you sure?
A: Yeah, sure. Don't worry.

Although the result is the same (they did not change the seats), the difference is that they have come to this settlement through negotiation, which is in my view an important aspect in Japanese interactions. Considering my own experience in communicating with English speaking people, I think that one of the major causes of dissatisfaction I have felt stemmed from the lack of this kind of negotiation, not by the settlement itself. Even when I think the matter itself is trivial, I sometimes feel 'neglected' as the other person does not respond to the main purpose of my utterance, that is, to exchange consideration. This suggests that problems in communication may occur not only when we misinterpret what the other person means by the utterance, but also when we fail to notice what s/he wants to do by making the utterance.

CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to examine how *uncertainty* is employed in interaction, to develop the concept of *ambivalence*, and to consider the implication for cross-cultural interaction. Although the uncertainty the speaker creates in ambivalence can be a useful strategy to achieve a particular purpose, it may prevent the addressee from understanding the speaker's intent properly. Especially when we interact with people who may have different norms or conventions in how to use ambivalence, it may be a major cause of misunderstanding.

However, it does not mean that I am pessimistic about people from different cultural backgrounds understanding each other. To me, cross-cultural interaction has been interesting and constructive, including the misunderstandings I sometimes suffer from. Cross-cultural communication may be difficult, but I believe that it is possible to avoid conflict or to improve tolerance if we are sufficiently aware of the possible causes of misunderstanding. I hope that the discussion above will make some contribution to raising the awareness.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special thanks go to Jenny Thomas for her help and support while I was working on the thesis that this paper is based on. I would also like to thank Hisae Niki for her encouragement.

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NOTES

[1] [ ] indicates the first publication.

[2] In 'perlocutionary effect', Austin (1980, p. 101) [1962] includes not only 'action' but also 'the feelings or thoughts' of the other person, saying: 'Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects up on the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons (...) We shall call the performance of an act of this kind the performance of a 'perlocutionary' act (...)'. In this sense, 'how S wants A to consider the speech act' should be also categorised as 'perlocutionary intent'. However, highlighting the goal which is directed to the 'interpersonal' aspect, I categorise it as 'interpersonal intent' here.

[3] When I gave this paper at the 9th Annual International Conference on Pragmatics and Language Learning (1995), Bouton, L. F. commented on this point; that is, even when X says X_2, she may not clearly intend a request but still think about Y's benefit. Bouton also pointed out that even if so, she might have changed that position if Y had not taken her 'offer'. I completely agree that a speaker's intention is not always clear and s/he may change it according to the development of the discourse. I will discuss this point also in Ambivalence - genuine.

[4] As well as the cultural difference, the gender difference may also be a factor of this mismatch. Giving a similar example of the discrepancy between the speaker's expectation and the addressee's understanding, Tannen (1991) ascribes the mismatch to the gender difference in conversational style. She states:

> (...) The woman had asked, "Would you like to stop for a drink?" Her husband had answered, truthfully, "No," and they hadn't stopped. He was later frustrated to learn that his wife was annoyed because she had wanted to stop for a drink. He wondered, "Why didn't she just say what she wanted? Why did she play games with me?" The wife, I explained, was annoyed not because she had not gotten her way, but because her preference had not been considered. From her point of view, she had shown concern for her husband's wishes, but he had shown no concern for hers.
>
> (Tannen, 1991, p. 15)

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SOCIOCULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF VOICE IN NON-NATIVE LANGUAGE WRITING

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Projecting a sense of stylistic voice into texts is an aspect of pragmatic competence that is particularly difficult to master. For L2 writers, the complexity of this task is compounded by an uncertain command of linguistic resources. Moreover, even extremely proficient bilinguals grapple with reconciling multiple systems of stylistic expression and cultural world views.

In this paper, we explore how writing in a non-native language affects the ability to express stylistic voice and to enter into a social dialogue with readers. Utilizing the published reflections of authors writing professionally in a non-native language, we show how the differing social and historical circumstances under which they write in an L2 affect their attitude and approach towards the endeavor. We also identify several common themes that run throughout these authors' experiences with creating a persona in L2 texts. Based on this analysis, we suggest a research agenda to explore further the pragmatics of voice in L2 texts.

INTRODUCTION

In compiling an annotated bibliography and synthesis of the research on writing in a non-native language for the National Center for the Study of Writing (Schecter & Harklau, 1991), the authors identified several gaps in the literature, areas which we felt deserved further exploration. In particular, considering the role of affective factors in the writing process, we were intrigued to find that research had yet to identify the particular concerns of those attempting self-expression in a less familiar language. With few exceptions, most notably Silva (1992), much of the research in this area appears to be derivative of first language writing issues--for example, surveys of writing anxiety that are based on similar surveys of L1 writers--rather than dealing with issues that may be unique to non-native language writing. In calling for more research into issues of identity and affect confronting non-native language writers (Schecter & Harklau, 1992), we asked "How much can be revealed about ... personality or character in non-native language writing? To what extent and in what ways do writers experience a constriction of their sense of selfhood? Or perhaps one's 'self' takes on different nuances when writing in different languages? How is it that some non-native language writers report experiencing less anxiety about writing in a non-native language than do writers who are composing in their native language?" This paper is our first step towards addressing these questions.

Before immersing ourselves in the details of this agenda, however, we wish first to acknowledge the complexity of the set of issues we have put on the table. Indeed, as post-structuralists and others have convincingly argued (cf. Yancey, 1994), it is not as though those who write in their native language can be claimed to possess a single, multi-purpose identity. Rather, our voices are situated; and we are advised to locate our textual identities at the intersection of characterological makeup and the cultural image refracted in a given context (Faigley, 1994; Foucault, 1977). Sparing individuals from a multiplicity of discrete identities, that is, from clinical schizophrenia, is the *intertextuality* of their life experiences, the fact that they encounter similar or overlapping narratives across a variety of contexts, and are able to relate them in meaningful, integrative ways (Bakhtin, 1981). Although we endorse this representation, we at the same time must insist that if projecting a persona in text involves an intricate process of constructing a dialogic relationship between writer and reader, the complexity of the process is compounded in the case of non-native-language writers. They are likely to command fewer linguistic resources than native-language speaking counterparts and, moreover, must grapple with reconciling multiple, culturally-imbued systems of stylistic expression (cf. Powers & Gong, 1994).

We will return to elaborate further on aspects of this complexity. First, though: What is *voice*, or more precisely, in what sense do we use the term? In a 1992 column, William Safire noted increasing use of the term *voice* in literary criticism and the media. He distinguished two major meanings. The first is the linguistic or grammatical sense, be it active, passive, or middle voice (cf. Fox & Hopper, 1994). The second meaning he described as "the distinctive mode of expression, the expected quirks and trademark tone, the characteristic attitude of writer toward reader and subject," noting that T. S. Eliot (1954) identified this as the writer's "stylistic voice." It is this "stylistic voice" through which authors project their own unique persona and identity in texts that interests us here. In the same vein, playwright Sam Shepard (cited in Safire, 1992) asserts that "voice is almost without words...It's something in the spaces, in between." Working in the genre of analytic text, where one expects to find concrete delineations of terms, we own up to a certain discomfort in relying on metaphor to convey this notion of authorial persona. At the same time, we would be remiss to gloss this 'something,' as Shepard would have it, in empirical terms that may render the notion of stylistic voice more technically precise and yet not capture its full richness or subtlety. In the end, our most persuasive argument for pursuing this topic, despite our difficulty in defining it, is that if voice is an aspect of pragmatic competence that native language writers find elusive, it is reasonable to hypothesize that it is all the more difficult for non-native language writers to master.

Since stylistic voice is especially important in literary work, we made a decision to initiate our exploration by examining those who write professionally in a non-native language. Here we underscore that our decision was to begin by identifying writers' orientations toward the sociocultural and historical contexts that give rise to their work rather than by looking at specific linguistic practices (such as lexicalization, or use of tense and aspect, to give examples) in their texts. We acknowledge the usefulness of the latter approach in refining the concept of *contact literature* and in addressing the authenticity of various vernacular styles (cf. Kachru, 1987).[1] Our primary interest in examining these literary texts, however, is to propose, or place on the agenda, a set of issues that may be associated with entering into a dialogic relationship with an audience who, by virtue of linguistic and cultural origin, are positioned in a different social place than that of the author and, more importantly, do not necessarily share the author's sense of the social and power relationships implicit in the dialogue between writer and reader (cf. Bakhtin, 1981; 1986).

EFFECTS OF SOCIOCULTURAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

We identified four discrete categories of non-native language writers, distinguished by differences in the sociocultural and historical contexts which make non-native language writing either possible or necessary. In the following discussion, we draw from the work of: Eva Hoffman, whose book Lost in Translation (1989) **addresses the immigrant experience**; Alice Kaplan (1993), who, while residing both in her native and her adopted countries, **seeks out bilingualism and a dual cultural identity**; Chinua Achebe (Achebe, 1975; Rowell, 1990) and Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o (Ngũgĩ, 1981; 1993), African writers who **write in a former colonial language**; and Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) and Juan Flores (Flores, 1985; Flores & Yudice, 1990), whose work addresses the perspective of **linguistic minorities in the U.S.**

Although the authors share a particular interest in examining the sociocultural and historical contexts in which they employ a non-native language, they evidence vastly different motives for and attitudes towards non-native language writing as a mode of self-expression. Eva Hoffman, to start with, writes as a contemporary immigrant to Canada from Poland. As a white middle-class European, she appears to take for granted that her final goal will be to integrate completely into the mainstream English-speaking culture. In her retrospective memoir, Hoffman (1989) argues that the process of learning how to express identity and voice in a new language necessarily entails a process of self-transformation and the recreation of self-identity in the new culture. This process begins upon immersion in the new culture in a painful phase she dubs "exile." In exile, one enters a sort of semilingual or alingual state, where neither L1 or L2 is truly incorporated into self, and where neither seems a truly appropriate vehicle to express individual personality and voice. She recalls the inadequacy of her first language during this phase:

> "Polish, in a short time, has atrophied, shriveled from sheer uselessness. Its words don't apply to my new experiences; they're not coeval with any of the objects, or faces, or the very air I breathe in the daytime" (p. 107).

At the same time, using English for personal expression is equally uncomfortable. She likens it to "a school exercise, or performing in front of yourself, a slightly perverse act of self-voyeurism" (p. 121). In Hoffman's view, the process of taking on a new language, identity, and voice is at first artifice. In a new language, one's voice becomes monotonous, deliberate, heavy, and humorless. Hoffman laments that she cannot be the "light footed dancer" (p. 119) that she was in her native language.

As she proceeds down the road towards linguistic assimilation, Hoffman comes to feel that her very sense of reality is threatened. She discusses how native speakers unknowingly hold a consensus about reality. Outnumbered and surrounded by them, Hoffman understands that she needs to come to terms with this different world view, but she fears how much of herself (and her own voice) she will have to give up in the process. Eventually, she reconciles the two cultural value systems. She likens this process to fragments of others' voices entering her, remaking her "fragment by fragment, like a patchwork quilt" (p. 220). At the same time, she notes that there remains an inassimilable part of her that exists outside of culture (and language), a part of her that realizes that other cultural world views exist and that one way is not necessarily the **only** way to think or to be.

In looking back on her experience, Hoffman notes that at the same time she was seeking to assimilate to American culture, and to "live within {the target} language" (p. 194), many of her American-born peers were seeking to break out of the constraints both of their native language and of their culture. Such a one is Alice Kaplan, whose memoir French Lessons (1993) relates her efforts to develop an alternate identity and voice in L2 French. Like Hoffman, Kaplan is a white, middle-class 'Euro-American' who can blend visually into mainstream French culture. Unlike Hoffman, however, Kaplan's adoption of a second language is not imposed by irreversible socio-historical processes associated with migration. Rather, she voluntarily embraces French language and culture while remaining rooted in her first language and culture.

Kaplan experienced her earliest efforts to create a persona in a non-native language as redemptive. Her father had recently died, and her mother, ill and grieving, sent her to a Swiss boarding school for a year. Thus, for Kaplan, self-expression in a second language became associated with escape from an unpleasantness associated with her native language, English. As she puts it, "It felt like my life had been given to me to start over. French had saved me" (p. 57). In her quest for an authentic French voice, Kaplan seems willing to endure a number of slights from native French speakers who criticize or dismiss her efforts to approximate the stylistics and voice of a native speaker. She describes, for example, how a French boyfriend wrote corrections all over a love letter she had sent him, and recalls how as he read it he had made "that little ticking sound French people make...a fussy, condescending sound, by way of saying, 'That's *not* how one says it'" (p. 86). Nevertheless, Kaplan regards it a "privilege" to "live in translation" (p. 140). Significantly, she never represents her quest for mastery of L2 French as in any way threatening to her American identity.

Kaplan's experience forms an interesting contrast to Hoffman, who feels at times as though her identity and voice have been coopted by the new language. Kaplan has a far less ambivalent attitude towards self-expression in her adopted language. Perhaps it is precisely because Kaplan will not reside permanently in the target culture that she can embrace French with such unequivocal ardor--her identity in L1 is never seriously threatened because she knows that she can return to her native language ways virtually at will. The challenge for her, then, is to approximate as closely as possible a French persona even though she will never be wholly integrated into the culture. For Hoffman, on the other hand, L2 English is the only available means of public expression of persona and voice, while L1 becomes limited to a private sphere. She understands, correctly, that her survival will depend on her ability to appreciate the distinction and make the needed transition.

Whatever the differences in their psychological orientations, both Hoffman and Kaplan enter into their relationship with a non-native written language as assimilable, regarding their struggles with self-expression in L2 as a personal odyssey, and not part of a broader social phenomenon. Attitudinally, this position has far-reaching effects on whether they believe that taking on a new voice and identity in L2 is a worthwhile goal. For other L2 writers--those using the majority language while they are part of a linguistic minority, or those using the language of a former colonial ruler--the non-native language cannot be taken on its own terms, for it is associated with unequal power relationships. The dominant-subordinate relationship of the L1 and L2 cultures has repercussions for how willing writers are to acknowledge and uncritically approximate a prototypical L2 voice, and how strenuously they argue for accommodation of their L1 identity when writing in L2.

Chinua Achebe is a Nigerian writer, a L1 Igbo speaker who writes in English. In a 1989 interview (Rowell, 1990), Achebe asserted that while Third World writers employ former colonial languages, they are reshaping the L2 to fit their experiences as they do it. Despite its colonial legacy, Achebe notes the value of English as lingua franca in a country with almost 200 varieties. Since English is already present in his culture and occupies a privileged position as the language of administration and higher education, Achebe believes that the best way to deal with it is to "contain and control" (p. 95) it by relegating it to specific spheres where its uses can be monitored. In his words,

> "Our people don't allow anything as powerful as that to keep knocking around without a job to do, because it would cause trouble...anything which is new and powerful, which appears on the horizon, is brought in and domesticated" (p. 95).

Personally, he feels that his role as a writer is to incorporate the L2 into his culture and to use it to tell his story and express his point of view. Thus, for Achebe, the issue is not the development of a new voice and identity in a second language, but how best to express L1 cultural identity and voice through the medium of L2, and by so doing to transform the former colonizer's medium.

Is Achebe's goal realistic? A fellow African writer, Kenyan Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, believes not. In his book Decolonising the mind (1981), Ngũgĩ includes a statement renouncing English L2 as a medium for his future writing, and announcing his intention to express himself solely in his African L1. While he acknowledges that language can have a purely utilitarian, communicative function, he also regards it as "a carrier for the history and the culture" in which it originated. He believes that these two aspects of language "are inseparable; they form a dialectical unity" (1993, p. 30). For Ngũgĩ, then, it is not possible to develop a voice and identity in L2 writing that is true to one's L1 cultural view, because an "oppressor language inevitably carries racist and negative images of the conquered nation" (1993, p. 33). Furthermore, writing in an L2 that exists in a neo-colonial power relationship with the L1 inevitably perpetuates these patterns of domination, and creates a voice which is alienated from the native culture.

American language minority writers share post-colonial writers' concerns regarding self-expression in a language that represents a hegemonic relationship. Unlike post-colonial writers, however, language minority writers must live with a daily intermingling of dominant and minority cultures. This non-negotiable reality leads Latino writers such as Gloria Anzaldúa and Juan Flores to argue for the synthesis of L1 and L2 codes in stylistic voice. While the other writers discussed previously, regardless of their attitude towards the non-native language, assume a separability of language codes, both Mexican-American Anzaldúa and Puerto Rican Flores carefully consider questions of discreteness and synthesis when negotiating their identities as writers. Both call for an "interlingual, border voice" (Flores & Yudice, 1990, p. 60) that affirms and legitimizes the act of straddling two cultures through writing. Flores argues that for New York Puerto Rican, or "Nuyorican" writers, bilingualism can initially seem as a predicament, as a "confining and prejudicial dilemma with no visible resolution," (Flores, 1985, p. 9) potentially creating in the individual a

> "...schizophrenia, of that pathological duality born of contending cultural worlds and, perhaps more significantly, of the conflicting pressures towards both exclusion and forced incorporation" (Flores & Yudice, 1990, p. 60).

Likewise, Anzaldúa in discussing the discomfort of living simultaneously with two languages and cultures, comments

> "Living on borders and in margins, keeping intact one's shifting and multiple identity and integrity, is like trying to swim in a new element, an 'alien' element" (1987, preface).

However, as the writer develops, bilingual discourse "becomes an issue of social contention and beyond that, a sign of potential enrichment and advantage" (Flores, 1985, p. 9). Flores argues that Nuyoricans develop a voice which is neither Puerto Rican nor assimilated. He understands well that this interlingual voice is in an embattled and stigmatized position, deemed non-standard in both monolingual English- and Spanish-speaking cultures. However, both he and Anzaldúa reject attempts to cast their language as illegitimate. Anzaldúa (1987) asserts,

> "I will no longer be made to feel ashamed of existing. I will have my voice: Indian, Spanish, white" (p. 59).

Flores argues that efforts to delegitimize inter-lingual Latino language uses are emblematic of a larger cultural and political struggle between Latino and the dominant Anglo culture over the terms of Latino participation in American society. He suggests that the metamorphosis of a border language is threatening to the dominant culture, because it represents a demand for change and accommodation of Latino language and culture in the broader society.

One sees a debate emerging among these L2 writers, and indeed within them, as to whether one can successfully collapse, merge, or mingle meaning and identity in two languages. Clearly, the socio-historical context in which each writes has a powerful effect on their position in this debate. While assimilationist writers such as Kaplan and Hoffman seem to believe that the non-native writer's task is to approximate existing target language and culture values for stylistic voice, Achebe argues from a post-colonial context that the non-native language writer has the power--almost the obligation--to transform norms for writing in the target language so that they more closely reflect L1 values and mores. However, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, writing in the same context, advocates against language mixing in any form. To him, a language imposed by a colonizer remains the language of the oppressor, and no amount of stylistic adaptation can alter that fact. As we have seen, American Latino writers present the strongest and most radical case for language mixing. What they advocate goes well beyond the development of a stylistic voice in L2 that reflects L1 cultural and aesthetic norms, to a mixing of codes themselves, in effect creating a new language. While Anzaldúa acknowledges that code-mixing creates a stigmatized variety, observing that, "this infant language, this bastard language, Chicano Spanish, is not approved by any society," she places this consequence on the agenda for political action, contending that "we Chicanos no longer feel that we need to beg entrance" (Anzaldúa, 1987, preface). For those of us who teach writing to non-native speakers, these debates are not unfamiliar. We constantly re-enact them, as we wrestle individually and collectively with questions of how to simultaneously legitimize students' rights to transform language and have their voice be heard, while at the same time provide them with the literacy tools deemed necessary for them to succeed in academic contexts and the workplace.

COMMON THEMES

While the particular social and historical circumstances under which they write and create an identity in a non-native language capture the large share of these authors' attentions, there are also a number of themes that recur across the different pieces and contexts. For example, several of the authors remark on a phenomenon in non-native-language writing that Hoffman describes as the signifier becoming severed from the signified. By that, she means that words "don't stand for things in the same unquestioned way they did" (p. 106) in the native language. Hoffman discusses, for example, how words for emotional states in L2 can seem abstract, literary, or academic rather than evoking a visceral, emotional response as they do in L1. Likewise, Ngũgĩ observes that words in L2 may have an "alien far-away sound," making working through the medium of L2 "a cerebral activity and not an emotionally felt experience" (1981, p. 17). Both Hoffman and Ngũgĩ believe that this aspect of writing in a non-native language produces a voice with less authority, ease, and "harmony." This sentiment merits further attention. How does this sense of disembodiment from the target language affects one's ability or willingness to project a persona in L2 writing? We note with interest that the Latino authors discussed in this piece do not articulate this sense of separation from language as a problematic issue. Was it once an issue, but was resolved early in the experiences of bilingual writers such that they no longer recall it? Or perhaps in cases where L1 and L2 are learned simultaneously, such feelings of alienation from language are never evoked? Alternatively, one could speculate that in such contexts authors may feel an alienation or disconnectedness from both of their languages at times.

Another general observation about stylistic voice reported by these non-native language writers is that the way one is taught about writing in a certain language affects what one writes about and how one writes about it. Kaplan, for example, notes that she carries a value for stylistic voice in English that was conveyed to her by midwestern culture and particularly by her mother:

> "She is against waste in language. Her sentences are short and blunt, yet ripe with innuendo and the promise that more is being said than meets the ear. Now I write in the staccato Midwestern style she taught me" (p. 7).

Likewise, Chinua Achebe (1990) notes that Western critics often ask why African art, including writing, is so political. He asserts that in his native culture, writing is expected to carry a political and moral message as well as to be creative or to entertain. He notes that in Igbo culture, the goddess of creativity is also the goddess of morality. He comments that in African writing,

> "People are expecting from literature serious comment on their lives. They are not expecting frivolity. They are expecting literature to say something important to help them with their struggle with life" (p. 88).

Thus, for Achebe, moral and political themes are integral to his sense of appropriate stylistic voice in writing, a cultural value that he maintains and transfers to a non-native language medium. Similarly, Anzaldúa notes that in her Native American cultural heritage, the purpose of writing is simultaneously religious, social, and aesthetic. Unlike Western writing, which she sees as being a rationally oriented exercise in virtuosity and mastery, writing in her native culture is supposed to evoke images, to have the same life-transforming and almost mystical properties as religious ritual. Anzaldúa likens her persona in writing to that of a shaman.

Finally, we noted at the beginning of this paper that studies of writing anxiety in L2 writers have sometimes shown that, in contrast to the assumption that L2 writing and self-expression is constricting and problematic, writers may actually feel **less** anxiety when writing in L2. We looked to these authors for indications that L2 writing might be liberating or less anxiety-producing than writing in L1, and explanations of why this might be so. Kaplan (1993) provides an illuminating discussion of this point. She asks,

> "Why have I chosen to live in not-quite-my-own-language, in exile from myself, for so many years--why have I gone through school with a gag on, do I like not really being able to express myself?" (p. 210)

Answering her own question, Kaplan observes that as she has taught French to others, she has come to see...

> "this French language as essential *in its imperfection*: the fact that we don't have as many words is forcing us to say more. The simplicity of our communication moves us, we're outside of cliché, free of easy eloquence, some deeper ideas and feelings make it through the mistakes and shine all the more through them. In French class I feel close, open, willing to risk a language that isn't the language of everyday life. A sacred language" (p. 210).

Similarly, the linguistic minority `border voices´ argue that writing in a language that is neither L1 nor L2 can lead to greater creativity and can be artistically inspiring. Flores, for example, comments that

> "Whether the wildest extravagance of the bilingual poet or the most mundane comment of everyday life, Latino usage tends necessarily toward interlingual innovation. The interfacing of multiple codes serves to decanonize all of them, at least in their presumed discrete authority, thus allowing ample space for spontaneous experimentation and punning" (Flores & Yudice, 1990, p. 75).

And Anzaldúa (1987) attributes her creativity as a writer to the fact that she lives in a state of "psychic unrest, in a Borderland" (p. 73).

IMPLICATIONS FOR NON-LITERARY L2 WRITERS

Although the above is a circumscribed treatment of literary writers' thoughts on voice and stylistic expression across linguistic boundaries, the reflections of the writers cited suffice to generate a heuristic for exploration of similar kinds of issues as they concern a wider stratum of non-native language writers. However, in the end we must ask how representative the issues articulated by this subset are of the concerns of most non-native language writers. Undeniably, there are caveats in looking to professional writers as a source of data. One is that they are a select group--they make their living as writers precisely because they are skillful with language, be it L1 or L2; moreover, they clearly enjoy the challenges posed by the creative process. (Those of us who teach L2 writing at the college or adult levels would wager that few students share the confidence in their writing ability implicit in Alice Kaplan's (1993, p. 194) assertion that "...writing isn't a straight line but a process where you have to get in trouble to get anywhere." We are left wondering how more average non-native-language writers performing more prosaic writing tasks might approach voice issues.

We would wish to pursue how some of the concerns expressed by these authors play out in other writing contexts; for example, when the purpose for writing is not artistic but functional, be it in academia or in the workplace. A dialogic perspective would suggest that L2 writers in these latter areas have a greater concern for *face* (Goffman, 1967), as they strive to present to their readers images of selves that appear 'smart,' 'competent,' and 'likable.' Such a perspective would also suggest that writers' concerns with issues of stylistic voice would diminish with a decrease in creative latitude or an increase in the number of normative discourse conventions associated with a given genre.

The sociocultural context of normative conventions, the L2 writers approximating them, and the readers of their texts must be carefully specified in this inquiry, however; for as Kachru (1987) has shown, discourse norms for English language writing differ considerably across contact varieties, and American monolingual norms cannot be regarded as the only target voice for L2 writers. Rather, normative tendencies for written expression, including voice, must be evaluated in terms of the varieties of English to which the L2 writer has access, the writer's expected audience, and the power relationship obtaining between writer and reader.

Another caveat in looking at professional, non-native-language writers is that they are self-selected in terms of language proficiency. As accomplished, published authors, they have moved beyond the basic communicative hurdles of making themselves understood in L2, and have resolved many of the mechanical and logistical problems that would impede self-expression in a non-native language. We would want to explore similar issues of voice and other affective factors with L2 writers at a range of proficiency levels. Such exploration would benefit from a research design that would include as a major component analysis of L2 writers' linguistic practices. Where language proficiency is a factor, readers' impressions will be affected by perceptions regarding intelligibility of text, judgments formed from examining structural relationships at the surface level.

We are confident that further investigation of similar issues with a broader sample of writers will lead to both theoretical and pedagogical insights into the relation between affective factors and the L2 writing process. While first language writing research has provided us with suggestions regarding the nature of affective factors in second language writing, we nevertheless believe that at this point the introspections of non-native language writers themselves are needed in order to significantly enrich our understanding. Finally, as language educators, we see inquiry in the direction we are suggesting as integral to our pedagogical practice. Our students' experiential and interpretive frameworks are our most valuable allies as we continue to try to negotiate between institutional demands for conformity with the standard or dominant modes of self-expression in a culture, and our writers' needs to express their individual experience and persona as these have been constituted and reconstituted by the social and historical forces that have acted to shape their lives.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Our thanks to the National Center for the Study of Writing and Literacy for its support of the research reported here.

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NOTES

[1] Kachru (1987) defines *contact literature* as "literatures written by the users of English as a second language to delineate contexts which generally do not form part of what may be labelled the traditions of English literature." Kachru points out that such literatures are likely to manifest culturally-specific collocational, lexical, and grammatical features.

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METADISCOURSE AND TEXT PRAGMATICS: HOW STUDENTS WRITE AFTER LEARNING ABOUT METADISCOURSE

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Native speakers of English participated in composition classes using either a process approach (the control classroom--CC) or direct teaching of metadiscourse (the experimental classroom--EC). The CC students worked on the propositional content of their essays while the EC students concentrated on the pragmatic functions of metadiscourse. The posttests written by the EC students were significantly better than those of the CC although the pretests of the two groups did not differ. In this paper, we analyze what made this difference in the EC papers, including changes in metadiscourse markers, the tone of the essays, and topical progression. It will be proposed that the EC students not only used metadiscourse markers more effectively but also wrote with more attention to audience needs, thereby making global changes that improved their papers.

When we write, we attend to the topic we are discussing and what we have to say about it--the propositional content of our text. But there is another part of the text that is of considerable importance--the metadiscourse markers. These markers are the means we use to indicate how the text is structured, to explain difficult words and expressions for readers, and to encode what rhetorical acts we are preforming. Such metadiscourse markers, if used skillfully, make the text easier for our projected readers to process. Metadiscourse markers also perform the important interpersonal function of allowing us to make the interaction between reader and writer a closer one by anticipating our readers' responses to the text, by indicating how certain we are about the truth value of what we are saying, and by expressing our feelings about the propositional content we are presenting.

These important pragmatic functions that metadiscourse performs increase the likelihood that our readers will end up with a message that is fairly close to the one we thought we were writing. Metadiscourse also greatly increases the efficiency of a text (de Beaugrande & Dressler, 1981), in the sense of making it easier to read and thus more reader-friendly or considerate (Armbruster, 1984). However, in spite of its importance, metadiscourse as a pragmatic system is rarely taught and is typically approached even by skillful writers on an intuitive basis. In this paper, after a brief description of metadiscourse, we will outline a classroom method that was used to teach metadiscourse to university-level native speakers of English. We will then analyze sections of compositions written in class to show how the styles of students in the control class (CC) and the experimental class (EC) differed at the end of the study. While there were many changes in the EC papers, we will discuss differences in (a) the use of metadiscourse markers generally, (b) the use of Hedges in particular, (c) the tone and considerateness of the essays, and (d) the transparency of topical progression.

Metadiscourse

A number of classification systems exist for metadiscourse (Crismore, 1984; Crismore, Markkanen, & Steffensen, 1993; Vande Kopple, 1985; Williams, 1981). Crismore, Markkanen, and Steffensen modified Vande Kopple's system to make it more suitable for persuasive essays and, since we were analyzing persuasive essays in this study, that system was the one we used. It consists of two broad categories, textual metadiscourse and interpersonal metadiscourse, which are further subdivided on the basis of particular pragmatic functions. Textual metadiscourse is intratextual, serves to mark the text structure, and consists of two subcategories, Textual Markers and Interpretive Markers. Textual Markers include Logical Connectives, Sequencers, Reminders, and Topicalizers. Interpretive Markers include Illocutionary Markers, which are derived from speech act theory and make explicit what rhetorical acts the writer is performing. Code Glosses, another category of Interpretive Markers, provide the writer a means of simplifying material that they expect might be difficult for their readers, a means of downgrading the information level (de Beaugrande & Dressler, 1981). Examples of these categories include the following:

(a) Textual Markers
    Logical Connectives (*and, but, in addition, however*)
    Sequencers (*first, second, finally*)
    Reminders (*as we noted earlier*)
    Topicalizers (*there is, there are, as for*)

(b) Interpretive Markers
    Code Glosses (*namely, in other words*)
    Illocutionary Markers (*to summarize, I wish to reiterate*)

Interpersonal markers are extratextual, support the interaction between reader, text, and writer, and comprise five groups of markers. Hedges and Certainty Markers allow writers to indicate how certain they are of the truth value of what they are asserting, while Attributors provide the source of information presented in the text. Attitude Markers allow writers to express their feelings about what they are saying, and Commentaries are used to anticipate the responses of their readers and address them. The following examples will give a sense of these types:

(c) Hedges (*may, might, maybe, perhaps, possibly*)
(d) Certainty Markers (*certainly, it is true that*)
(e) Attributors (*according to X, X says*)
(f) Attitude Markers (*I hope, I find it surprising that*)
(g) Commentaries (*you may not agree, think about X, my friends*)

The Teaching Method

In a semester-long study, Cheng taught two 100-level composition classes of native speakers of English at a large, Midwestern university. One class, the CC, was taught using the dominant strategy in university composition courses, the process method. This method focuses on the importance of propositional content in writing and emphasizes invention and the generation of ideas. To augment the generation of ideas, the students read materials about the subjects on which they are writing. Students are also taught to emulate the processes of professional writers and are instructed in the techniques of reviewing each other's papers and revising following the suggestions made during these peer review sessions. Thus, the CC students were focusing on the propositional content of their essays through the generation of knowledge by reading and discussion, and on audience reactions and needs through peer review and revision.

In the EC, the time devoted to reading about the topic was reduced and the time saved was spent reading scholarly articles about metadiscourse: Williams' chapter on style (1981), Vande Kopple's first article on metadiscourse (1985), Halliday and Hasan's introductory chapter on cohesion and their chapter on conjunction (1976), and Lautamatti's article on strategies for simplifying texts, which includes a detailed discussion of topical and non-topical material (1978). To increase the level of understanding of these articles, some of which were very technical, students were asked to write summaries and critiques in their journals, which Cheng read on a regular basis. Classroom discussion followed which was based on misunderstandings revealed in the students' summaries. Once the students had some grasp of the concept of metadiscourse, a variety of discrete and holistic exercises were used to increase their understanding of how metadiscourse markers are used in writing. The crucial step, of course, was the use of metadiscourse in their own writing. (See Cheng, 1994; Cheng & Steffensen, forthcoming, for a complete discussion of this method.)

Outcomes were assessed on the basis of a comparison of two sets of papers: (a) an in-class essay on an assigned topic written at the beginning of the semester (pretest) and one written at the end of the semester (posttest), and (b) by the third revision of the first assigned paper written in September and a fourth revision written at the end of the semester. These papers were rated by composition instructors who were not familiar with the classes, the techniques, the hypotheses, or the theoretical constructs. The pretests revealed no significant differences between the EC and CC. However, the EC posttests were significantly better than those of the CC. Furthermore, comments in the experimental students' journals were much more positive about their classroom experience and indicated that they had learned more than the control students had (Cheng, 1994; Cheng & Steffensen, forthcoming). We will propose that the use of metadiscourse greatly increased the student writer's understanding of readers' need. In effect, the writing in the EC slowly changed from writer-based to reader-based writing.

Changes in the Use of Metadiscourse

We now wish to examine in some detail what changes actually occurred to make the differences in the texts of the EC and the CC. We will discuss the in-class papers because all the students wrote on the same topics, making comparisons slightly easier. One predictable set of results involved more effective use of metadiscourse itself. While there has not yet been enough research to establish what optimal rates of metadiscourse are, it is certainly the case that there can be too much or not enough. Williams (1981), for example, discusses texts with excessive use of metadiscourse, which buries the propositional content and makes them very difficult to read. Crismore (1984), on the other hand, found that social studies textbooks use less metadiscourse than trade books, and she argues that this lack of pragmatic markers makes textbooks more difficult to read. In our data, several of the pretest papers used metadiscourse too heavily as well as ineffectively. Consider the following excerpt from an EC paper. (Examples of metadiscourse are underlined; errors are not corrected):

(1) EC Pretest

> In the beginning the television was posed as a real asset for families with children because it would be a big influence in the home. Basically this is what Marie Winn discussed in her article "The Plug-In Drug". As a young adult today I can safely say that the hours one person sits in front of the television has greatly increased from what it was forty years ago. So, yes Winn is correct in stating that the television is a major influence on children these days.

The student begins with the statement that television was first considered an asset for children. In the second sentence, she provides a source for this information, an Attributor. She then moves to a new topic, TV viewing time. She bases the claim that viewing time has increased over the last forty years on her personal experience, a second Attributor, which is ineffective since the writer is not forty or fifty years old and thus does not have the experience necessary for such a claim. In the final sentence of her introductory paragraph, she includes four metadiscourse markers bundled together--a Logical Connective *so*, a Certainty Marker *yes*, an Attributor and an Attitude Marker, *Winn is correct in stating that* to lead into her assertion that television is a major influence on children. Since this final sentence is simply a reiteration of the proposition in her first sentence, her first paragraph has a low level of informativity (de Beaugrande & Dressler, 1981).

A pretest essay written in the CC shows a similar high level of metadiscourse:

(2) CC Pretest

> After experiencing this phenomena, as myself has, one would have to say that Winn is totally correct with her assumption. One would also have to say that her proposition of correcting this television based life we live in is indeed necessary to keep family life as we know it, if not to improve it.
>
> As Winn has understated in her article, concern for change should be high among family members. People should be concerned for quite a few reasons.

The student begins his essay by establishing himself as an Attributor on the basis of personal experience, the same strategy used by the EC student above. The expression, *one would have to say*, is odd because it is fundamentally a Certainty Marker, but it includes the modal *would* used as a Hedge. (Contrast this with the statement, *After experiencing this phenomenon, as I have, one has to say that Winn is totally correct in her assumption.*) An Attributor referring to Winn and a Certainty Marker are also included in the first sentence, a tangled web of metadiscourse. His second sentence repeats the Certainty Marker, which involves the awkward use of a third person indefinite pronoun, includes a Logical

Connective, *also*, and an Attributor, *her proposition of*, before he gets to the proposition that our use of television must be changed if we are to preserve family life. His second paragraph, which also comprises introductory material, begins with another Attributor. Two uses of the Attitude Marker *should* follow in the proposition that concern is high and that this concern is appropriate. As in the case of the EC pretest, the use of metadiscourse is excessive and ineffective because it adds little but verbiage, obscuring the small amount of propositional content in each essay and contributing to low informativity.

In the final in-class essays, we find clear differences between these two writers in the use of metadiscourse. The EC writer still uses quite a bit of metadiscourse in her final in-class paper, but uses it much more skillfully, as the following introductory paragraph shows:

(3) EC Posttest

Language And The View of Reality

> In the article "Nuclear Language and How We Learned To Pat The Bomb" Carol Cohn describes the issue of language and reality after having spent a year in a world of nuclear strategists. She argues how the language that surrounds us changes our views on reality, and nuclear war is one subject that brings about such changes. I have to agree with Cohn after reading her article. It provides many convincing examples that lead you into believing.

The writer begins by referencing the source of her information about the relationship of language and reality with an Attributor, then, with another reference to Cohn, introduces the thesis of her essay--that language changes our view of reality. She states her opinion about the propositional content she is developing with an Attitude Marker, and leads into the body of her essay with a statement that the article is convincing because of the evidence Cohn cites. Here, the amount of metadiscourse is reduced and its more judicious use offers the reader insight into the source of the ideas and into the author's position on the claims in the essay. In the body of her essay, the writer uses a wider variety of metadiscourse markers which are appropriate to the assertions she is making.

The final in-class paper from the CC certainly shows improvement in the use of non-propositional material, with some of the metadiscourse being used effectively, but there is still some wordiness involved:

(4) CC Posttest

Language: The Art of Deception

> After reading "Nuclear Language And How We Learned to Pat the Bomb", one finds that Cohn's main thesis is how language is used to deceive people and distort reality. I would, after reading this essay, have to strongly agree with her.

> Today, if one were to go home and read a daily newspaper one would easily find that every article would in some way or other be guilty of using language to cover up reality. Take for example an article on a burglary. Though this is totally fictional, the article would probably have the same traits. Let's suppose that there was a gun involved, in the article, the gun wouldn't simply be a gun, it would be "a menacing machine capable of causing a horrifying death".

The source of the claim that language is used to distort reality is based on authority through an Attributor. We find that this writer continues to use the third person indefinite pronoun in *one finds* instead of a reference to himself or to the reader, an awkward expression which has the disadvantage of creating distance and diminishing the level of interaction in the text. His position is then clearly given in a sentence-long Attitude Marker. (Although the Attitude statement is not a subtle way to state one's position, it is much better than trying forcing the reader to infer the thesis.) In the second paragraph, the writer attempts to draw the reader into a dialogue through two Commentaries (the imperative, *take*, and a first person plural imperative, *let's suppose*), followed by a Topicalizer, *there was*. He also uses an Interpretive Marker, *for example*, and two Hedges, *though this is totally fictional* and *probable*. While the use of the Attributor and the imperative are effective, the Hedge and the second imperative weaken the author's position. It should be noted that both writers were using titles by the end of the semester, a small but significant step in giving their readers some help.

A similar problem to using an excessive amount of metadiscourse is that of using one particular marker excessively. One form that is frequently overused is the Hedges. Consider the follow excerpt:

(5) EC Pretest

> Americans watch television a lot. Adults probably spend at least five hours in front of the t.v., watching prime time, the news and maybe a show or two after that. Children spend many more hours than that watching television. A child could spend the entire day in front of the t.v.
>
> I'm not so sure that a child watching t.v. all day is a very good idea. Children are very influential. Most parents work all day so they aren't always around to moniter what they watch. Children pick up many of their habits from t.v. I agree totally with Winn when he says that t.v. is the important influence in childrens lives.

Here we find four Hedges, the Connective *so*, and one long authorial intrusion that includes a strongly stated Attitude Marker combined with an Attributor. The Hedges make the introduction vague and ineffective, particularly the statement *I'm not so sure that*. This is quite different from a Hedge such as *I think* because the latter indicates that what follows is the writer's own opinion (that may or may not be correct) while the former indicates that the writer is not sure what he/she is thinking. It is possible to Hedge without sounding unsure, but unfortunately, this young writer does not succeed in these first two paragraphs. These hedged statements are interspersed with one or two statements that should be qualified, producing a disconcerting mix of odd contrasts in tone.

In his posttest, the writer strengthens his assertions by using more Attributors, which indicate the source of information. He includes one Attitude Marker in this excerpt:

(6) EC Posttest

> In her article "Nuclear Language and How We Learned to Pat the Bomb" Carol Cohn tells of the year she spent as a visiting scholar at a university defense study center. She says that as she learned the nuclear language, her views began to change. She started thinking less about the people that would be killed by a nuclear bomb and more about the politics involved and the weapons themselves. Cohn claims that using the language affected her views of reality.
>
> I believe that learning all the vocabulary of nuclear language did affect her views. The reason for this is the language itself.

He uses metadiscourse effectively to provide the source of his information and to mark his beliefs about the propositional content that he is developing. This is followed up with a clear position statement and a lead-in to the body of the essay. It seems to us this is a much stronger introduction than that of his pretest.

Now consider two papers written by a CC student:

(7) CC Pretest

> The observation Winn stated that "through the changes it has made in family life, television emerges as the important influence in children's lives today" seems to hold true in most cases. In the past this may not have been a correct statement, but in today's society it holds true.
>
> In the past, families seemed to spend more time together, and tended to go on outings together. However, today it seems like families crowd around the television together or watch television in separate rooms, any spare time they have.

In the first part of her essay, the writer hedges a Certainty Marker, then hedges the negation of a Certainty Marker, then affirms her original hedged statement. This is followed by three more Hedges and a Connective. In her one-page paper, which is less than 250 words, she uses eleven Hedges. This usage conveys a lack of commitment to the position she is attempting to develop.

There is certainly improvement in her posttest. However, she does not seem to have a conscious awareness of the category of Hedges or their function because, in her final example, which should present the strongest statement of her position, she reverts to a heavy use of Hedges:

(8) CC Posttest

> Language Affecting Reality
>
> In the article "Nuclear Language And How We Learned to Pat The Bomb", written by Carol Cohn, the subject of language reflects one's view of reality is discussed. The author contrasts the different outlooks of when a person is familiar with a certain subject's language and when that person is not. In this article, Cohn uses the subject of nuclear weapons and how when she learned the specific language of nuclear weapons she began to think in a totally different way than before. The acquisition of this language gave the author a new outlook on the topic and also made the topic more interesting and fun for her to talk about. After reading this article, I agree with the statement that language affects one's view of reality. . . .
>
> For a person who is was brought up in a wealthy community, his or her language will tend to be more advance and their views will be different from those who were brought up in a different environment. An example of this would be someone growing up in a city where most people are living in poverty. For the person who grew up in a wealthy community, he or she may have developed a sophisticated language, and with that language, a sophisticated attitude may have developed. That person views on life may deal with where they want to go to college or which country club to belong to. For the person who grew up in a poverty-stricken area, there language may be less developed. Instead of where to go to college, the person from the poor area may think of the world of a cruel and hard place to survive.

From a sociolinguist's point of view, it is a good thing the writer hedged these ethnocentric claims. But the fact remains that she was trying to use these claims to develop her thesis, and her heavy use of Hedges completely undercuts her argument. If she had had greater awareness of the pragmatic function of *may* and what she was doing with that form, she might have recognized the fallacies in this paragraph and selected better support for her position.

Another way metadiscourse can be used to strengthen an essay is shown by a second set of papers from the EC. In her first paper, the writer was direct and blunt in the expression of her opinions. She begins:

(9) EC Pretest

> I believe Winn is one hundred percent correct, even more so in the past couple of years since the invention of cable. TV is used as a sort of pacifier for a child. When a child is upset or whining, parents find it a solution to stick the child in front of the t.v. and let him have reigns over the channel

> selector. And it does become a pacifier--momentarily--until the t.v. is shut off and the problems come flooding back to both the parents and child. This is one influence it has on the child--to make them want to escape reality and not face the truth.
>
> Now, to even further expand on the idea of escaping reality, let's look at the program shown on t.v.. They certainly far depict reality. . . . we have shows depicting violence, like "Miami Vice", "L. A. Law", not to name all the nightly movies that are broadcasted. Children see this and see a grown man shooting a woman and will think, "Hey, this man is shooting someone. I guess it's ok." They are not taught that this type of program is wrong because this type of program is a "norm" for t.v., and the child is being socialized into this kind of viewing. . . . Stick the kid in front of the t.v., and he'll shut up. The kid watches t.v., and the mom and dad go about their own business. It is really a factor in the breaking up of the relationship between child/parents. Gone are the days when families sat around the dinner table and shared conversations. Here is the day of the surrogate mothers and fathers--T.V!

There are a number of problems with this paper, including the fact that the reader is never told what Winn's position is. In terms of metadiscourse, the main problem is the dogmatic tone that the writer adopts toward the propositions she is presenting. While we might generally agree with her positions, most readers would find them too strongly stated and would reject the writer's conclusions on the basis of such extreme claims. If she had hedged her strong judgments, such as, "They are not taught that this type of program is wrong. . . ." and provided some openings so the reader could entertain a somewhat different slant on the propositional content being presented, it is more likely that her thesis would be accepted.

After a semester of training in the use of metadiscourse, and the resulting focus on the reader, we find a dramatic change in this student's writing:

(10) EC Posttest

> "Language in the World of Nuclear Arms"
>
> Penetration aids. Cookie cutter. Shopping list. What comes to mind upon hearing these words? Certainly not nuclear warfare! These words are just a few of the many euphemisms that nuclear arms specialists use among themselves to discuss their own little "subculture." When used, these words soften the horror of nuclear arms race and don't convey the truth of the matter--the actual amount of destruction taking place. Let's take a look at some of the words or phrases that "distort" reality.

Here she begins with a short series of noun phrases, then addresses a rhetorical question to her readers, a Commentary. She expresses strong certainty that the reader would not expect them to refer to nuclear warfare (*certainly* and an exclamation mark), then moves into a statement of her thesis. Her skeptical attitude toward content is expressed with quotes ("*subculture*"). She ends her introduction with an invitation to the reader to join her in examining the lexicon of the military professions, let's. Throughout her final paper, the writer uses a variety of metadiscourse markers, including other Commentaries to engage her reader (*as one may expect*), Attitude Markers to reveal her own affective responses to the text (*surprisingly*), and a Commentary and a Reminder, which brings the readers back to her opening series (*And what about the euphemisms like "cookie cutter" and "shopping list?"*). Her new-found attention to her reader is perhaps best demonstrated when she concludes with an Attitude Marker and an Illocutionary Marker, *"I believe I have justified my argument--these words certainly cover up the serious effects of what nuclear warfare is. . . .* They reflect a significant change, in our opinion, both toward her reader and to the underlying purpose of writing--communicating to persuade.

There are many ways an essay can "go wrong" in tone. None of the CC writers adopted such a judgmental tone as the EC pretest just quoted, but many of them produced inconsiderate texts that closed out the reader. Consider the following CC pretest:

(11) CC Pretest

> The harmful effects of television, particularly on children has been the interest of Marie Winn for many years. I completely agree with the author that it is improper and unhealthy for children and families to watch to much TV.
>
> Today television is becoming an real asset in every home where there is children. This statement is true, because I have two younger brothers and my family has six television sets in our home.
>
> Watching television as far as a child is concerned is obviously unhealthy for someone to sit in front of day after day. The fiction type movies could corrupt a child's ideas on reality. Television as a means of communication is all right in my mind but abuse like anything else could have negative effects.

In his essay, repeated here in its entirety, the writer uses two Certainty Markers, an Attributor, two Attitude Markers, and--in his concluding statement--two Hedges. This is not a bad mix, but the text still comes across as quite inconsiderate, partly because of the inferences the reader must make (for example, that Marie Winn is the author), partly because of the serious syntactic and lexical errors. The Hedges are misplaced: Rather than using them to moderate some of the sweeping statements at the beginning of his essay, the author has used them to hedge his final statements--which should be given more forcefully in order to sway the reader.

In his posttest, we find about the same mix:

(12) CC Posttest

> Nuclear Language
>
> I agree that language has a big effect on a persons view of reality. This article by Carol Cohn is about the nature of nuclear strategic thinking and a specialized language called "technostrategic." This language has enormous destructive power.
>
> Technostrategic language articulated only the perspective of the users nuclear weapons, not the victims. Speaking the expert language not only offers distance, a feeling of control, and an alternative focus for ones energies, it also offers escape from thinking of oneself as a victim of nuclear war.
>
> It is tempting to attribute this problem to the words themselves, the abstractness, the euphemisms, the santizied, friendly, sexy acronyms. One would only need to change the words themselves, the abstractness, the euphemisms, the santizied, friendly, sexy acronyms. One would only need to change the words: get the military planners to say "mass murder" instead of "collateral damage," and there thinking would change. The problem, however, is not simply the defense intellectuals use abstract terminology that removes the realities of what they speak.
>
> Language that is abstract, santizied, full of euphemisms; language that is sexy and fun to use; paradigms whose referant is weapons.

This text, like the pretest, has a reasonable mix of metadiscourse markers--two Attitude Markers, an Attributor, two Connectives, and a Commentary. The connection between the first sentence, in which he states his thesis, and the second, which refers to the source article, requires inferencing but is reasonably transparent. The Attitude Marker, *it is tempting*, should be leading to a counterargument and refutation, and this does seem to be the case at the conclusion of the third paragraph. But in the fourth paragraph, the paper falls apart with a bewildering fragment reiterating examples of technostrategic language. This paper shows exactly the problems in writing that we were trying to correct--an absence of a sense of audience and an absence of any ethics in writing. By teaching the pragmatics of metadiscourse, we intended to instill awareness of audience in our EC writers as well as attention to their own belief systems as it was reflected in their essays. What we find in this CC paper, in contrast, is a collage of concepts from the material he had read, a pastiche of chunks of proposition content that has no development and little persuasive power. The lack of development shown in these two CC essays contrasts with the development in the use of metadiscourse forms and attention to their pragmatic functions on the part of EC students.

It is not surprising that we find more appropriate use of metadiscourse in the EC papers. After all, the experimental treatment involved teaching students what metadiscourse is, how to recognize it, and how to incorporate it into their papers. However, something more seems to have been going on here because it is unlikely that just the use of metadiscourse would count for an average difference between the two classes of almost one letter grade. To understand what made this difference, we must consider another feature of the texts, topical progression.

Simplified Topical Progression

One way of analyzing a text is through topical progression, which describes how authors develop the subjects and predicates of their sentences to introduce different topics on which they comment. Lautamatti (1978) discusses two types of progression, parallel and sequential. In parallel progression, the author introduces a topic in subject position, and continues to use it as a topic, as in the following example:

> My cat loves to eat mice. She's ten years old, and she's still an excellent hunter.

"My cat" is introduced in the first sentence, then remains the given information as additional information is provided about her in the predicate. The reader thus keeps the same topic in mind as a richer concept of the cat is developed over the three sentences. In sequential topical progression, the topic changes. The first sentence presents a topic and a predication. The second sentence introduces a new topic from the predicate of the preceding sentence, and provides information about this second topic in the predicate. A third topic is selected from the predicate of the second sentence and is developed, and so on. An example of sequential predication follows:

> My cat ate a mouse. The mouse was in the barn. The barn is old and is a never-ending source of food for her.

Cat is the first topic, followed by *the mouse* as the second topic, and *the barn* in the third. The last two topics are definite because they have occurred in the previous predicate.

If topical progression is not fairly orderly, the reader must inference in order to follow the development of the text:

> My cat loves catnip. Our nursery is ordering some so she will have a never-ending supply.

In such a sequence, *my cat* is the first topic. A new second topic is introduced, *our nursery*, and the reader must make a series of simple inferences (but inferences nevertheless) that the writer is going to buy catnip plants at the nursery and plant them in order to have a continuous supply on hand for the cat. Inference becomes more problematic as the text introduces more information for which the reader does not have the appropriate background knowledge.

In analyzing how English teachers simplified texts for EFL students, Lautamatti (1978) found that one strategy involved topical progression. She proposes that some of the teachers she studied intuitively made the topical progression simpler and more explicit as a way of making the text easier to follow. The simplifying effect of transparent topical progression can be seen in the writing of Hemingway. Consider the use of topical progression (indicated in boldface) in the first paragraph of The Sun Also Rises (Hemingway, 1954):

> **Robert Cohn** was once middleweight boxing champion of Princeton. Do not think that I am very much impressed by that as a boxing title, but **it** meant a lot to Cohn. **He** cared nothing for boxing, in fact **he** disliked it, but **he** learned it painfully and thoroughly to counteract the feeling of inferiority and shyness he had felt on being treated as a Jew at Princeton. There was **a certain inner comfort** in knowing he could knock down anybody who was snooty to him, although, being shy and a thoroughly nice boy, he never fought except in the gym. **He** was Spider Kelly's star pupil. **Spider Kelly** taught all his young gentlemen to fight like featherweights, no matter whether they weighed one hundred and five or two hundred and five pounds. But **it** seemed to fit Cohn. **He** was really very fast. **He** was so good that Spider promptly overmatched him and got his nose permanently flattened. **This** increased Cohn's distaste. . . .

In the four cases that do not involve parallel progression of the topic introduced in the first sentence, *Robert Cohn*, there are two cases of sequential progression (*Spider Kelly, it*), one case of sequential progression to a predicate introduced in a metadiscursive expression (*a boxing title*), and a topic introduced with the Topicalizer *there was*. In this example, topical progression is predominantly parallel with only a few cases of sequential, and in the one case in which a new topic is introduced, it is by means of the Topicalizer, *there was*. A reader would have to work hard to lose the structure of this opening.

If writers become more aware of audience and the value of making texts easier to follow, some of them (like Lautamatti's teachers) would be expected to intuitively focus on topical progression as a way of improving the clarity of their essays. The following two excerpts show how topical progression was handled by a CC student (numbers indicate topics):

(13) CC Pretest

1. ...**the majority of young people** ...center their lives around the television.
2. **Television** has changed family life drastically and will do so even more in the future unless we can direct our children's attention away from the set
1. . . . **our future adults** are going to know more about the first caucasian rapper to appear on MTV than the meaning of the common ideas learned in a healthy family setting.
3. **These ideas** would include love...
4. **Children** today know what programs will be on from the minute they walk in the door from school....
5. **Mealtime** doesn't seem to see a break in television either.

In this CC pretest, we find five different topics in the introduction, if we consider young people to be a different group than children. (Those people we have informally polled do; for them, children are school kids, young people are teenagers.) Parallel progression is used when *the majority of young people* is paraphrased as *our future adults*. Sequential progression occurs when the second topic, *television*, follows its mention in the predicate of the first sentence, and when the predication, *common ideas learned in a healthy family setting*, is paraphrased as the topic, *these ideas*. *Children*, the fourth topic, might be traced back to the possessive in the second sentence and *mealtime* certainty requires some inferencing on the part of the reader.

There is some improvement in the writer's posttest:

(14) CC Posttest

1. . . . Carol Cohn demonstrated . . . **the reality of nuclear wars** was changed by learning the language.
2. . . . **she** hadn't needed to deal with the acronyms and phrases used in discussing nuclear war.
3. She believed that **nuclear war** was dangerous and irrational and associated with insanity or evil with our decision makers.
4. . . . Cohn found it hard to believe that **the defense professionals** could speak of nuclear war without taking into account. . . .
4. **They** rattled off terms and nick-names. . . .
2. **Cohn** was astounded by this. . . .

In her final paper, the writer uses one less topic. There are two cases of parallel progression (*she* and *Cohn*, *the defense professionals* and *they*) and one case of sequential progression (*nuclear war* in the predicate of the second sentence and as the subject of the following sentence). It is not clear whether *the defense professionals* is a paraphrase of *our decision makers*. It may be, but the fact that it can not unambiguously be so analyzed points out a problem in this paragraph. Another problem is the way the topical progression flows in the second sentence from the metadiscourse in the first sentence. One has to infer that Carol Cohn was learning the language, not simply reporting about the effect of learning the language on someone else's perception of reality in the first sentence. Generally, the topical development is less straightforward than in her pretest.

When we consider a sample from the EC, we find a similar high number of topics in the pretest, embedded in considerable metadiscourse. There is one case of sequential progression, between the predicate of the first sentence and the subject of the next to last sentence, which is followed by a case of parallel progression in the last sentence. Besides these cases, readers are faced with several inferences as they make their way through this paragraph, although it could be argued that the four remaining topics (*today's family*, *Americans*, *family time*, *children*) all show lexical cohesion, as described by Halliday and Hasan (1976). Even if this is the appropriate analysis, some inferencing is still involved.

(15) EC Pretest

1. It is true that **today's family** has less time for doing things together but it is not all together fair to put the blame only on television.
2. Studys have shown that . . . **Americans** . . . are working more . . . .

3. This fact alone shows that **family time** is greatly reduced.
4. **Children**...would be likely to feel alone.
5. In this instance **the television** becomes a friend....
5. It is true that **television** greatly influences children...

In his Posttest, after a less-than-perfect first sentence, this writer uses one less topic, with one topic occurring three times. A tighter structure is also developed by two clear cases of sequential progression and possibly a third, if we consider *the people who hold the fate of the world in their hands* to be referring to the same set as *military advisors*. Another thing contributing to the clarity of this introduction is the fact that proposition content is not buried in excessive metadiscourse, as in the first, and what there is is used more effectively.

(16) EC Posttest

1. In Cohn's article, **she** had the opportunity to study and be with the people who hold the fate of the world in their hands.
2. When someone mentions the phrase nuclear war, **the first thing that comes to mind** is the terrible destruction...
3. However, when Cohn was in the presence of military advisors **they** didn't quite regard nuclear war in the same way...
3. It was clear that **the military** had their own system of slang when talking about weapons of mass destruction.
4. **These** are violent, dangerous weapons that need to be respected for their power.
3. **Military analysts** however, would talk of "patting the bomb"...

This is a significant improvement over his pretest.

CONCLUSION

There are other facets of the text that could be examined, such as the development of the argument and the structure of paragraphs. However, the changes in metadiscourse and those in topical progression represent two important developments that occurred more frequently in the writing of the EC. The first type, more effective use of metadiscourse markers, would be expected as an effect of direct teaching. (If the use of these markers did not change, it would be surprising if there were any differences between students in the EC and in the CC.) Classroom discussion and interactions during peer review sessions suggested that as the EC students became aware of the pragmatic/rhetorical function of metadiscourse through direct teaching, they moved away from regarding metadiscourse markers as empty fillers with low informativity to recognizing their pragmatic functions. On the basis of their comments and journal entries, they realized that when Hedges are used too frequently, they significantly weaken authorial voice and render an argument ineffective. Conversely, they recognized that there are times when a Hedge must be used if the writing is to be ethical and reflect what is truly known about the propositional content. They understood how Hedges and Attributors interact: When a proposition is not generally known or accepted, it can be hedged or an authority can be cited as a source. They gradually realized that one of the functions of Hedges is to allow readers some latitude so they can enter a dialogue with the text/writer in a way that is not possible if all propositions are stated so baldly that no other position can even be entertained.

They also seemed to be questioning some of the techniques and restrictions they had been taught about writing, and began to effectively express their own opinions and feelings about what they were saying, through Attitude Markers, to their audience. Similarly, they realized that devices exist which can be used to reach readers (Commentaries), and that they did not have to rely on the force of their arguments alone to persuade. They consciously began to allow their personalities to intrude into the text as a strategy of persuasion.

The second type of change was global rather than local and resulted, we believe, from a shift from writer-based to reader-based prose. As the students became more aware that they were writing to be read, they began to consider what sort of information their readers might need and how to present that information to them. They became aware of their audience, and this affected aspects of the text, such as topical progression, which were not taught but rather improved as the writers attempted to reach their readers.

Most students begin their first university-level composition course with a naive sense of audience--a real reader, a flesh and blood person who gives some sort of response to the text (Wilson, 1981). We believe a significant number of students write for their teacher, who is perceived as having an abnormal concern with grammatical correctness and the superficial structure of the text and who, of course, gives them a grade. We suggest that, over the course of the semester, many of the EC students developed a more adequate understanding of audience as a discourse community. According to Porter (1992), in a discourse community, the distinctions between composer and audience are blurred. When writers become members of a discourse community, they adopt the conventions of the community, incorporating them into their writing, and they judge that writing as a member of the community. Let us consider how this might have worked with our method of teaching metadiscourse.

The instructor (Cheng) began to shape the emerging culture of the classroom by introducing the concept of metadiscourse. As the students began to understand the concept, it became an expected facet of their written texts and one of the characteristics of their developing discourse community. The process of discovering meaning through writing was facilitated because metadiscourse made it easier to identify fallacies and infelicities in the emerging texts. Cases that demanded too great an inference or which needed further elaboration were more apparent. Overall, there was greater attention on the part of the student writers to saying what they really believed and to developing support for their positions. Such attention resulted in better texts.

Thus by teaching metadiscourse in terms of its pragmatic functions, two important changes occurred in student writing. Most expected was the greatly improved use of the metadiscourse forms themselves. We found fewer cases of overuse or underuse, as well as fewer incorrect or infelicitous examples. Perhaps more important, the students began to critique their own and others' essays at a much higher level. They moved from problems of mechanics and grammar to problems of rhetorical structure, the development of argumentation, and clarity and logic of expression. An awareness of the importance of the interpersonal function of text emerged, and the focus of attention turned from writer as writer to writer as reader. Metadiscourse as a subject of direct study and metadiscourse as a way of evaluating text resulted in changes in the propositional content that made the EC texts more effective than those texts written by CC student writers, who focused on propositional content by reading about it, discussing it and learning about it. This may seem to be a contradictory result, but once we accept what the purpose of writing is and what the pragmatic functions of metadiscourse are, this is also a predictable result.

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UNDERPRODUCTION DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN AVOIDANCE: INVESTIGATION OF UNDERPRODUCTION USING CHINESE ESL LEARNERS

Jiang Li

This paper proposes a differentiation between conscious avoidance and subconscious underproduction through examining Schachter's (1974) avoidance theory, which was based on a study in which Chinese and Japanese ESL learners produced fewer English relative clauses (RCs) than learners of other L1 backgrounds. A comparison of Chinese and English RCs reveals that they are different not only in form but also in other aspects, such as pragmatic functions. In a survey 15 out of 16 Chinese ESL learners denied having consciously tried to avoid English RCs. Two tests involving another group of Chinese learners showed no evidence that they consciously avoided English RCs. The author therefore concludes that it is not the apparent formal difference that causes Chinese learners to consciously avoid English RCs, but the more subtle pragmatic differences that make them subconsciously underproduce this structure. Underproduction does not necessarily mean avoidance. 'Subconscious underproduction' may be a better term when L2 learners underproduce certain structures in the target language without realizing they are doing so.

The issue of avoidance behavior in second language learning was first raised by Schachter (1974), who based her theory on her study in which Chinese and Japanese speakers produced fewer English relative clauses than other L1 speakers in their writings. The problem has since been extensively discussed by researchers (Kleinmann, 1977, 1978; Chiang, 1980; Dagut & Laufer, 1985; Hulstijn & Marchena, 1989; Laufer & Eliasson, 1991; Seliger, 1989; Kamimoto, et al. 1992). However, the differentiation of conscious avoidance and subconscious underproduction has hardly received any attention. The present paper is intended to address this issue.

THE PROBLEM

Schachter (1974) examined four sets of 50 English compositions by ESL learners and compared them with the compositions of a group of native American English speakers. The first languages of the four groups of non-native speakers were Japanese, Chinese, Arabic, and Persian. The proficiency levels of the learners were either intermediate or advanced. The production of restrictive relative clauses was studied. It was found that the Persian and Arabic speakers produced as many relative clauses in their compositions as the native American English speakers (Persian 174, Arabic 154, and American 173), whereas the Chinese and Japanese speakers produced far fewer relative clauses in their compositions (Chinese 76, Japanese 63). However, it was also discovered that the Chinese and Japanese learners' error rate in producing English relative clauses was significantly lower than that of the Arabic and the Persian learners.

Schachter explains this as the 'avoidance phenomenon'. According to Schachter, because in Chinese and Japanese the relative clauses occur to the left of head nouns, whereas in Persian and Arabic they occur to the right of head nouns, as in English, the difference between Chinese/Japanese relative clauses and English ones is greater than that between Persian/Arabic and English. Therefore, it is more difficult for Chinese and Japanese speakers to acquire this English structure, and thus, they have a tendency to avoid using English relative clauses.

> It is plausible and I think correct to suppose that they produce fewer relative clauses in English because they are *trying*[1] to avoid them, and that they only produce them in English when they are relatively sure that they are correct, which would also account for the extremely small number of errors they make (p. 210).

Conscious Avoidance And Subconscious Underproduction

According to Schachter, when learners find a certain structure difficult to produce, they will "take advantage of paraphrase relations to avoid" such a construction "while getting his ideas across" (p. 212). Thus, we can define what Schachter called "avoidance" as a situation when a second language learner knows the existence of the rules of a certain structure but is not sure about the details, and therefore when there is a need to use this structure, he/she tries to use another structure or other structures to serve the same or similar communicative purpose. Hence, there are four conditions for the potential of avoidance: (1) The learner knows the existence of the rule(s) of a specific structure; (2) He/she is not sure about certain details of the rule(s); (3) There is a need to use the structure and the learner is aware of this; and (4) The learner does not use the structure but uses some other structure(s) instead.

Kamimoto et al. (1992) quoted the comments by two second language speakers which can be regarded as examples of such kind of avoidance behavior in oral contexts (p. 251):

> I never know which Dutch nouns have common or neuter gender, so I always stick a diminutive suffix on the end of them, because then they're always neuter, bless the little things (British university professor after 25 years in the Netherlands).
>
> I can't master the Polish case system. Whenever I buy food, I try to use supermarkets as often as possible so I don't have to talk and when I have to go to the butcher's or the bookstore, say, I always find myself mumbling the ends of words (Fulbright scholar, Warsaw).

During an ESL writing tutoring session, a Chinese learner of English once told me that "When I don't know whether a noun is countable or not, I just use 'a lot of' or 'lots of' to modify it. I don't use either 'many' or 'much' in such a situation". This case can be regarded as an example of second language avoidance in written contexts.

Odlin (1989) coined another term 'underproduction' to describe such a phenomenon as Chinese and Japanese learners' producing fewer relative clauses in their English writing, though he did not distinguish between the two terms. In my view, however, there are two categories of underproduction: conscious avoidance, as portrayed above, and subconscious underproduction, which refers to such a situation when L2 learners underproduce certain structures in the target language without realizing that they are doing so. In other words, L2 learners may underproduce a certain structure in the target language, not because they feel difficulty in producing the structure but because the difference between the L1 and L2 is too subtle to be noticed. In such a situation, 'subconscious underproduction' is a better term than 'avoidance'.

Figure 1: The Relationship Between Two Kinds of Underproduction



Why Study Relative Clauses?

As mentioned above, it is more appropriate to use the term 'subconscious underproduction' than the term 'avoidance' when a group of L2 learners who share the same L1 underproduce certain structures in the L2 without realizing that they are doing so; whereas the term "avoidance" should be used exclusively for a situation where L2 learners consciously try to avoid certain forms or structures in the target language. As the latter term was put forward by Schachter (1974) and based on the findings that Chinese and Japanese students underproduced English relative clauses in their compositions, it would make sense to study the differences between English and Chinese relative clauses and to look into the issue of how Chinese learners underproduce English relative clauses. Namely, do Chinese learners consciously avoid English relative clauses or subconsciously underproduce them?

Chinese Relative Clauses

It is true that formally Chinese relative clauses are apparently different from English relative clauses: they occur to the left of head nouns. An English sentence "The girl who has just come in is my sister" can be translated into Chinese as:

Nage	*gang*	*jinlai*	*de*	*nuhai*	*shi*	*wode*	*meimei.*
That	just	come in	REL	girl	be	my	sister.

The Chinese language does not have non-restrictive relative clauses. Thus, the English sentence "The Browns, whose house has been burgled six times, never go on holiday now." will be usually translated into Chinese as two independent clauses:

Bulang	*jia*	*de*	*fangzi*	*beidao*	*guo*	*wuci,*	*tamen*	*zaiyebu*
Brown	family	GEN	house	be burgled	tense	5 times	they	never again

qu *dujia* *le*
go on holiday marker

English restrictive relative clauses can be "reduced" to *ing* phrases, *en* phrases, *to*-infinitive phrases, and in some cases, prepositional phrases; whereas Chinese relative clauses cannot:

i. *ing* phrase

Eng: People wishing to attend…

Chi: *dasuan* *yao* *canja* *de* *ren…*
wish will attend REL people

ii. *en* phrase

Eng: the 14 people arrested…

Chi: *… bei* *daibu* *de* *14* *ren*
passive arrest REL 14 people

iii. *to*-infinitive phrase

Eng: a house to let

Chi: *dai* *chuzu* *de* *fangzi*
wait let REL house

iv. prepositional phrase

Eng: visitors from London

Chi: Lunden lai de keren
London come REL visitor

Bley-Vroman and Houng (1988) examined the issue of comparative frequency of relative clauses in Chinese and English by counting relative clauses in the first five chapters of an American literary work *The Great Gatsby* and its Chinese translation. They found that only about one-third (32/93) of the original relative clauses were translated into Chinese as relative clauses. This indicates that the Chinese language may have a much lower frequency of relative clauses in written discourse. .

Table 1: Frequency of RCs in first five chapters of the *Great Gatsby* and the number of the clauses translated as RCs in the Chinese Version (Adapted from Bley-Vroman and Houng, 1988:96)

RC types in English	The Great Gatsby	Rendered as RCs in Chinese translation
Restrictive	50	21 (42%)
Non-restrictive	43	11 (25%)
TOTAL	93	32 (34%)

Zhao (1989) used a translation to compare the frequency of relative clauses in English and Chinese. She collected her data by comparing English writings about impressions of China by Chinese Canadians and Americans with their Chinese translations. She concluded that Chinese may make less use of relative clause constructions than English (Zhao, 1989, quoted by Kamimoto et al., 1992).

Table 2: RCs in English text and their Chinese translation (Zhao, 1989, quoted by Kamimoto et al., 1992)

RCs in English	RCs in Chinese	RCs in English =RC in Chinese	In English only	In Chinese only
124	91	59 (48%)	65	32

Zhao (1989) also studied the functions of certain relative clauses in English. She pointed out that there are certain English relative clauses which do not have equivalent counterparts in Chinese due to their special functions (Zhao, 1989, p. 109f, quoted by Kamimoto et al., 1992)[2]:

Extraposed restrictive relative clause:

i-a) A girl is studying with me who has an IQ of 200.
[Cf. A girl who has an IQ of 200 is studying with me.]

ii-a) A man came in who was wearing very funny clothes.
[Cf. A man who was wearing funny clothes came in.]

These types of English sentences can only be translated into Chinese as independent clauses serving as comments on the previous clauses, where the latter function as topics of the sentences:

i-b)	*Wo*	*you*	*ge*	*nu*	*tongxue,*	*ta*	*de*	*zhishang*	*wei*	200.
	I	have	one	female	classmate,	she	GEN	IQ	be	200

ii-b) *Jinlai le ge ren, ta chuandai qiguai*
come in tense one man he wear funny

Existential sentences introduced by "there be":

ii-a) There were certain aspects of China which I was very interested in examining.

iii-b) *Wo dui zhongguo de mouxie wenti hen you xingqu jinxing kaocha*
I about China GEN some aspect very have interest carry out examining

Restrictive relative clauses which have adverbial function of concession:

iv-a) Mother who was married at sixteen had been very accurate about village life.
[Cf. Although mother was married at 16 (marriage required her to move to her in-law's village at a young age), she still remembered details of the life at her home village.]

iv-b) *Jinguan muqin shiliu sui jiu jehun le…*
although mother 16 year-old tense marry tens

Restrictive relative clauses which can only be rendered into Chinese adverbial clause of reason:

v-a) I began to wonder if I would be comfortable in a place where the people for once are just like me and yet in many ways not like me at all.
[Cf. I began to wonder if I would be comfortable there because people there for once are just like me and yet in many ways not like me at all]

v-b) *Wo bu zhidao zai nali wo huibuhui gandao shufu, yinwei nali*
I not know in there I whether or not feel comfortable because there

de renmen ji hen xiang wo, you you xuduo fangmian genben
GEN people for-once very be like me but have many aspect at all

bu xiang wo.
not be like me

English relative clauses which also serve as information focus and can only be translated into Chinese by "shi…de" construction, which is used to express an established fact:

vi-a) China is a country that is behind Canada in technology and a number of scientific disciplines
[Cf. China is behind Canada in technology and a number of scientific disciplines.].

vi-b) *Zhongguo zai jishu he yixie kexue xueke fangmian shi luohou yu*
China in technology and some science discipline aspects behind (prep)

Jianada de
Canada

I compared narrative articles in a nation-wide Chinese newspaper *People's Daily* (November 10 and 11, 1992) and those in a Canadian newspaper *The Globe and Mail* (December 12, 15 and 16, 1992) as well as an article in the "MLC Bulletin" of Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (November 13, 1992). I found that on average among every 1000 English words in the articles studied, there are approximately ten restrictive relative clauses, plus approximately seven other "reduced" relative clauses, such as *-ing* phrases, *en phrases*, *to*-infinitive phrases and prepositional phrases. It was also discovered that among every 1000 Chinese words in the article studied, there are roughly eight relative clauses. However, what interests me more is that out of ten Chinese relative clauses, five of them can only or would likely be translated into English as "reduced" relative clauses[3].

Table 3: Number of RC Structures in an English newspaper and a Chinese newspaper

Newspaper	Number of RCs (Out of 1000 words)	Reduced RCs	Total
Glodal and Mail (English)	10	7	17
People's Daily (Chinese)	8 (50% would be rendered into English reduced RCs)	0	8

From the above data we can see that (1) written Chinese appears to have fewer relative clauses than English; (2) certain English "reduced" relative clause structures correspond to Chinese relative structures whereas Chinese does not have such "reduced" relative clauses; (3) certain English relative structures correspond to Chinese non-relative clause structures; (4) only some of the English "full" relative clause structures totally correspond to Chinese relative clauses.

Do Chinese Learners Try To Avoid English Relative Clauses?

I have conducted two studies to investigate the issue of whether Chinese learners of English consciously avoid using English relative clauses or subconsciously underproduce them. The first study was a retrospective interview conducted individually with sixteen Chinese speakers of English in Toronto, Canada, who came respectively from mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Seven of them were doing degree studies at universities, three were spouses of students, two were working in Toronto, and four were presently learning English at the School of Continuing Education of the University of Toronto. The English proficiency levels of these people varied from intermediate to advanced.

The following questions were asked in Chinese: "From your own experience in learning English, have you ever considered this: because English relative clauses are difficult, you tried to avoid using them in your writing? In other words, when there was a need to use relative clauses, you deliberately used other structures instead. Is that true for you? For example, when you intended to say "I sent him a gift which I bought in Shanghai', you wrote "I sent him a gift. I bought the gift in Shanghai' or "I bought a gift in Shanghai, and sent it to him'".

After thinking about ten seconds, all but one answered "No". The one who said "Yes" answered: "When I just learned the structure many years ago and was writing an examination, I might choose to avoid using a relative clause for fear of losing marks. Otherwise I wouldn't do so." Later I learned that this participant received his master's degree in applied linguistics. He may have read Schachter's article or other related articles, and thus had a kind of preconception on this issue. None of the other participants thought that English relative clauses were difficult for them.

In order to objectively investigate whether Chinese learners would consciously avoid English relative clauses, a second investigation involving another group of eleven Chinese learners was conducted. All the participants in the second study were of similar backgrounds to the first group but were different people except one[4]. Among them, four were doing degree studies at the University of Toronto, one had just graduated from a Canadian university, two were visiting scholars at the University of Toronto, two were students learning English in the School of Continuing Education of the University of Toronto, and two were working in Toronto. The English proficiency levels of the subjects ranged from intermediate to advanced.

Two tests were given to the participants. An interview was held with each of the participants after the first test. The first test was composed of two parts: the first required the testees to answer in written English three questions which required them to define certain objects in order to elicit the use of relative clauses; the second required the subjects to provide written translations of six sentences from Chinese into English, which also may elicit English relative clauses. Among the translation sentences, two can only be rendered into English with relative clauses, so that it also tested whether the participants had the knowledge of English relative clauses (see Appendix A). The participants were tested and interviewed individually.

None of the participants were able to produce all the sentences with relative clauses. The participant who scored best was able to produce seven relative clauses out of nine sentences; the participant who scored lowest was able to produce two relative clauses out of nine. The average of the correct production of relative clauses was 49.5% (see Table 4). For each of the sentences which was not produced with a relative clause, a question was asked "Did you ever think about using a relative clause in this sentence?". If the answer was "Yes", then the participant was requested to answer "Why?".

Table 4: The production of English RCs in the two tests in descending order of ability level (A to K)

Subject	Test	Correct RCs	RCs with errors	Non-RCs
A	1st	7 (77.8%)	0 (0%)	2 (2.22%)
	2nd	9 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
B	1st	6 (66.7%)	0 (0%)	3 (33.3%)
	2nd	9 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
C	1st	5 (55.6%)	2 (22.2%)	2 (22.2%)
	2nd	9 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
D*	1st	6 (66.7%)	0 (0%)	3 (33.3%)
	2nd	5 (55.6%)	1 (11.1%)	3 (33.3%)
E	1st	5 (55.6%)	0 (0%)	4 (44.4%)
	2nd	6 (66.7%)	0 (0%)	3 (33.3%)
F	1st	5 (55.6%)	1 (11.1%)	3 (33.3%)
	2nd	5 (55.6%)	0 (0%)	4 (44.4%)
G	1st	4 (44.4%)	0 (0%)	5 (55.6%)
	2nd	6 (66.7%)	0 (0%)	3 (33.3%)
H	1st	3 (33.3%)	1 (11.1%)	5 (55.5%)
	2nd	6 (66.7%)	0 (0%)	3 (33.3%)
I	1st	3 (33.3%)	1 (11.1%)	5 (55.5%)
	2nd	6 (66.7%)	0 (0%)	3 (33.3%)
J	1st	3 (33.3%)	1 (11.1%)	5 (55.6%)
	2nd	5 (55.6%)	1 (11.1%)	3 (33.3%)
K	1st	2 (22.2%)	1 (11.1%)	6 (66.7%)
	2nd	6 (66.7%)	0 (0%)	3 (33.3%)
TOTAL	1st	49 (49.5%)	7 (7.1%)	43 (43.4%)
	2nd	71 (71.7%)	2 (2.0%)	26 (26.3%)

*Subject D was the subject who had attended the first study.

Out of thirty-seven cases in which the participants did not produce relative clauses, only four of them in five cases answered that he/she had thought about using a relative clause but then decided not to do so; then when asked why they did not use relative clauses, one answered "I think a prepositional phrase is better here", one answered "I think an *-ing* phrase is simpler in this case", and one answered "A relative clause here would be too long; I prefer a prepositional phrase in this case". The participant who had taken part in the first study answered "Yes" twice. His explanation for one case was "I prefer a *to*-infinitive phrase in this case" and for the other "The distance between the head noun and the relative clause is too long, and I was taught by my teacher not to use relative clauses in such cases." None of the participants consciously "try to avoid" relative clauses because they "are too difficult" to them. In addition, at the end of the test, the participants were also given feedback on the errors they had made in the relative clauses they had constructed if there were any[5].

One or two days after the first test, another test was given to the participants, again individually. The test was also made up of definition questions and translation sentences (Chinese-English) though the contents were different. Among the translation sentences, three were adapted from Zhao's examples of English relative clauses mentioned above which do not have Chinese equivalents due to their special functions (Zhao, 1989, quoted by Kamimoto et al., 1992; also see Appendix B). Before the participants started writing the test, they were told that each of the sentences should contain a relative clause.

Every participant was able to produce all the relative clauses except for those which do not have equivalent counterparts in Chinese due to their special pragmatic functions mentioned above[6]. This suggests that when being consciously aware of the situation, Chinese learners of English whose language proficiency levels are at or above intermediate can easily produce those English relative clauses which do not have special functions as mentioned above. They do not consciously avoid English relative clauses. This also indicates that English relative clauses are not difficult to Chinese learners as far as the forms are concerned. Because these Chinese learners made far fewer errors in the second test than they did in the first test [only two errors out of seventy-three relative clauses (2.7%) as compared with seven out of fifty-six relative clauses in the first test (12%)], it appears that Chinese learners' errors in forming relative clauses are easy to correct.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

By analysing the above data we can see that there is a major syntactical difference between the Chinese and English relative clauses--the Chinese relative clauses occur to the left of head nouns whereas the English relative clauses occur to the right of head nouns. There are also functional or pragmatic differences as well as other syntactic differences: some English relative clauses have special pragmatic functions besides functioning as noun modifiers, such as those categories of English relative clauses which serve as the information focus, those which function as adverbial clauses of concession and reason, and reduced relative clauses in English.

It appears that the major syntactic difference, namely, the position of the English relative clauses with respect to the head nouns, does not cause much difficulty to Chinese learners, as has been manifested in this study. What does cause problems are those English relative clauses which have special pragmatic functions. These relative clauses can hardly find their way into the English writing by Chinese learners, because Chinese learners would naturally produce non-relative clause structures according to their functions, which are closer to corresponding structures in Chinese, to achieve the same communicative purposes. That is to say, under such circumstances, Chinese learners do not think about relative clauses and would produce such structures as adverbial clauses, compound clauses or independent simple sentences instead.

As mentioned above, there are also a group of Chinese relative clauses which would likely or can only be translated into English as other simpler structures--'reduced' relative clauses. This group of Chinese relative clauses cannot be easily transferred into Chinese learners' English as relative clauses either, for the linguistic rule of economy will work here and thus prevents Chinese learners from producing more sophisticated structures, as has been shown in this study.

Therefore, Chinese learners only transfer those Chinese relative clauses that totally correspond to 'pure' English relative clauses, namely, those full relative clauses which do not have other functions beside being noun modifiers, into their English writing, and thus produce fewer relative clauses. The problem of Chinese learners' underproduction of English relative clauses is subconscious underproduction, but not conscious avoidance. What causes the problem is not the apparent syntactic difference, but the more subtle pragmatic differences. In other words, it is not the gross difference between the forms of the relative clauses of the two languages that causes Chinese learners to consciously avoid using English relative clauses, but the pragmatic differences, which are too subtle for Chinese learners of English to perceive, that make them subconsciously underproduce English relative clauses. Underproduction does not necessarily mean avoidance.

From the present study we can also see that as far as the form is concerned, English relative clauses are not so difficult for Chinese learners whose language proficiency is at or above the intermediate level as Schachter has claimed. Then why are the forms of English relative clauses not that difficult to Chinese learners while the constructions of relative clauses in the two languages are so different? To answer this question, we should go back to the theoretical basis of Schachter's version of avoidance behavior in second language learning. According to Schachter, because of the gross syntactic difference between the Chinese/Japanese relative clauses and the English ones, the English relative clauses are difficult to these learners and they therefore try to avoid using this structure. Such an assumption is, in fact, based on the so-called strong version of Contrastive Analysis Hypothesis, which claims that a difference in patterns and forms between a learner's first language and the target language will cause interference and therefore will be difficult for him/her to learn and that a greater difference will result in greater learning difficulty (Lado, 1957). Many studies, however, have proved that this version of the Contrastive Analysis Hypothesis is invalid in predicting the difficulty a learner of a second language may encounter (Buteau, 1970; Wardhaugh, 1970; Whitman & Jackson, 1972; Dulay & Burt, 1974). Oller & Ziahosseiny (1970) compared the learning of English spelling by learners who use Roman alphabet in their first languages and those who do not use Roman alphabet, and discovered that the learners who use Roman alphabet in their first languages made more spelling errors than those who do not use Roman alphabet in their first languages. They therefore suggested a moderate version of the Contrastive Analysis Hypothesis: gross differences do not necessarily cause greater learning difficulty; on the contrary, slight or subtle differences can result in greater learning difficulty.

According to the moderate version of the Contrastive Analysis Hypothesis, Chinese learners of English do not necessarily have difficulty in learning the forms of English relative clauses which are apparently different from those of their first language. What does cause problems to Chinese learners are the pragmatic differences. Such differences are too subtle to be noticed by these learners, and therefore, they subconsciously underproduce relative clauses in their English writing. Thus, it is fair to conclude that so far the study of avoidance is based on a false hypothesis--the strong version of the Contrastive Analysis Hypothesis--which is in the first place invalid in predicting the difficulty a second language learner may encounter. Although intermediate and advanced second language learners may consciously avoid using certain structures in which they do not have confidence, they do not necessarily avoid structures which are apparently different in forms. Furthermore, they may subconsciously underproduce certain structures because of certain differences between the first and the second languages that are too subtle to be noticed, especially the differences in the aspects of pragmatics.

In spite of the debate over whether second language researchers should distinguish between "conscious" and "subconscious" learning (McLaughlin, 1990), the fact does exist that in communication, people, particularly L2 speakers, may sometimes pay more attention and sometimes less attention to the forms of a language. On one hand, they may consciously avoid the structures in which they do not have confidence; on the other hand, they may underproduce certain structures certain structures without realizing they are doing so, as was manifested in the present study. Therefore, a distinction between conscious avoidance and subconscious underproduction may help second language learners to better master the target language. If learners of a second language who share the same first language have a tendency to consciously avoid a certain structure in the second language because they are not quite clear about the construction of the structure, sufficient comprehensible input and output of the structure together with some explicit instruction of the rule(s) in meaningful contexts may help them to solve their problem. If they subconsciously underproduce a certain structure of the second language, then the task can be more difficult. In this case, exactly what causes the underproduction should be found out, and corresponding remedies should be offered, such as informing the learners of the problem and providing them with proper training; yet more research is needed in this respect.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to Dr. Merrill Swain, Dr. Birgit Harley and Dr. Sharon Lapkin for their help when I was writing earlier versions of this article. I also want to thank Dr. Harley for her comments on parts of the final draft.

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NOTES

[1] Italicized by the present writer

[2] The following six pairs of English and Chinese examples are from Zhao, quoted by Kamimoto et al. 1992:270.

[3] Among the three English newspaper articles studied, one was titled as "History in the making", an article about Black Creek Pioneer Village in Metro Toronto by John Bentley May; one was "Putting a new face on Berlin's urban renewal" on the issue of house construction in Berlin in the post-cold-war era, special to the Globe and Mail, by Joyce Drohan; the other was by Marry Taylor, a Canadian living in Japan, "Remembering the 47 Samurai", which was about what the she had seen in that country. The article on the Modern Language Center Bulletin was by a former M.Ed. student at Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Jeff Neufeld about his experience in Saudi Arabia as an EFL teacher. Among the six Chinese articles, one was a report about a remote area in Northwestern China by a newspaper reporter; one was a report on a certain university in China, also by a newspaper reporter; the others were written by Chinese students doing graduate studies in the U.S.A. and some European countries about their experience in these countries.

[4] This subject was the first one to be tested, and it was found that he was aware of the purpose of the test because he had taken part in the first study, so it was decided not to use the subjects who had participated in the first study any more.

[5] Five of the errors the subjects made were leaving out relative pronouns, one was misusing "who" for "that", and one was leaving out "in" in the structure "in which".

[6] Out of the eleven subjects, only three were able to construct the relative clauses adapted from Zhao's examples. All of the other subjects were only able to render these structures into English adverbial clauses, compound clauses, or independent simple sentences no matter how hard they tried.

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APPENDIX A: TEST ONE

I. Answer the following questions:

1. What is a clock? (Supposed answer: A clock is an instrument that tells time.)
2. What is a hat? (Supposed answer: A hat is something [that] a person wears on his/her head.
3. What is a house? (Suppose answer: A house is a building where/in which people live.)

II. Translate the following into English:

1. Chi: *Gang jinlai de na nuhai shi wode meimei.*
just come in REL that nuhai be my sister

(Eng: The girl who just came in is my sister).

2. Chi: *Wo xihuan ni zuotian mai de xie.*
I like you yesterday buy REL shoe

(Eng: I like the shoes you bought yesterday.)

3. Chi: Smith *boshi zhengzai xie yiben youguan zhongguo de shu.*
Dr. Smith (tense) write one about China GEN book
Wo hen xihuan tade shu.
I very like his book(s)

(Eng: Dr. Smith, whose books I like very much, is writing a book on China.)

4. Chi: *Jinlai le ge ren, ta dai ze qiguaide maozi.*
come in tense one man he wear tense funny hat

(Eng: A man who was wearing a funny hat came in. or: A man who came in was wearing a funny hat.)

5. Chi: *Zhe shi wo shi nian qia zhu guo de fangzi.*
this be I 10 year ago zhu tense GEN house

(Eng: This is the house where/in which I lived ten years ago.)

6. Chi: *zhe bushi ni chidao de yuanyin.*
this be not you be late REL reason

(Eng: This is not the reason why you were late.)

APPENDIX B: TEST TWO

I. Answer the following questions:

1. What is shoes? (Supposed answer: Shoes are objects [that/which] you wear on your feet.)
2. What is a classroom? (Supposed answer: A classroom is a room where/in which students have classes.)
3. What is a teacher? (Supposed answer: A teacher is a person who teaches.)

II. Translate the following into Chinese:

1. Chi: *wo you ge gege, ta hui youyong.*
I have one brother he can swim

(Eng: I have a brother who can swim.)

2. Chi: *Zhang xiansheng zhengzai daoyan yichu xin dianying, wo hen*
Mr. Zhang tense direct one new movie I very

xihuan tade dianying.
like his movie

(Eng: Mr. Zhang, whose movies I like very much, is directing a new movie.)

3. Chi: *Wo you yiliang Ribeng zao de qiche.*
I have one Japan make REL car

(Eng. I have a car made in Japan.)

4. Chi: *Zhongguo zai kexue he jishu fangmian shi luohou*
China (prep) science and technology aspects behind

yu Meiguo de.
(prep) USA

(Eng: China is a country that is behind USA in science and technology.)

5. Chi: *Wo bu zhidao zai nali wo huibuhui gandao shufu, yinwei nali*
I not know (prep) there I whether feel comfortable because there

de renmen yidian bu xiang wo.
GEN people a little not be like me

(Eng: I wonder if I would be comfortable in a place where the people are not like me at all.)

6. Chi: *Muqin shiqi shui jiu chujia le, ke dui jiaxiang de shenghuo*
mother 17 year-old tense married tense but about home town GEN life

renran shifeng shuxi.
still very be familiar with

(Eng: Mother who was married at seventeen were still familiar with the life in her home town.)

CONTEXTUAL THINKING ABOUT TEACHING: SPECIAL EDUCATORS' METAPHORICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE

Mark P. Mostert

This study used qualitative within case and cross-case analysis to document how experienced special education teachers used metaphors to describe their practical knowledge of teaching and how those representations compared to similar representations among regular teachers. Comparison of the study findings to previous research with general education teachers revealed that there were several similarities and notable differences between the teaching assumptions of regular and special educators in their descriptions of practical knowledge.

INTRODUCTION

While general teacher education has continued to address what teachers know and how they acquire their practical knowledge (e.g., Clark & Peterson, 1986), similar work in special teacher education is generally unavailable. The absence of such research is intriguing given a commonly held belief among practitioners that regular education and special education teachers appear to possess different teaching skills which may indicate different bases of practical classroom knowledge. Differences between regular and special educators, however, appear to be intuitive rather than empirical although some researchers are beginning to examine the relationship between special and regular educators, particularly to address whether there are any skills possessed by one group but not by the other (e.g., Seidenberg & Koenigsberg, 1990).

Experienced teachers possess complex representations of professional knowledge through their experiences with students over time and often employ metaphors to describe these constructs. Research examining the metaphors that experienced regular education teachers use to describe what they do has proved viable and fruitful (Carter, 1990a; Russell, 1988). However, there are no studies in the literature documenting the metaphors of special educators or comparing their metaphors to those of regular educators. There is little evidence, therefore, to indicate whether regular and special educators hold similar views about teaching or how they describe their practical teaching knowledge. Such investigations have important implications for both regular and special education because of the renewed interest in teacher education reform in general education teacher preparation, the influence of general education reform debates on special education reform rhetoric, the lack of attention to special educators' practical knowledge, and the intuitive belief that regular and special education teachers possess, at least partially, different teaching skills and bases of practical classroom knowledge.

The purpose of this study was to describe how special education teachers explained and viewed their teaching through their metaphorical language. The study was embedded in two general questions: (1) How do special education teachers use metaphor to describe their practical knowledge of teaching? and (2) How do special education teachers' metaphorical descriptions of their practical knowledge compare to similar representations among regular education teachers? The study generated several outcomes, including empirical evidence of a previously unresearched area of teacher thinking, documentation of special educators' metaphors of practical classroom knowledge, support for higher-order conceptualizations of teachers' frames of teaching, refinement of Munby's (1987) orientational and ontological categories of metaphorical representation, and a comparison of special educators' metaphorical patterns to those of regular educators.

Review of the Literature

This study built on two primary areas of theory and research: One focused on the function of metaphor in language use; the other on the cognitions of teachers. These two areas intersect in the study of teachers' use of metaphor to describe their classroom practice as a way of understanding their practical knowledge.

Recent Views on Metaphor. Recently, several authors have argued for the study of metaphor as a means of investigating cognition and learning (e.g., Ortony, 1975) and as a legitimate endeavor outside of philosophy (e.g., Ortony, 1980). This research continues in the work of Johnson (1981, 1987), Lakoff (1987), Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Schon (1983, 1987), and Taylor (1984). Interest in metaphor in research on teaching and teacher education has also increased in the last decade (e.g., Morine-Dershimer, 1983; Munby, 1986, 1987, 1990; Russell, 1988).

Research on Teachers' Knowledge and Implicit Beliefs. Concurrent with more qualitative and interpretative methods of studying teaching, there has been a move in the social sciences to study cognition. In education, early studies reflecting this change include work by Jackson (1968), Kounin (1970), and Smith and Geoffrey (1968) which stimulated research on teachers' implicit understandings of their work (Carter, 1990a) and provided the foundation for study of the knowledge base for teaching from teachers' points of view (Cochran-Smith & Lytle 1990; Elbaz, 1988). Other early studies emphasizing what teachers know and the puzzle of how they acquire their knowledge of teaching (e.g., Bussis, Chittenden, & Amarel, 1976; Janesick, 1977) eventually led to a focus on teachers' practical knowledge (e.g., Connelly & Clandinin, 1990; Elbaz, 1983; Lampert, 1985), and, pertinent to this study, an investigation of metaphor as a way of accessing teachers' practical knowledge (Carter 1990b; Munby, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1990; Munby & Russell, 1989, 1990; Munby & Spafford, 1987; Russell, 1988; Russell & Munby, 1991; Russell, Munby, Spafford & Johnson, 1988; Tobin, 1990).

The Study of Metaphor as an Aspect of Practical Knowledge. Recently, scholars such as Johnson, (1987), Lakoff, (1987), Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Ortony, (1975, 1980), Reddy (1979), Ricoeur (1977), and Schon (1980, 1983, 1987, 1991) have encouraged the view that the study of metaphor has utility beyond literary or linguistic functions. In education, other researchers have acknowledged metaphor as a useful heuristic to generate understanding (e.g., Marshall, 1990) including the notion that teachers' use of metaphor can reveal much about their practical knowledge.

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The extant literature describing teachers' use of metaphor to describe practical knowledge, has, however, been confined to general education, including several studies germane to this investigation, namely, Olson (1981), Morine-Dershimer (1983), Russell (1988), Provenzo, McKloskey, Kottkamp, and Cohn, (1989), Carter (1990b), Munby, (1990) and, most importantly, the findings of Munby (1987), which formed the analytical framework for the results reported here.

Olson (1981) based his study on the premise that teachers translate research into practice using a practical language derived from their need to influence and control classroom teaching events, concluding, in part, that much of what teachers know is intuitive and hidden behind a rhetoric of professional language. In addition, he suggested that researchers learn the language of teachers to advance the translation of theoretical innovations into practice.

Morine-Dershimer (1983) utilized three separate data collection methods on teacher thinking (stimulated recall interviews, Kelly Repertory Grid interviews, ethnographic descriptions of classroom lessons) to demonstrate the validity of research findings by triangulation. An unexpected result of her investigation revealed the rich imagery, themes, and metaphorical content of the participating teachers' language during the stimulated recall interviews which she used to construct composite descriptions of their thinking.

Russell (1988) investigated the metaphorical language used by teachers to describe the tension between theory and practice. He concluded that the teachers he studied felt that (a) what they learned at university was much less important than the need to accumulate classroom experience, which, in turn, was highly personal, (b) accumulating classroom experience was the only way to establish teaching behaviors and routines, and (c) experience might also give meaning to what was previously known to the teacher as "theory." In addition, Russell found that, for teachers, learning theory and practice appeared to be a single, reciprocally reinforcing process.

Provenzo, McKloskey, Kottkamp, and Cohn (1989) contended that metaphor fulfills two functions in teacher education in that (a) they are a way for teachers to categorize and simplify the complicated world of teaching and (b) for the researcher, the metaphors teachers use provide the means for interpreting what it means to be a teacher in American society.

Munby (1990) applied the study of metaphor to examine teachers' practical knowledge of curriculum. He reported that teachers' metaphorical descriptions of curriculum was a useful way of examining curriculum-in-use as opposed to the more traditional notion of curriculum-in-theory.

Carter (1990b) described how student teachers and their supervising teachers understood their work by constructing cases of teaching and by studying metaphors and metaphorical language. Based on the study of these cases and interviews, Carter formulated several metaphorical functions related to teaching and reported that student teachers found the exercise useful for reflecting on their concepts of teaching.

These studies support the analytical framework posited by Munby (1987), and used in this investigation. Munby contended that the richness of metaphorical speech provided useful information about how teachers structure their thinking about their professional activity by comparing the metaphorical content of two teachers' descriptions of their work. He noted the general orientational character of some metaphors found in the data (metaphors denoting movement or action, e.g. lesson as moving object) as well as several categories of ontological metaphor (metaphors attaching physical qualities to inherently abstract phenomena): time, grades, attention, lesson/class/ period, assignment/work, information/ideas, mind/ learning, and behavior/management.

These studies in general education reveal two important methodological features, namely, (a) the procedures and purposes for eliciting teachers' metaphors (natural use, cued use, and use in intervention for change) as well as (b) participants' levels of teaching experience (novice, experienced, preservice, and multiple-group studies). I discuss this literature elsewhere (Mostert, 1992). This literature, however, reveals no evidence of investigation of the use of metaphor by special education teachers through differential elicitation nor at different experiential levels. Hence, there is no evidence of comparison between the thinking of regular and special education teachers. Following the precedents established by the research with general education teachers, I investigated the use of metaphor by experienced special education teachers to describe their thinking about teaching.

TECHNICAL METHOD

The conceptual framework of the study was influenced by the prior empirical and descriptive studies above, especially the work of Munby and his associates who have directed their research toward how teachers use metaphor and image to describe their professional practice and decision-making. The study of teacher thinking through metaphor is based on the assumptions that (a) the metaphors teachers use when they talk about their work represent, at least in part, how they construct their professional realities (Bullough, 1991; Carter, 1990b; Munby, 1990; Tobin, 1990) and (b) the metaphors teachers select are relatively stable over time (Carter, 1990b; Tobin, 1990).

These assumptions have made investigators increasingly aware of the need to study teacher thinking in terms of the teachers' own language because it is insufficient to assume that teachers and investigators share the same perceptions about what teaching is or how teacher thinking is described (Munby, 1982; Olson, 1981; Roberts, 1984). Investigators, therefore, must (a) establish investigative conditions conducive to eliciting teacher talk, (b) learn the teachers' language of practice in order to communicate with in "classroom research," (c) translate helpful research ideas into the language of practice, and (d) allow teachers, through teacher/investigator dialogue, to build and extend their experiential base as a way of developing a more powerful language of practice (Olson, 1981; Yinger, 1987).

Obtaining information about a teachers' thinking via what they say, however, is difficult but can be mitigated by attending carefully to teachers' linguistic descriptions of their work. The closer the researcher remains to the language of the teacher, the more likely the findings are to be faithful to teacher perceptions. The investigator, therefore, allows interpretation of the data to emerge from the language teachers select (Munby, 1990). Several investigative options have been proposed, including the Kelly Repertory Grid (Fransella & Bannister, 1977; Kelly, 1955; Munby 1984), discourse analysis (Cazden, 1986) and stimulated recall interviewing (Calderhead, 1981; Conners 1978).

Design

The study design was framed by the two research questions addressed through naturalistic inquiry, that is, inquiry in which (a) the natural setting is the direct source of data and the investigator is the key instrument, (b) reported findings are descriptive, (c) process is emphasized over outcomes or products, (d) investigators tend to analyze their data inductively, and (e) particularistic meaning is of essential concern (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992). Thus, naturalistic inquiry emphasizes understanding, explanation of the particular, and detailed description of complex phenomena (Bronfenbrenner, 1976; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

Participants. I selected five special education teachers because of their teaching experience (at least five years), their area of expertise (educating children with mild disabilities), their technical status (state certification to teach special education), and their willingness to talk about their teaching. Four of the five teachers were female, one male. Paul and Marlene were high school teachers of students with emotional problems, Penny and Judy taught lower elementary students with learning problems, and Kim taught junior high school students with learning problems.

Data Collection and Recording. The data set consisted of videotaping two lessons in each classroom, conducting stimulated recall interviews on the videotaped lessons, and conducting follow-up interviews when necessary. Generally, stimulated recall interviews involve eliciting teacher reports of their thinking through a two step process of (a) videotaping teaching behavior and (b) interviewing the teacher a short while later using the videotape to aid the teachers' recall of the thought process at the time of the teaching behavior (Calderhead, 1981, 1988; Shavelson, Webb, & Burstein, 1986). Some researchers see this technique as more viable than either systematic observation (where description tends to be restricted) or participant observation (which tends to limit researcher insights). I selected stimulated recall interviews as the method of data collection because (a) it was consistent with, and effective in collecting data in similar studies with general educators, (b) there is support in the literature for it's efficacy (e.g. Calderhead, 1988; Gaier, 1954), and (c) many constraints of stimulated recall interviewing (e.g., the structure of the interview influencing any elicited responses; the appearance of many extraneous, distracting comments, etc.) can be minimized by ensuring that the participants see themselves as co-investigators rather than the more traditional role of researcher and subject. To this end, the teachers collaborated throughout the study by reading successive analytical drafts and provided feedback and correction where necessary so that the analysis would remain true to their descriptions of practical teaching knowledge.

Each teacher participated in two videotaped lessons: A lesson that they felt most confident about teaching and a lesson they felt less confident about teaching. They were asked to distinguish between these two lessons on such factors as their confidence in using instructional techniques effectively, their ability to handle student learning or behavior problems, their perceptions of levels of student ability, and their motivation for teaching each particular lesson. The contrast between the two lessons allowed for a wider range of teacher response. The videotapes of these lessons focused on the teachers' actions and teaching activity with individual students or the class.

Data Analysis Procedures. The transcribed stimulated recall interviews were content-analyzed by the constant comparative method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) first within each individual case to uncover with-in case contrasts, and then in a cross-case analysis to reveal any patterns across the data. I began the analysis by content-analyzing the transcripts of one teacher through several phases, each time refining entries into Munby's (1987) suggested categories, and by engaging in the constant comparison of what I found in one category or with one teacher with other metaphors across the data set. Metaphors that appeared to be unrelated to Munby's categories or which seemed to be of questionable value were listed separately. I then deleted from Munby's categories metaphors which appeared to be weak or isolated. I classified the remaining metaphors as either orientational (metaphors denoting movement or action) or ontological (metaphors attaching physical qualities to inherently abstract phenomena) and entered them into a matrix. I evaluated the remaining unclassified metaphors for their potential representativeness of a category not previously noted by Munby (1987). Finally, I compiled a list of assumptions about teaching reflected in each teachers' language of practice. I repeated this procedure with the second teacher's transcripts and with the remaining three teachers, refining the results by constant comparison within and across the transcripts and teachers.

Evaluation of the Design. I evaluated the appropriateness of the methodology in three ways. First, I applied Bronfenbrenner's (1976) criteria for ecological legitimacy for studying the microsystem, the core layer of his formulation. In this study, the microsystem was described through the metaphors or metaphorical language special education teachers used to describe their activities and roles. The design met all of Bronfenbrenner's propositions for ecological legitimacy at the level of the microsystem. Second, I applied Lincoln and Guba's (1985) four tenets of trustworthiness for qualitative studies (credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability). The design met all four tenets as described by Lincoln and Guba (1985). Third, I conducted the study according to accepted ethical principles (American Psychological Association, 1989) to ensure confidentiality and to build trust with the participants.

RESULTS

General Impressions. Overall, the cases revealed that Penny and Judy, both lower elementary teachers, were more concerned with academic learning than the behavior of their students. They emphasized the importance of teaching the curriculum and explained elaborate ways of accomplishing this goal, consistent with their highly structured classes. Paul and Marlene, both high school teachers, were generally far more concerned with the inappropriate behavior of their students and how to teach appropriate social skills. Kim seemed to divide her professional insights equally between the academic and behavioral need of her students. Being a junior high school teacher, she still saw some hope of providing basic academic skills but she was acutely aware that by the time students reached her, their disturbed behavior was beginning to cause major social and interpersonal problems.

All five teachers made extensive use of orientational metaphors for both academic and social learning interactions, although, individually, they tended to emphasize some aspects more than others. Metaphorical phrases common across several teachers did not always convey the same meaning. Equally pervasive was their use of ontological metaphors. The most commonly mentioned aspects of teaching were Munby's (1987) ontological categories of behavior and information, followed, in descending order, by strategy, ideas, attention, time, and assignment of schoolwork. There were very few ontological references to Munby's (1987) categories of work or lesson/class/grade. Furthermore, different metaphorical categories appeared to be important to different teachers. The teachers also alluded to a variety of ontological subcategories.

In addition to these general characteristics, a new ontological category, strategy, emerged. This category involved descriptions of cognitive teaching processes resulting in specific interactive plans to increase students' learning and socialization characterized by a rich mixture of ontological and orientational metaphors. Strategy was further characterized by an inherent flexibility closely related to the social construction of the actual, unpredictable teaching event between teacher and student.

General Character of Orientational Metaphor. The orientational metaphors used in the teachers' language of practice reflected their diverse personal views of what they did in the classroom. There were many instances where they used identical movement metaphors to describe identical concepts while at other times they used similar orientational metaphors to describe vastly different notions of teaching. I discuss the general character of orientational metaphor by elaborating on illustrative examples around the use of (a) an example of two of the orientational terms of "going," namely, "going over," and "going back," (b) the emergence of orientational metaphors with strong physical features, and (c) the teachers' orientational descriptions of their teaching relationship with students.

"Going." "Going over" was mentioned by three of the five teachers. For Penny, "going over" was an activity whereby old, familiar work was reviewed as a precursor to new, unfamiliar work. Penny observed: "We went over the exercises that she had already done...reading a little bit with her, going over it..."

Judy had a similar sense to Penny when she said "the students needed to "...read part of the paragraph over again...." She also alluded to this notion of old, familiar work review when she said "[I am concerned that] I didn't go over it like I should have today at the beginning of the lesson..." Judy added another dimension to the concept of "going over," though, when she communicated "going over" in the sense of review of familiar, but as yet unrecognized work where students "...go over things that [were not recognized]..."

The movement metaphor of "going over" seemed to have a quite different and more diverse sense for Kim. She used "go over" as a way of explaining the movement of information in relation to her students when she reported that "[if] I just stood up there at the front and said 'On Wednesday, and Friday, blah, blah...' it would just go right over them." In another sense, she used this movement metaphor to connote a view of overcoming an obstacle when she explained that "He thinks that he can be obnoxious to them and they'll just get over it."

"Going over," then, connoted movement related to a current problem (review of old work both recognized and unrecognized); a lack of understanding; and surmounting an interpersonal problem. "Going over" also provided a rich tacit framework which described student learning. On the one hand, "going over" implied "staying on top" of a problem. On the other hand, learning could be "missed" if it went too far above the students' heads.

Three of the five teachers, Penny, Judy, and Paul, talked about "going back." Penny talked of "going back" to connote a sense of returning from the forward momentum of the lesson. She said:

> She [Jessica, the student] wanted to go on. She started and I said 'Jessica,' bringing her back. So I just brought her back by calling her name...she wanted to go on and I wouldn't allow that. I said, 'Let's go back to this.'

Penny also said that Jessica "goes back" on her own when the movement of the lesson paused at the end of an exercise. She explained that "If I say 'do it at the end,' she would forget to go back, and I would probably forget to go back and tell her." Penny then extended this notion of "going back" to her other students while still maintaining this particular sense of the movement metaphor: "...starting and stopping [for other students] I cannot do...they'll want to stop completely or they don't want to go back to it."

Penny used "back" in another sense when she talked of reminding a student to return to the work at hand. In this case "back" was related to reverting to work rather than to a forward movement of the lesson: "So rather than say, 'Colleen, get back to work' all I do is reach over and pat her." In another example, Penny said: "So then I took advantage of her having that experience, brought her right back into what Tom was telling me..."

Judy first used "going back" similarly to Penny when she described how forward movement through the lesson could be discontinued. She said: "I'm going back to it after every [other, recognized] sound. I go back to one [recognized] sound, then I go back to that [unrecognized] one..." She also used "going back" to explain how "back" could potentially restore forward motion of the lesson: "I think I went back and had them read part of the paragraph [because] they just didn't answer it. They were confused and so we needed to go back." Then she used "back" to indicate a reversal of progress through the lesson when she said "they still don't have counting backwards and forwards. I had to back up."

Paul's ideas presented several other aspects of "going back." In one instance he used the orientational metaphor to describe movement away from the special education class towards the mainstream when he said "...it's our goal to get them back out there." In another way, though, Paul echoed Judy's understanding when he talked of reversing his progress through the lesson to relocate to a place he had already passed as he moved through the lesson. He explained: "You've got to back up and go, 'How do I respond to this kind of situation?'" He also mentioned this notion later when he said: "When you step back from what you're doing, it's easy to see that [the explanation might have been less than clear]."

"Going back" generally seemed to mean more than a mere reversal of forward movement, although that sense was clear in examples which described a backtracking maneuver by the teacher or the learner to review or reinforce learning. "Going back" was also given a connotation of returning to work left previously and as a "promotion" to the mainstream. The antithetical tension was clearest, however, in the use of "going back" as a means for guaranteeing going forward through the lesson.

Physical Movement. All five teachers used powerful orientational metaphors of physical action to describe academic and social teaching interactions. I describe two representative examples.

Kim provided perhaps the most complete set of orientational physical metaphors to describe her management techniques. Her first reference indicated a vigorous movement metaphor: "I guess I'm really strict with them, and I jumped all over them in the beginning [of the year]." She went on to say: "So then I thought, well, I'll just work with him in a minute, give him something to do to keep him busy here for the next few seconds, and get the others started then jump on him." In one sense, "jump" alluded to Penny's connotation of a sudden movement for controlling student behavior. In another sense, Kim used "jump" to describe focusing academic help on a student, adding a less forceful physical movement figure in the form of "nudge:"

> Now, one of the children in particular has very poor eye contact, so I don't jump on him, but I watch his eyes for that glazed-over look which is a frequent happening, and I'll nudge him.

Apparently, a third, middle-ground solution, not as spirited as "jumping" and more forceful than "nudging," was also available: "It's really hard to lean on him and say, 'Do better.'" In addition, Kim referred to an even more aggressive physical image when she described a strategy she often used to discuss behavioral problems with her students: "There's lots of days when I kick out my lesson when they come in with something that they want to talk about."

Paul, like Kim, alluded to forceful orientational physical images to explain behavior management techniques. He also distinguished between less and more forceful images of the same metaphor. Initially, he talked of redirecting wandering student conversation by explaining: "I'll cut it off and try to bring it back in." This sense was given more power when Pete talked of stopping students' bragging about how they consume alcohol when he said: "As soon as they talk about that kind of stuff I'll cut the conversation off, dead."

Metaphorical references to physical movement appeared to possess a number of inherent qualities: (a) they required teacher effort, (b) they all indicated a metaphorical use of physical teacher strength directed at the students and the curriculum, (c) specific physical movement metaphors were more effective in some teaching situations than in others, (d) they were used to describe both academic and social teaching interactions, and (e) they had different levels of intensity for different levels of teaching or management. Physical movement metaphors, therefore, supported a conceptual teacher assumption of teacher-directed academic and social instruction.

The Interactive Teacher-Student Relationship. All the teachers characterized their teaching with underlying assumptions about the distance between themselves and the students as they moved through the lesson. While there appeared to be a generally consistent sense of distance, all 5 teachers expressed other notions of distance dictated by the teaching task. For example, while Penny appeared to move through the lesson and learning in tandem with her students--a clear notion of "we," she also made passing references to other notions of distance for specific teaching purposes (see #4 under Strategy, below). Paul, on the other hand, let his students dictate the direction of the lesson. His view was one of "them and me." He was convinced that learning was more meaningful to his students if he could incorporate their views, comments, and adolescent subculture in the lesson content. Marlene combined some of these concepts when she (a) accompanied her students ("we"), (b) in other instances, followed her students as they moved through the lesson ("them") and (c) separated from her students at certain points, allowing them to move forward alone.

Kim and Judy, however, provided the most striking illustration of a different notion of distance. They saw themselves as dictating the pace of the lesson as they moved ahead of their students. The students then followed along while Judy and Kim adjusted the pace accordingly. Their comments rarely included references to "we," or "us" (as teachers with students) but were characterized instead by a sense of "me" or "us" (as teacher/s) and "them" (as students). For example, and in contrast to the "we" used by Penny, Judy observed that "what's happened is they've gotten stuck." In other places Penny provided evidence of a divide between herself and the students she taught when she recounted that "they miss that one sound," "they missed some of the words," "Colin missed this yesterday," and "they're going to continue to miss them." Judy alluded to this sense again when she combined her senses of "me" and "them" y saying: "The whole lesson kind of blends in to my deciding they need more drill in something."

Kim had similar perceptions of the gap between "me" and "them." She said: "I don't like to say, 'Look at me,' but I always explain to them 'that's how I know you're listening.' I always explain that to them." The distinction was even more pronounced when she alluded to "we" as being herself in a collective group with other teachers:

> I want them to see, because I really don't believe that they fully understand that we're gearing them up for the rest of their life, we're not just here to keep them off the streets. We're not just here to babysit them. I don't really believe that they understand that. So, I like them to see that they need to do this and this and this in order to get what they want in the end.

Both Kim and Judy described how they led by setting the pace of movement through their lessons while the students followed on in an attempt to keep up with the lesson tempo. Kim said: "That's me checking to see whether they're following at all" Judy echoed this sense when she said "I'm just trying to catch some of them up and move them out [to a different ability] group," and "I caught him up and put him in that group."

Judy and Kim's professional language was couched in terms of moving, stopping and starting, all indications of not having the students "with" them. Judy said "they still don't have counting backwards and forwards. I had to back up."

Kim echoed Judy's idea of a separation between teacher and students when she said:

> Something that I've learned with this group again with the speaking slow and everything,...I gave up a long time ago trying to give them more than one direction at a time. When it's one direction at a time and I wait...things run more smoothly...[I try] to see how they are progressing, whether they look confused. I always try to rate whether I'm going too fast or too slow. They won't tell me, some of them, but they will get very upset if I'm going too fast.

In this example, the control of the lesson was obviously with the teacher. There was little in the language of practice to convey a sense of collaboration or partnership, an aspect which was clear with some of the other teachers. Adjustment of movement through the lesson was based on the position of the learner in relation to where the teacher was--unlike Paul, who adjusted the locus of his teaching based on where his students were. For example, the learner might be "behind" and need to "catch up." For Judy and Kim, the teacher navigated movement through the lesson, and the learner followed.

General Character of Ontological Metaphor. Munby's (1987) ontological categories of metaphor were prominently represented in the language of the special education teachers. All 5 teachers mentioned attention, assessment, behavior, information, and time. In addition, my analysis uncovered a new category, strategy, mentioned by all 5 teachers. 4 teachers mentioned mind, ideas, management, and learning. 3 teachers mentioned grades. Other teaching aspects appeared less often and were deleted from the analysis. Table 1 summarizes how different teachers emphasized different ontological metaphors as being important and central to their teaching.

Strategy. All five teachers recounted articulate cognitive plans of instruction and management that they constructed prior to teaching. They described detailed strategies of how they were going to deal with specific events in terms of their cognitive preparation, rehearsal, execution, and adjustment for future similar situations, often mixing orientational and ontological metaphors to communicate the meaning of their maneuvers. The metaphorical descriptions of practical knowledge articulated in this category emphasize two essential points. First, all 5 teachers understood that their teaching and work in the classroom was a **process** which proceeded through a series of well defined and sequential steps from preparation, through execution, to adjustment for future teaching events. Second, and more important in terms of their practical knowledge, the teachers were acutely aware that this process had to be flexible given that the actual teaching event was reciprocally constructed through social interaction between themselves and their students.

I discuss a detailed example of strategy as a teaching process from Penny's language of practice where she described her thinking about planning and executing a student learning task. Penny's strategy involved introducing an extension activity into a routine reading lesson with Jessica, a second grade student. Her plan revealed an intricate series of decisions and phases culminating in the assignment of the activity during the reading lesson.

Table 1: Frequency of Ontological Categories by Teacher

	Penny Raw/%	Judy Raw/%	Kim Raw/%	Paul Raw/%	Marlene Raw/%
1	Strategy 131/24.3%	Strategy 56/25.46%	Behavior 79/19.66%	Strategy 117/28.2%	Information 79/26
2	Assignment 98/18.18%	Attention 44/20%	Information 70/17.41%	Behavior 90/21.67%	Behavior 78/25.67
3	Attention 77/14.29%	Learning 41/18.64%	Management 60/16.42%	Information 60/14.5%	Strategy 50/16.5
4	Information 47/14.1%	Behavior 31/14.1%	Attention 44/10.9%	Management 49/11.8%	Time 30/9.87
5	Ideas 61/11.31%	Management, Time 13/5.1%	Assignment 29/7.21%	Ideas 31/7.47%	Attention 20/6.58
6	Behavior 47/8.72%	Information 10/4.55%	Learning, Strategy 29/7.21%	Learning 23/5.54%	Ideas 19/6.25
7	Mind 18/3.34%	Assignment, Mind 9/4.1%	Mind 27/6.72%	Attention 21/5.06%	Learning 10/3.29
8	Time 19/3.53%	Ideas 2/0.1%	Time 22/5.48%	Assignment 20/4.82%	Management 8/2.63
9	Grades 12/2.23%		Grades 7/1.74%	Time 4/0.96%	Assignment, Mind 4/1.32
Total	539	220	402	415	304

Note: > or < than 100% due to rounding.

First, before the project was devised, Penny possessed a preparatory knowledge base about Jessica and the curriculum content she would teach. She explained that Jessica had:

> ...been with me a long time and I know Jessica's come such a long way...She's grown to rely on me over the years. When you have a student for a long time, they kind of know you. That's just the type of student she is."

Penny also explained a little about her knowledge of the curriculum:

> Well, she was doing something outside of the basal. I hate using basal books with kids, especially LD kids. We read a story about Beatrix Potter in the basal so the skills were there. I have extended the lesson by having her come to the library, choose a book that Beatrix Potter wrote [and] read the book.

This knowledge about Jessica and the curriculum provided a crucial background in designing the learning task and the strategy to deliver it successfully.

Second, Penny revealed that she prepared the activity ahead of time based on her knowledge of Jessica and the curriculum. She said: "The project that I have decided for Jessica I had already in my head, I knew [before the lesson] I was going to do this..." Her preparation of the project involved several elements:

(1) A decision of what the activity would entail: "I feel good because I think it's an extension of not just learning about Beatrix Potter, but trying to see what it's like to be an author and trying to draw and do some fun things with books."

(2) Planning how to implement the project. Penny divided the implementation of the activity into two parts. First, Jessica was prepared ("I'm really going to set her up [with this activity]" and second, the activity was presented ("I am going to lay on [the activity] in a minute").

(3) Penny predicted an outcome of the activity: "I'm going to make a book and probably laminate it for her..."

(4) She tailored the activity to Jessica's needs and, in an acute example of the reciprocal, socially constructed flexibility of her teaching strategy, she modifies the process from her usual teaching distance of "we" to "her" (Jessica): "She loves [doing projects]" and "I give her choices. Especially with things that really don't make a difference, but make her feel like maybe she's got a little more control over what's going on because so much of her life is kind of out of control."

Third, once Penny had formulated the activity and planned how it would be delivered, she retained her strategy "in her head" and carried it with her to the lesson: "I myself know in my head what I'm going to do with it."

Fourth, during the lesson, Penny had an acute sense of timing for introducing the activity. As she sensed this time approaching, she began steering the lesson and Jessica towards the introduction of the activity, all the while remembering to meet Jessica's needs for control, Jessica's ability to make simple decisions, and Jessica's enjoyment of surprises. Penny accomplished this by asking Jessica to find her favorite part of the story. All that Jessica knew was that she must find her favorite part of the story--she had no idea that this instruction from Penny was leading to something much more complicated. Penny, however, had a distinct knowledge of where this would lead: "She has no idea [about the activity]. Right now she just knows she's going to find her favorite part." Subtly, at the very time she wished it, Penny had introduced the activity. She recalled:

> [Telling Jessica all the steps of the project at once] would be too confusing for her. Too much information at once. One step at a time. Find your favorite part. Let's read it. Then I'm going to spring on her, 'Guess what, you are going to rewrite your favorite part and make it even more funny.'

Penny's description revealed one of the ways she utilized her cognitive processes to present a learning task. Her complicated strategy, richly layered in metaphors of professional language took into account a host of learner needs and curriculum characteristics.

The general sense of strategy which was so clear in Penny's example also appeared in the other teachers' descriptions of their teaching. Strategies were characterized by a conscious effort to plan, implement, and evaluate academic and social teaching interactions. Strategies were apparently not meant for general, across-the-board implementation, but appeared to be devised either for individual students or small groups. Because they were tailored so closely to individual or small group learning needs, their generic application was inappropriate.

Ontological Subcategories. In conducting the within-case analyses, some categories were mentioned more than others (See Table 1, above):

(1) 6 Categories (information, behavior, attention, time, assignment, strategy) were mentioned by all 5 teachers in one or more subcategories.

(2) 4 Other categories (mind, ideas, learning, management) were mentioned by 4 of the 5 teachers.

(3) 1 Category (grade/class/level) appeared negligibly, and was deleted from further analysis.

(4) 1 category (work) did not appear in the teachers' ontological references.

As the analysis progressed, it became possible to classify ontological references into subcategories. The frequency of ontological references across subcategories varied widely with no discernible pattern. I reduced the scope of further analysis by examining which of these subcategories within each category appeared across at least two teachers (see Table 2). Similar subcategories emerged for the rest of Munby's (1987) categories (except for lesson/class/grade) and strategy. Sample quotes for the subcategories appear in Table 3.

To illustrate these findings, I discuss the most complex subcategory, attention. Attention was ontologically referred to as missing object, as an embodiment of the whole student, as a manipulable object, and as an exchangeable value or commodity (see Table 4). References in attention subcategories revolved around tangible object qualities because the metaphors appeared to be attached to a physical sense of being able to "see" them.

Thus, attention-as-object can be "seen" in order to be manipulated, to pass among learners and to the teacher, and to describe the whole child. It must be "unseen" in order to be described as missing. The quality of exchange value, though, is a much more intangible metaphorical image indicating an unseen, but known, quality. The teachers' emphasis on attention reflects their knowledge of the importance of controlling inattention, a primary characteristic of students with mild learning handicaps. Gaining, keeping, and directing these students' attention, of course, is crucial for any type of understanding and learning.

Other results were visible from the analysis. Table 4 shows 10 common subcategories, used by at least two teachers across the 10 categories. The recurrence of subcategories across these 10 categories shows that the most common ontological appearances in the teachers' language of practice related to images of manipulation and commodity which appeared to share a number of common connotations. A brief discussion of these two chief subcategories will suffice to illustrate similar results uncovered in other subcategories.

Manipulation and commodity share a sense of describing "tangible" metaphorical objects that can be "seen" and therefore manipulated and handled. This rather "concrete" set of metaphorical references might indicate the teachers' perception of learning as grappling with the curriculum and the learners' acquisition of knowledge and skills. Furthermore, they might reinforce the pervasive concept of teacher-directed instruction so evident in the distance allusions of "us," "we," and "them." This argument can be supported further by the physical movement metaphors which all described teacher-initiated and controlled actions to direct and manage learning interactions.

Manipulation and commodity are also different because they connote contrasting senses of handling. Teaching manipulates the learner and learning for increased acquisition of knowledge and learning skills. Learning and lessons are malleable and have the potential to be changed and reshaped. Manipulation might also imply teaching skill and work necessary for reshaping. At least part of the teacher work and skill involved in manipulation implied that the learner and learning can be shaped for purposes other than that for which they were intended.

In another sense, manipulation also implied a sense of unfair influence exerted by the teacher on the learner with the intention of reaching a certain learning goal. Manipulation, which is mentioned across most of the categories, might also explain the pervasive willingness of the teachers to reshape and mold most aspects of their teaching to suit both individual and collective student needs for learning and behavior management. The utility of manipulation as a teaching assumption, then, appeared to lie in the possibility of change for effective learning.

Table 2: Pattern of Subcategories Across Categories by Teacher

Munby '87		Teachers				
Category, # subcats	Subcategory	Pen.	Judy	Kim	Paul	Mar.
Attention 5	Missing object	X	X	X		
	Whole student	X	X			
	Manipulation	X	X			X
	Exchange Value	X	X	X		
	Commodity		X		X	X
Information 4	Missing	X	X		X	
	Manipulation			X	X	
	Commodity	X	X		X	X
	Possession			X	X	
Time 3	Manipulation	X		X		X
	Exchange value		X		X	X
	Finite source	X		X		X
Behavior 3	Manipulation	X			X	X
	Commodity	X			X	
	Possession	X			X	
	Other		X	X		
Mind 3	Location	X		X		
	Container	X	X			
	Rates of Operation	X		X		
	Other				X	
Strategy 2	Manipulation	X			X	
	Commodity		X		X	
	Other					X
Assignment 2	Manipulation	X		X		
	Commodity			X		X
	Other		X		X	
Ideas 1	Container	X	X		X	
	Other			X		
Learning 1	Manipulation		X	X	X	
	Other					X
Management 1	Manipulation		X	X		
	Other	X				X

Table 3: Sample Quotes by Ontological Category and Subcategory

Category	Subcategory	Example
Attention	Manipulation of Object	"[One should] redirect kids' attention to the stimulus you're using."
	Object as Commodity	"...any attention is fine with him, so I try not to give him any."
	Missing Object	"Kent also pretty desperately seeks attention and approval, and so I wanted to let him know that he was doing something appropriate to seek attention."
	Exchange Val of Object	"That's me checking to see if they're paying attention."
	Describe Whole Object	"...they tend to wander."
Information	Manipulation of Object	"I'll ask them questions I think they can handle"
	Object as Commodity	"But the bottom line is that they need to get the information and learn it."
	Missing Object	"...they missed that one sound."
	Possession of Object	"...they want it for themselves sometimes..."
Time	Manipulation of Object	"...she doesn't usually take that much time..."
	Exchange Val of Object	"I'm spending half the time trying to get him to tell what it is that has him so disturbed..."
	Object as Fin Source	"We never have enough time for [instruction]"
Behavior	Manipulation of Object	"There's no letting her air out whatever she needs to air out..."
	Object as Commodity	"[Colleen] never gives me any problems behavior-wise"
	Possession of Object	"...they certainly have the behaviors which would qualify them for ED."
Mind	Object as/in Container	"Put[ing it right] in my own mind."
	Location of Object	"Jessica came to mind right away,"
	Rates of Op of Object	"I know sometimes she gets so confused and her mind is going so fast that what she writes isn't [correct]."
Strategy	Manipulation of Object	"I'm really going to set her up."
	Object as Commodity	"...sharing my personal stuff with them up to a certain point seems to break down some of the barriers and they seem more trusting..."
Assignment	Manipulation of Object	"[I liked that] she was willing to take this [work] on and rewrite part of the story."
	Object as Commodity	"So I try to give them some kind of assignment on Friday."
Ideas	Object as/in Container	"She has this thing in her head [that] she cannot succeed."
Learning	Manipulation of Object	"...the other kids pick up on it for some reason."
Management	Manipulation of Object	"I noticed I was standing by him a lot today because it's hard to keep him tuned in."

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Table 4: Common Categories Used by More Than One Teacher in Rank Order by Ontological Metaphor

Number of Subcategories per Category	5	4	3			2		1		
Ontological Subcategories	Munby's (1987) Categories									
	Att.	Info.	Time	Beh.	Mind	Strat	Ass	Manag	Learn	Ideas
Manipulation	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	
Commodity	X	X		X		X	X			
Missing	X	X								
Exchange Value	X		X							
Possession		X		X						
Container					X					X
Finite Source			X							
Location					X					
Rate of Operation					X					
Whole Person	X									

On the other hand, commodities were usually fixed and unchangeable. They were objects of known quantity and quality which could be passed among or between people. They might or might not have some form of attached value. Commodities were objects produced with a particular function in mind to suit particular purposes. As the purposes of exchange varied, so did the commodities used in transaction.

It is noteworthy that commodity metaphors often appeared in the same categories as metaphors of manipulation, perhaps indicating that these categories also possessed, at certain times, a fixed quality which could not be reshaped, but rather seemed to be fixed in space between the teacher and the learner. Attention, information, behavior, strategy, and assignment were objects which at times could be reshaped while at other times remained fixed and unmalleable. Equally important was the omission of commodity from the categories of time, management, and learning, indicating that these aspects of teaching were almost always reshaped where necessary.

Notably, the only two categories that did not allude to either manipulation or commodity were mind and ideas, the most abstract categories in the analysis. This might support the notion that in the teachers' language of practice manipulation and commodity were used to describe "seen" rather than "abstract" metaphorical images of teaching. The teachers, in utilizing the "seen," were therefore able to justify the importance of manipulation to reshape the learner.

Conceptual Assumptions Underlying Teaching

The teachers' language of practice revealed, through their use of metaphor, some cohesive sets of underlying assumptions about teaching, including four categories mentioned prominently by all five teachers: Effective teaching, learning, lesson pace, and students' ability to learn.

Effective Teaching. The teachers' practical language revealed that they viewed teaching as a dynamic undertaking requiring initiation, movement, and effort on their part, endeavors which produced a reciprocal student effort for learning. Effective teaching, therefore, grew out of mutual, goal directed effort. The teachers also made clear that in such effective teaching (a) the learner's potential for achievement was maximized, (b) actual learner achievement was supported, and (c) the ability of the learner had to be matched with an appropriate curriculum level.

Learning. Effective teaching appeared to be inextricably involved with student learning, and became plain in the teachers' agreement that the amount of student learning increased with a concomitant increase in time spent on teaching. Their observations also revealed that they viewed students' learning as grounded in previous and current knowledge: That (a) reviewing previously learned work was a way of assessing how much the learner had learned, and that (b) current work should be thoroughly learned before new work is introduced. They also extended the notion of learning to include a teaching strategy whereby learning occurred by making plain previously unknown information to the learner.

Pace of the Lesson. The participants' sense of pacing provided the third undergirding set of assumptions about teaching. All five teachers agreed that the objectives of the lesson were more effectively reached when there were no lesson interruptions, although they were equally clear that disrupting the pace of the lesson **was** permissible if the stoppage was for further instruction. To keep a balance between unnecessary stoppages and necessary stoppages for instruction, they all mentioned that the pace of the lesson was clearly enhanced by effective behavior management techniques.

Students' Ability. All five teachers made pointed comments about the ability of the students they 'taught. They reported that, for them as special educators, student learning was influenced by the learner's intellectual ability **and** the difficulty of the work. They further noted that, in terms of their students' learning that the ability to learn mediated the acquisition of knowledge and higher achievement levels. Ever mindful of their role in teaching the curriculum, they were also unanimous in their assumption that students' attainment of teaching goals was dependent on the students' ability to learn.

Special Educators' Metaphorical Language of Practice and the General Education Literature

Various aspects of this study support findings noted by other researchers in this area. For example, my findings support Olson's (1981) observations that teachers' metaphors are spontaneous and deeply embedded in their professional language. Furthermore, the special educators' use of metaphor revealed quite clearly their underlying assumptions about interactive practice in academic/behavioral teaching and learning domains. There was also evidence to support Olson's finding that teachers used differing images to suggest that they moved through the lesson with, ahead of, or behind their students. Olson's references to high and low influence teaching were also borne out among the special education teachers, whose descriptions of high influence teaching appear to be a hallmark of their practice. That is, they acted as "prime movers" who lectured, directed, and navigated--all ways of being firmly in control of the lesson.

Aspects of this research confirmed Morine-Dershimer's (1983) descriptions of the appearance of rich language of practice among regular educators as being present in the language of at least some special education teachers. Many metaphorical images appeared to be contextually connected within each teacher's thinking. In addition, several teaching themes appeared to span the thinking of all five teachers.

Among the special education teachers in this study, the movement figure previously described by Munby (1986) as a substantial component of orientational metaphor was substantiated. Furthermore, it was possible to discern some connections among the movement figures of all five teachers. In addition, figures of teaching similar to those described by Munby (1987) emerged through the uncovering of ontological metaphor. I found references to most of Munby's ontological categories and the appearance of a distinct ontological category, strategy, which did not appear in Munby's (1987) study. While I did not specifically address perceptions of curriculum, allusions similar to Munby's (1990) descriptions were apparent when the participants talked about the different individual learning goals of their students.

The special educators also appeared to use metaphors in a similar way to the teachers described by Provenzo, McCloskey, Kottkamp, and Cohn (1989). Their metaphorical language of practice identified their ability to categorize their thinking into several broad figures of teaching and showed that in some respects their categorization was different from that of regular educators (i.e., no lesson/class/grade and the appearance of the strategy category).

Some of Russell's (1988) findings also emerged in my analysis. For example, none of the special educators emphasized the importance of what they learned at university. Instead, their language was replete with references to their experiential learning over time in the classroom. Furthermore, the conceptual assumptions of practice revealed theoretical concepts of teaching in a personal and individual translation for classroom practice which substantiates the observations of Russell et al. (1988) because the metaphors used by the special educators clearly guided their practice.

Finally, all three aspects of metaphor mentioned by Carter (1990b) appeared in the special education teachers' language of practice in the present study. For example, the special education teachers used strong ontological metaphors which conveyed their affective involvement in aspects of behavior, attention, and strategy.

CONCLUSION

Munby's (1987) study provided a general framework for the findings reported here. My study of special educators' practical language supports and corroborates Munby's findings in that these teachers also showed an extensive, interrelated set of orientational and ontological metaphor in their language of practice. Several findings not only corroborated Munby's findings with general education teachers, but extended what was essentially a descriptive analytical framework. As with Munby's general education teachers, the special educators' language of practice revealed the rich complexity of the movement figure in conjunction with other orientational references. This study also allowed me to refine Munby's (1987) categories of ontological metaphor to show that, at least among these five participants, some ontological categories were used more extensively than others.

Several new findings emerged from the analysis. First, the overall sense of orientational references across the five teachers showed that they had distinct notions of their relationships with their students as they moved through the lesson. These relationships were expressed in terms of their metaphorical distance from and with their students as teaching and learning occurred, and also in the differential levels of ontological metaphor. Second, there were very few instances of Munby's ontological category of lesson/class/grade and no mention of his category of work. They did mention work, however, in an orientational sense. Third, the analysis revealed extensive evidence of ontological subcategories including the new category, strategy, which were differentially emphasized in the five teachers' language of practice. Fourth, a new ontological category, strategy, emerged from the analysis across all five teachers. This category appeared to have several features that precluded inclusion in any other category, and which contained an unusually strong mix of orientational and ontological metaphor describing a specific teaching strategy tailored to the individual learning

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characteristics and needs of the learner. An important corroboration of strategy as a previously uncovered category used to describe practical knowledge was found in similar metaphorical representations which appeared in other ontological categories as well. Fifth, the analysis revealed a set of underlying implicit teaching assumptions which are similar to theoretical aspects of what we consider to be good teaching (e.g. Rosenshine & Stevens, 1986). In summary, this study revealed several important similarities noted in the literature relating to general educators using a purposive sample of special education teachers. While the similarities are quite extensive, several clear differences also emerged and warrant further study of other subgroups of special educators (e.g., teachers of children with severe and profound disabilities).

Finally, while beyond the scope of this paper, the results reported here raise several issues for further work. First, the connection between what teachers know, how they know it, and the relationship between their beliefs and their teaching actions remains a potentially fruitful area of investigation. Second, the origins of teacher's beliefs, largely unconscious and implicit, merit even more attention than what is currently being provided. Third, the nature and influence of the **process** governing the translation of beliefs (whether overt or covert) into teaching actions, and the quite obvious dissonance their beliefs to actions display, generally remains uninvestigated.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research was supported by US Department of Education Grant HO23B10028 through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitation Services granted for the author's dissertation research.

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Pragmatics and Language Learning
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